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INTRODUCTION
Consider the case of Pamela Kotcher and Barbara Davis.' Both
women worked at the Oswego, New York branch store of the Rosa and
Sullivan Appliance Center-Kotcher as a salesperson, Davis as a clerk.
Their supervisor, store manager Herbert Trageser, sexually harassed
them with "continuous episodes of distasteful and abrasive comments
and gestures."2 Trageser regularly stood behind Kotcher and pre-
tended to masturbate and ejaculate onto her.3 He also suggested that
Kotcher exchange sex for sales4 and continuously made comments
about Davis's breasts and other parts of her body.5 The women re-
peatedly asked Trageser to stop and complained to other supervisors
at the store.6
1 See Kotcher v. Rosa & Sullivan Appliance Ctr., Inc., 53 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA)
1148 (N.D.N.Y. 1990), rev'd and remanded, 957 F.2d 59 (2d Cir. 1992), opinion on remand, 65
Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 1714 (N.D.N.Y. 1992).
2 53 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) at 1150.
3 Id.
4 Trageser told Kotcher that if he had "the same bodily 'equipment' as Kotcher, his
sales would be more substantial." Id.
5 Id.
6 957 F.2d at 63-64.
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Despite the complaints, nothing changed until Kotcher and Davis
contacted the company's main office in Rochester. The company
temporarily transferred and demoted Trageser.7 However, five
months later, after Davis quit and Kotcher was fired,8 the company
reinstated Trageser as manager of the Oswego store.9 Kotcher, who
was psychologically disabled by Trageser's harassment, engaged in
nine months of therapy before applying for another job.10
Kotcher and Davis brought an action for sexual harassment
against the company under Title VII of the 1964 Civil Rights Act."
Following a bench trial, the district court dismissed the action, hold-
ing that although both women had been sexually harassed, the imme-
diate temporary transfer and demotion of the harasser, combined
with the plaintiffs' failure to report the conduct to the main office in a
timely manner, immunized the company from liability.' 2
Only Kotcher chose to appeal, arguing that because Trageser was
an agent of the company, the district court should have ruled against
the company under the law of vicarious liability.' 3 The Second Circuit
rejected her argument, holding that liability would extend to the em-
ployer company only if it "provided no reasonable avenue for com-
plaint or knew of the harassment but did nothing about it." 14 If
instead the company responded properly when the main office re-
ceived Kotcher's complaint, it was not liable. 15
Or consider the case of Sally Klessens. 16 After beginning work as
a mail handler for the Postal Service, Klessens became the target of
sexual remarks made by male co-employees. In one instance, a co-
worker stated that if he didn't "get laid [he was] going to take hos-
tages."17 Another told her that she had "small tits"; a third, that she
7 Id. Notably, Trageser had been disciplined for sexual harassment on a separate
occasion; one year earlier, he had received a written reprimand for harassing another em-
ployee. Id. at 63.
8 The court's decision does not make clear the chronology; instead, this information
was provided by Faith Seidenberg, attorney for Kotcher and Davis. Telephone Interview
with Faith Seidenberg, Esq. (May 15, 1995).
9 957 F.2d at 62.
10 The court never explicitly adjudged Kotcher psychologically disabled by the inci-
dent; however, Kotcher recovered her counseling expenses and compensatory damages for
mental anguish. 65 Fair Emp. Prac. Gas. (BNA) at 1715.
11 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e to 2000e-17 (1988 & Supp. V 1993).
12 53 Fair EmpI. Prac. Cas. (BNA) at 1151.
13 957 F.2d at 63-64.
14 Id.
15 See id. at 64. The court then remanded the case for factual findings to determine
whether Trageser's transfer was a "sham" and whether Rosa and Sullivan discharged
Kotcher in retaliation for the complaint. Id. at 63-65.
16 Klessens v. United States Postal Serv., 66 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 1630 (lst Cir.
1994).
17 Id. at 1631.
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was a "nice piece of ass."' 8 When Klessens complained to her immedi-
ate supervisor, he joked with one of the harassers about "getting
laid."19 She then reported the activities to her supervisor's supervisor.
After informing Klessens that one of the harassers had a history of
sexual harassment, the second supervisor then explicitly described to
her one of the incidents: "[H] e wrote a letter to another female that
worked there, saying that he wanted to slip his tongue... up her ass
"20
When Klessens sued the Postal Service for sexual harassment, it
disclaimed responsibility for its employees' acts.2 ' The district court
agreed, holding that Klessens' initial complaints to management were
insufficient to put her employer on notice, and that the employer's
eventual transfer of the supervisor was sufficiently timely for the em-
ployer to avoid liability.22 The First Circuit affirmed.23
Or consider the case of Mary Steele and Barbara McCullough. 24
While employees of Offshore Shipbuilding, Inc. at its Palatka, Florida
repair facility, the women were supervised by Anthony Bucknole, the
company's corporate vice-president and general manager.25 As the
court of appeals explained: "Bucknole often engaged in sexually-ori-
entedjoking [sic] with employees. For example, Bucknole requested
sexual favors from Steele and McCullough. He commented on their
attire in a suggestive manner and asked them to visit him on the
couch in his office."26
Like Kotcher, Davis, and Klessens, the two women sued their em-
ployer for sexual harassment. And, as in Kotcher and Klessens, the trial
and appellate courts in Steele held that because the company repri-
manded Bucknole when Steele and McCullough complained to cor-
porate headquarters, the company was not liable for the harassment.
27
Many may find these decisions surprising. And well they should.
It is well established that sexual harassment constitutes unlawful sex
discrimination under Title VII. 28 A number of early cases, as well as
18 Id.
19 Id.
20 Id.
21 See id.
22 See id. at 1632-33.
23 Id.
24 Steele v. Offshore Shipbuilding, Inc., 867 F.2d 1311 (11th Cir. 1989).
25 Id. at 1313.
26 Id.
27 Id.
28 See, e.g., Meritor Say. Bank v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 66 (1986) ("[C]ourts have uni-
formly held, and we agree, that a plaintiff may establish a violation of Title VII by proving
that discrimination based on sex has created a hostile or abusive work environment."); see
also Harris v. Forklift Sys., Inc., 114 S. Ct. 367 (1993) (reaffirming the standard used in
Mefitor).
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the guidelines adopted by the Equal Employment Opportunity Com-
mission (EEOC) in 1980,29 imposed absolute vicarious liability on the
employer when an employee was harassed by a supervisor.30 Recent
cases, however, have limited strict employer liability to "quid pro quo"
harassment,3' in which a sexual demand is made a condition of em-
ployment. In "hostile work environment" cases, in which the inci-
dents of sexual harassment render the workplace sufficiently hostile
or offensive as to interfere with an employee's ability to perform her
work, employer liability is uncertain.3 2 Currently, a federal court
hearing a sexual harassment claim under Title VII will not likely hold
an employer vicariously liable for its employee's harassing acts in the
absence of a "quid pro quo" sexual demand. The court will hold the
employer company liable only if the company's own wrongful acts sat-
isfy the requirements of direct, rather than vicarious, liability.
This Article examines and criticizes the courts' failure to uni-
formly impose vicarious liability on employers in cases involving sex-
ual harassment by supervisors, and considers the confusing rules
applied by the federal courts and the EEOC when determining em-
ployer liability for sexual harassment. It then compares federal law to
the state law of California, which imposes absolute vicarious liability
on employers for all on-the-job sexual harassment by supervisors (the
"California Rule"). This Article concludes that the federal courts
should adopt the California Rule as the proper application of Title
VII. Should the courts fail to do so, Congress should amend Title VII
to require the California Rule.
29 The guidelines are found at 29 C.F.R. § 1604.11(c) (1995). The EEOC was created
by Title VII to investigate and prosecute alleged violations of the Act and to issue rules and
regulations for its enforcement. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e-5, 2000e-12 (1988 & Supp. V 1998).
30 See infra part DIIA Although sexual harassment actions may be brought by or
against either women or men, most sexual harassment actions are brought by women
against men. Therefore, I regularly use the words "she" and "her" when referring to the
plaintiff in a sexual harassment suit, and "he" and "his" when referring to the harasser. I
also use the neutral pronoun "it" when referring to the employer company.
31 See, e.g., Gary v. Long, 59 F.3d 1391 (D.C. Cir. 1995) (facts insufficient to constitute
"quid pro quo" harassment may support a claim of hostile environment harassment); Car-
rero v. New York City Hous. Auth., 890 F.2d 569 (2d Cir. 1989) (identifying quid pro quo
and hostile work environment harassment as the only cognizable sexual harassment claims
under Title VII).
32 The distinction between "quid pro quo" and "hostile work environment" harass-
ment was first discussed by Professor MacKinnon in her book Sexual Harassment of Working
Women. See CATHASUNE A. MACKINNON, SExuAL HARASSMENT OF WORKING WOMEN 32
(1979). The Court later utilized the distinction in Meritor Savings Bank v. Vinson, 477
U.S. 57 (1986). There is little controversy regarding the effect of "quid pro quo" harass-
ment by supervisors; in "quid pro quo" harassment cases, courts readily impose liability on
the employer without regard to the agency issues discussed herein.
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Part I discusses the common-law principles that govern employer
liability for employee torts.83 It then describes how those principles
apply to workplace sexual harassment. As explained in Part I, the
common law of agency imposes liability on employers for employees'
wrongful conduct applying four distinct theories. Three of these the-
ories impose vicarious liability; the fourth imposes direct liability.
The principal mechanism used to impose vicarious liability is the
doctrine of respondeat superior. The doctrine provides that even when
an employer has policies prohibiting its employees from engaging in
wrongful acts, the employer may nevertheless be legally responsible
for the conduct of its employees if the acts occur within the scope of
the employment.
A second theory of liability permits imposition of vicarious liabil-
ity when an employee engages in wrongful conduct outside the scope
of employment, if the employee took advantage of his position with
the employer to commit the act. A third theory of liability provides
that an employer may be vicariously liable because public policy pro-
hibits an employer from delegating to others its duty to protect its
employees from harm.
A fourth theory of liability holds that when an employee commits
wrongful acts for which an employer is not subject to vicarious liabil-
ity, the employer may nonetheless be held directly liable for the
wrongful acts. Direct liability is imposed when an employer itself acts
wrongfully-for example, when it is negligent or reckless in the selec-
tion and training of its supervisors, or its supervision of its workplace
or employees. The circuit courts have held that once an employer is
put on notice of harassment, it is required to take appropriate reme-
dial steps or face direct liability for its failure to act.
The concepts of agency, respondeat superior, and vicarious and di-
rect liability are ripe for confusion when applied to sexual harassment
law. Part of the problem derives from the breadth of agency law-
although it defines the responsibility of employers for employees'
torts, agency law also defines a set of duties governing commercial
relationships. Therefore, when applying agency law to sexual harass-
ment occurring in the workplace, caution must be exercised to apply
33 On the question of whether a violation of Title VII is a tort, see Price Waterhouse v.
Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228, 264 (1989) (O'Connor, J., concurring) (referring to Title VII as
creating an employment "tort"). See also Hirschfeld v. New Mexico Corrections Dep't, 916
F.2d 572 (10th Cir. 1990) (same); Baker v. Weyerhaeuser Co., 903 F.2d 1342 (10th Cir.
1990) (treating sexual harassment as a tort). See generally Cheryl Kause Zemelman, The
After-Acquired Evidence Defense to Employment Discrimination Claims: The Privatization of Title Vf
and the Contours of Social Responsibility, 46 STAN. L. REv. 175, 196-97 (1993) (discussing the
wide acceptance of Title VII violations as torts).
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only those rules of agency intended to govern employment and not
those intended to govern general commercial relationships. 34
Moreover, respondeat superior is usually applied in cases involving
employers' liability for torts committed against non-employees; use of
the doctrine in situations in which employees commit torts against
other employees is relatively infrequent. When applying the law of
agency to employers' liability for sexual harassment, then, it is impor-
tant to focus not only on the duties a master owes a stranger, but also
on the duties a master owes a servant. Furthermore, the phrases
"scope of authority" and "scope of employment" as used in the doc-
trine of respondeat superior have a broader meaning than their com-
mon-sense meaning might suggest. As a result, the courts' failure to
apply these concepts correctly in harassment cases causes considera-
ble confusion.
The array of federal court decisions addressing the relationship
between agency law and sexual harassment by supervisors reveals an
exasperating problem. Federal courts routinely misapply the law of
agency. The prevailing line of cases requires employees to prove not
only that the harassing supervisor was acting within the scope of his
employment (vicarious liability), but also that the employer was reck-
less or negligent in its supervision (direct liability). Under common-
law theories of agency, proof of either (not both) should be sufficient
to impose liability on the employer. Yet federal courts routinely and
erroneously require the plaintiff to prove both vicarious and direct
liability, and just as routinely and erroneously describe this standard
as a rule of common-law agency.
Part II describes the process by which the courts' erroneous anal-
ysis developed. It outlines the legal development of the right to be
free from improper harassment under Title VII, beginning with a se-
ries of racial, religious, and ethnic harassment cases brought in the
late 1960s and early 1970s.35 In a few of these early cases, a distinction
arose between harassment committed by nonsupervisor co-employees
and harassment committed by supervisors. In cases of co-employee
harassment, liability was imposed on the employer only when the em-
ployer was directly liable due to negligent or reckless conduct, or
34 In their hornbook on agency law Reuschlein and Gregory argue that the critical
issue in agency law is distinguishing principal/agent relationships from master/servant re-
lationships. The former is a contractual relationship in which "the principal will not incur
liability for torts committed by the agent." The latter is an employment relationship in
which "[t] he servant, qua servant, has no power to bind [the] master in contract." HAROLD
GiLL REUSCHLEIN & WILLIAM A. GREGORY, THE LAW OF AGENCY AND PARTNERSHIP §§ 48-50, at
101-02 (2d ed. 1990). Thus, where courts use contract principals of agency to analyze re-
spondeat superior liability, confusion reigns.
35 This Part, as well as the first section of Part III, draws on a portion of an earlier
article of mine, David B. Oppenheimer, Negligent Discrimination, 141 U. PA. L. REv. 899,
945-67 (1993).
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when the employer ratified the harassment after it occurred. In cases
of harassment by supervisors, the courts correctly applied the law of
agency to hold employers vicariously liable.
Beginning in the mid-to-late 1970s, courts applied the reasoning
in the racial, religious, and ethnic harassment cases, with considerable
controversy, to the problem of sexual harassment. When applying Ti-
tle VII to sexual harassment, the federal courts regularly faced the
defense that when one employee harassed another, the employer
should not be liable, regardless of the harasser's position, unless the
employer had authorized or ratified the harassment. The first appel-
late courts to consider the question-the Third, Ninth, and D.C. Cir-
cuits-imposed vicarious liability (sometimes termed "strict" liability
or "per se" liability), holding the employer liable for the acts of all of
its supervisory employees, regardless of whether the employer itself
was at fault.3 6 But in the early 1980s, the Eleventh and Fourth Circuits
rejected the application of vicarious liability, requiring proof of direct
liability on the part of the employer.3 7 Their test required the em-
ployee to prove that she complained to the employer about harass-
ment, or that the employer otherwise learned of the harassment, and
that the employer thereafter failed to take appropriate steps to pre-
vent its recurrence.38
Part III describes the Supreme Court's treatment of the problem.
In 1986 the Court addressed the question in Meitor Savings Bank v.
Vinson.39 In ill-considered dicta, the Court criticized the application
of vicarious liability in hostile work environment cases. Demonstrat-
ing the confusion over agency law that marks sexual harassment cases,
the Court simultaneously rejected basic theories of agency law while
explaining that "Congress wanted courts to look to agency principles
for guidance in this area."40 Had the Court actually endorsed the ap-
plication of agency law, it would have imposed vicarious liability in all
36 See, e.g., Miller v. Bank of Am., 600 F.2d 211 (9th Cir. 1979); Tomkins v. Pub. Serv.
Elec. & Gas Co., 568 F.2d 1044 (3d Cir. 1977); Barnes v. Costle, 561 F.2d 983 (D.C. Cir.
1977).
37 See Katz v. Dole, 709 F.2d 251, 256 (4th Cir. 1983) ("[T]he plaintiff must show that
the employer knew or should have known of the harassment, and took no effectual action
to correct the situation."); Henson v. City of Dundee, 682 F.2d 897, 905 (11th Cir. 1982)
(The employee "must show that employer knew or should have known of the harassment
in question and failed to take prompt remedial action.").
38 The test is described as a rule of "notice liability." SeeJ. Hoult Verkerke, Notire
Liability in Employment Discrimination Law, 81 VA. L. REv. 273 (1995) (analyzing the differ-
ence between strict vicarious liability and notice liability in sexual harassment cases and
suggesting the application of notice liability in all individual employment discrimination
cases). Verkerke notes that "courts regularly confuse elements of strict and notice liabil-
ity," and that "[o]ne of the most common distortions occurs when courts describe respon-
deat superior as a standard that requires notice to the employer." Id. at 282 n.24.
39 477 U.S. 57 (1986).
40 Id. at 72.
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cases-quid pro quo and hostile work environment-in which em-
ployees were sexually harassed by supervisors.
The Vinson Court adopted the position expressed in an amicus
curiae brief filed by the Solicitor General on behalf of the EEOC at the
urging of its then-Chairman, Clarence Thomas. In that brief, the
EEOC disavowed a portion of its 1980 Sexual Harassment Guide-
lines.41 In the Guidelines, the EEOC had endorsed the imposition of
strict liability for all sexual harassment by supervisors.42 By disavowing
the Guidelines, the EEOC helped create the confusion which reigns
today.
Part IV discusses the application of the Vinson dicta. The courts
of appeals attempting to apply it have exhibited considerable confu-
sion. The courts have frequently applied a rule which they label "re-
spondeat superior;" but which is actually a rule of direct liability. These
decisions require the employee to prove both that the harasser-super-
visor was acting within the scope of employment and that the em-
ployer was directly liable for the harassment.
Part V criticizes these decisions for failing to apply agency law
properly. Moreover, that Part suggests a number of theories explain-
ing why federal courts have so consistently misapplied agency princi-
ples. To begin with, the law in this area is confusing; judges and
lawyers not accustomed to applying agency principles, or accustomed
to applying agency principles only in other situations, may easily con-
fuse them in this context. The error is particularly understandable
given the early sexual harassment decisions, which used the language
of agency law while misapplying its substance. The error of these early
decisions was exacerbated by the EEOC's abandonment of its 1980
Guidelines in its Vinson brief, and by the Court's dicta in Vinson, which
created a false distinction between strict liability for the acts of super-
visors, and agency liability. A related theory is that the courts are mis-
takenly applying agency rules for assessing punitive damages as if they
were the rules for imposing liability. For punitive damages, unlike
compensatory damages, direct liability is properly required. Another
possibility is that the federal courts' frequent exposure to civil rights
cases in which government employers enjoy limited sovereign immu-
nity, has contributed to an incorrect understanding of the usual rela-
tionship between a supervisor's wrongful acts and his employer's
liability. The analogy between the public employer defendant in a
civil rights action and the employer defendant in a sexual harassment
action is logical, but the immunities that apply to claims against the
41 See infra part I.B.2. The Guidelines are found at 29 C.F.R. § 1604.11 (1995). The
California Rule derives from the Guidelines. See discussion infra text accompanying notes
437-56.
42 See 29 C.FR. § 1604.11(c) (1995).
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government have no application in Title VII cases. Another possible
explanation is that gender bias by malejudges, in cases in which plain-
tiffs have been uniformly female and defendants nearly uniformly
male, has affected the imposition of liability.43 Finally, those who be-
lieve that Justice Thomas himself committed sexual harassment in the
1980s may conclude that he acted in self interest in disavowing the
EEOC's 1980 Guidelines. These theories are neither exhaustive nor
mutually exclusive.
In light of the federal courts' misapplication of agency law, this
Article poses a central question: Should we ever conclude that a har-
asser-supervisor is acting so far outside his role as a supervisory em-
ployee that his on-the-job harassment is not the responsibility of his
employer? For a number of reasons, I conclude that the answer to
this question must be "no." First, applying the traditional rules of
agency law appropriate to wrongful conduct by supervisors against
employees, employers are almost always properly subject to absolute
vicarious liability under the doctrine of respondeat superior. The appli-
cation of respondeat superior recognizes the supervisor's effect on the
work environment, which is so closely connected with the authority he
exercises as a supervisor that his acts of harassment within the work-
place can almost never be independent of his authority as an agent of
the employer. Second, a harassing supervisor almost certainly uses his
position as a supervisor to aid his harassment. Third, the statutory
duty imposed on employers to protect their employees from improper
harassment should be recognized as nondelegable. As a result, all
harassment by supervisors should be attributed to the employer.
Fourth, the failure of the federal courts to correctly apply agency
rules, and their focus on whether employers are directly liable for har-
assment by their supervisors, has created a quagmire. It has turned
the focus of Title VII sexual harassment cases from essential matters-
whether harassment occurred and, if so, what remedy is appropri-
ate-to collateral ones-the relationship between the supervisor and
his employer. Moreover, it has left an important area of law unclear
and unpredictable.
Part VI discusses California's adoption of the 1980 EEOC Guide-
lines' vicarious liability rule. The Fair Employment and Housing
Act,44 as amended by the California Legislature, imposes absolute vica-
rious liability for all harassment by supervisors.45 As a result, questions
43 Susan Estrich, Sex At Work, 43 STAN. L. REv. 813, 856 (1991) (arguing that courts
impose a higher standard of proof in hostile work environment cases than in quid pro quo
cases because they perceive hostile work environment harassment as less serious).
44 CAL GOV'T CODE §§ 12900-12996 (hereinafter FEHA) (West 1994).
45 See infra notes 441-47 and accompanying text.
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subject to uncertainty under federal law are settled under California
law.
In the Conclusion, I argue that the Vinson decision does not re-
quire the federal courts to abandon the law of agency, but instead
compels them to apply it properly. Properly applied, the common law
of agency imposes vicarious liability on employers for sexual harass-
ment by their supervisors. The Supreme Court should take the first
opportunity to so hold. If the federal courts continue to interpret
Vinson as requiring the abandonment of common-law agency princi-
ples, Congress should amend Title VII, as the California Legislature
has amended the FEHA, to impose vicarious liability for supervisorial
sexual harassment.
I
THE EXASPERATING PROBLEM OF APPLYING THE COMMON
LAw OF MASTER AND SERVANT IN ASSESSING
LIABILITY FOR WORKPLACE INJURIES
When an employee is injured on the job by another employee,
the problem of assessing liability requires consideration of the em-
ployer's liability both for its own acts or omissions and for those of its
employees. One branch of agency law is concerned with liability aris-
ing from the relationship between the employer and the employee
who causes the injury; it examines whether the employee's wrongful
acts were sufficiently related to the employment relationship to im-
pose liability on the employer. Another branch of agency law is con-
cerned with liability stemming from the relationship between the
employer and the injured employee; it considers whether the injury
was one from which the employer was obligated to protect the em-
ployee. A third branch focuses on policy justifications for liability; it
looks to risk allocation and foreseeability to determine when vicarious
liability should be imposed.
Given the two relationships implicated in an action against an
employer for sexual harassment by a supervisor-the relationship be-
tween the employer and the harassed employee and the relationship
between the employer and the harasser-a discussion of employer lia-
bility for sexual harassment of employees by supervisors must first dis-
tinguish between vicarious and direct liability. The portion of agency
law labeled "master and servant" governs an employer's vicarious lia-
bility for the acts of its employees, for the employer's failure to fulfill
its special duties to protect those employees,46 and for the employer's
direct liability for its own wrongful acts.47
46 See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 2 (1957) (definitions of "master," "ser-
vant," and "independent contractor").
47 See id. § 219 (describing when a master is liable for the torts of its servants).
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Under the doctrine of respondeat superior, the master-servant rela-
tionship may result in a master's vicarious liability for the wrongful
acts of its servants. 48 Numerous rationales have been offered in sup-
port of the doctrine. 49 Some courts and commentators focus on the
nature of the authority delegated by the master to the servant, impos-
ing liability when the servant's wrongful act is "within the scope of
[his] employment." These observers reason that when an employer
authorizes an employee to act on the employer's behalf, the law
should hold the employer responsible for the consequences of that
delegation of authority.50 The Restatement (Second) of Agency
adopts this rationale.5'
Other courts and commentators approach the problem from a
policy perspective. They attempt to determine the proper allocation
of risk for workplace injuries, holding employers responsible for
wrongful acts by their employees in order to: (1) spread the risk of
harm most efficiently, treating it as a necessary cost of business; (2)
insure that injured employees have an available source of compensa-
tion; and (3) deter improper workplace activity by placing the onus
48 Respondeat superior derives from the Latin phrase "let the superior respond." The
origins of the rule are obscure and in dispute. See William 0. Douglas, Ticarious Liability
and Administration ofRisk I, 38YALE LJ. 584 (1929) (history of the rule uncertain). Compare
Oliver Wendel Holmes, Jr., Agency, 4 HARv. L. REv. 345, 350 (1891) (origin found in Ro-
man law rule of "patria potestas") and Young B. Smith, Frolic and Detour 1, 23 COLIUM. L. REv.
444 (1923) (same) with T. BATY, VIcAmuous LIABImrn' 9 (1916) (origin found in eighteenth
century English common law); RICHARD A. EpSTErN, CASES AND MATERIALS ON TORTS 819
(5th ed. 1990) (origin found in religious duties of vicar); G. EDWARD WHrTE, TORT .AW IN
AMERICA 51 (1980) (origin found in English common law of household employment); and
John H. Wigmore, Responsibilityfor Tortious Acts, 7 HARv. L. Ruv. 315 (1894) (origin found
in Germanic law).
49 For a comprehensive summary of the sources and applications of the diverse theo-
ries of respondeat superior, see Rochelle Rubin Weber, Note, "Scope of Employment" Redefined:
Holding Employers Vicariously Liable for Sexual Assaults Committed By Their Employees, 76 MINNm.
L. REa. 1513 (1992).
50 See infra part I.A.
51 Section 219 of the RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY (1957) reads:
When A Master is Liable for Torts of His Servants
(1) A master is subject to liability for the torts of his servants committed
while acting in the scope of their employment.
(2) A master is not subject to liability for the torts of his servants acting
outside the scope of their employment, unless:
(a) the master intended the conduct or the consequences, or
(b) the master was negligent or reckless, or
(c) the conduct violated a non-delegable duty of the master, or
(d) the servant purported to act or to speak on behalf of the principal and
there was reliance upon apparent authority, or he was aided in accomplish-
ing the tort by the existence of the agency relation.
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 219 cmt. a (1957) provides in relevant part
The conception of the master's liability to third persons appears to be an
outgrowth of the idea that within the time of service, the master can exer-
cise control over the physical activities of the servant. From this, the idea of
responsibility for the harm done by the servant's activities followed
naturally.
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for corrective action on the employer, as the party best able to control
the work environment. 52 Still other courts and commentators focus
on the issue of foreseeability.53 They hold employers responsible for
workplace injuries that the employers should have reasonably
foreseen.
The master-servant relationship may also give rise to liability for
the master's breach of duties owed the injured servant. Three theo-
ries explain how an employer may be liable for an employee's injury.
First, an employer may be directly liable to an injured employee be-
cause the employer acted wrongfully toward her. For example, the
employer may have acted negligently by breaching its duty to protect
her from harm, its duty to hire competent supervisors, its duty to train
employees in matters of safety, or its duty to investigate and remedy
dangerous conditions.5 4 Second, the employer may have adopted or
ratified a wrongful act of another employee, thus assuming responsi-
bility for the harm caused.55 Third, even when an employer has acted
properly toward an employee, that employer's obligation to protect its
employees is, under certain circumstances, nondelegable. Thus, even
when the employer is not at fault, vicarious liability may result when
one employee is harmed by another.56
This Part explains how the law of master and servant should apply
to the problem of sexual harassment committed by supervisors. It fo-
cuses on those cases that apply agency law to hold employers responsi-
ble for acts analogous to sexual harassment.57 Subsequent Parts
examine how courts have failed to correctly apply agency doctrine in
sexual harassment cases, thereby creating confusion in this volatile
area of law.
52 See infra part I.B.
53 See infra part I.B.
54 See Alfred G. Feliu, Workplace Violence and the Duty of Care: The Scope of Employer's
Obligation to Protect Against the Vwlent Employee, 20 EMPL. REL LJ. 381 (1994-1995).
55 See infra part I.C.2.
56 See infra part I.C.1.
57 This Part will also discuss cases that support the position that employer liability
should not be imposed for sexual harassment. In my view, however, it is the cases in which
liability is imposed that correctly apply agency principles.
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A. Vicarious Liability Based on the Relationship Between the
Employer and the Harasser
1. Liability Based on Harassment Within the Scope of the
Supervisor's Authority
a. The Requirement that the Servant Be Exercising the Authority
Delegated by the Master
Under traditional respondeat superior analysis, liability for the
wrongs of the servant may extend to the master because agency law
dictates that the principal is responsible for acts of its agents within
the agents' delegated authority. An agent may be vested with actual
authority or apparent authority to act on behalf of the principal. An
agent's actual authority to bind the principal may be created expressly
or by reasonable implication from the circumstances.58 An agent's ap-
parent authority is established when, based on the principal's words
or conduct, the agent reasonably appears to others to be acting on
behalf of the principal.59
Actual authority is the express or implied delegation of powers by
words, conduct, or acquiescence. In the employment setting, it is the
employer's delegation of power to the employee to supervise the
workplace. To create actual authority, an employer need not specifi-
cally limit or provide a list of duties for the supervisor to perform.
The supervisor possesses actual authority to perform all acts reason-
ably necessary to his supervision of the workplace. 60 More generally,
the supervisor possesses actual authority when he reasonably infers
that he is acting pursuant to the instructions of his employer, even
though the conduct, in actuality, is not consistent with his employer's
intent.6' Actual authority by implication may then be created by the
employer's manifestation of consent to the supervisor to conduct the
employer's business. 62
Accordingly, a supervisor's actual delegated authority is broad.
Employers, with the exception of sole proprietorships, often act only
through the actions of their supervisors. Supervisors act as the eyes,
ears, and, most importantly, voice of the employer in all interactions
with employees. Supervisors give instructions, oversee operations,
provide and interpret regulations, mediate interactions between em-
ployees, evaluate and report on employee performance, and generally
influence-and at times determine-the working environment of
nonsupervisory employees.
58 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 7 cmt. c (1957); see WARREN A. SEAv'Z, THE
LAW OF AGENCY § 8(B), at 11-13 (1964).
59 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 8 cmt. a, illus. 1-4 (1957).
60 Id. § 7 cmt. c.
61 Id. § 7 cmt. b.
62 Id. § 7 cmt. c.
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Apparent authority, unlike actual authority, views the delegation
of authority from the perspective of a third person, rather than that of
the agent. Apparent authority exists when a third-party observer,
based upon existing facts and conditions, believes or has reason to
believe that the agent possesses authority to act on behalf of the
master.63 It is irrelevant that the agent may not in fact possess the
power or know that he has it.64 The principal's manifestation of con-
sent may be made directly to the third person, but explicit consent is
not necessary.65 The principal may manifest his consent to a commu-
nity of persons in a variety of ways, including continuously employing
the agent.66 In the employment context, the supervisor may possess
broad apparent authority simply because of the title, privileges, or re-
sponsibilities conferred upon him by his employer.
When an employer's words and conduct create the reasonable
impression that its supervisors are responsible for supervising the de-
corum of the workplace, the supervisor's acts become the acts of the
employer. Because of his position, conferred on him by the employer,
the supervisor has unique powers to influence the work environment.
His power and authority make it far more difficult for the employee to
influence his behavior than the behavior of a friend, acquaintance, or
stranger. Thus, even where a supervisor is given very limited actual
authority, to the extent that employees reasonably see him as acting as
the representative of the employer, he is legally exercising his appar-
ent authority as the representative of his employer.
b. The Requirement that the Servant Be Acting Within the Scope of
Employment
The law of agency determines whether a servant is acting within
the master's delegated authority by determining whether his act falls
within the "scope of employment." Generally, an employee's wrong-
ful conduct is within the scope of employment if it is the kind of con-
duct he is employed to perform and if the conduct substantially
adheres to the authorized time and space limits of the work assign-
ment.67 Some courts further require that the conduct be motivated,
at least in part, by a business purpose,68 although the growing trend is
to substitute a requirement that the misconduct be foreseeable. 69
63 Id. § 8 cmt. a.
64 Id. § 7 cmt. b.
65 Id. § 8 cmt. b.
66 Id.
67 Id. § 228; see also SEAvEY, supra note 58, § 87(A)-(G), at 148-52; Smith, supra note 48,
at 717.
68 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 228(1) (c) (1957).
69 See, e.g., Ira S. Bushey & Sons, Inc. v. United States, 398 F.2d 167 (2d Cir. 1968)
(substituting foreseeability test for business-purpose test); see also Verkerke, supra note 38,
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Conduct may be within the scope of employment even when it is an
intentionally wrongful act.
i. The requirement that the wrongful conduct be the kind of
conduct the employee is employed to peform, occurring
substantially within the time and space limits of the
employment
This Article assumes that employers typically do not employ su-
pervisors to sexually harass employees, 70 or to commit other wrongful
acts. Thus, one might assume that sexual harassment falls outside the
scope of a supervisor's employment, rendering the theory of vicarious
liability inapplicable. However, the doctrine of respondeat superior fo-
cuses on the relationship between the supervisor's job responsibilities
and the wrong he committed; it mandates that the "kind of conduct"
inquiry consider not the authority to harass, but the authority to su-
pervise. This element of respondeat superior has generated a great deal
of confusion. Many courts and commentators have fundamentally
erred by assuming that the relevant authority is the authority to har-
ass. 71 As numerous cases and the Restatement illustrate, this view is
simply wrong.
For example, the Restatement provides that "[a]n act, although
forbidden, or done in a forbidden manner, may be within the scope
of employment."72 It also states that "[a] n act may be within the scope
of employment although consciously criminal or tortious."73 In Doe v.
Samaritan Counseling Center,74 the Alaska Supreme Court relied on
such reasoning in reversing an order of summary judgment for a
counseling center whose pastoral counselor allegedly initiated a sex-
ual relationship with a patient. The court found that although the
counselor's acts were unauthorized, and led to his termination, the
acts were within the scope of employment because the harassment
arose from and was "reasonably incidental to the employee's legiti-
at 311 ("The present trend is toward more expansive interpretations of the scope of
employment.").
70 But see Thoreson v. Penthouse Int'l Ltd., 563 N.Y.S.2d 968 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. County
1990), aff'd, 583 N.Y.S.2d 213 (App. Div. 1992), affd, 606 N.E.2d 1369 (N.Y. 1992) (plain-
tiff employed, in part, to provide sex to employer's customers, states claim for sexual har-
assment under New York law); Dorchen A. Leidholdt, Pimping and Pornography as Sexual
Harassment: Amicus Brief in Support of Plaintiff-Respondent in Thoreson v. Penthouse Int'l
Ltd., 1 MICH. J. OF GENDER & L. 107, 108 (1993) (employee hired to "sexually service"
employer).
71 See, e.g., Michael J. Phillips, Employer Sexual Harassment Liability Under Agency Princi-
pies: A Second Look at Meritor Say. Bank, FSB v. Vinson, 44 VAND. L. Rxv. 1229, 1242-43
(1991); Note, Sexual Harassment and Title VII: The Foundation for the Elimination of Sexual
Cooperation as an Employment Condition, 76 MICH. L. Ra,. 1007, 1026 (1978).
72 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 230 (1957).
73 Id. § 231.
74 791 P.2d 344 (Alaska 1990).
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mate work activities."75 The Court of Appeal of Louisiana, in Samuels
v. Southern Baptist Hospital76 also adopted the Restatement's position
and affirmed ajudgment against the hospital where a nurse's assistant
raped a patient. The court reasoned:
Ensuring a patient's well-being from others, including staff, while
the patient is helpless in a locked environment is part of the hospi-
tal's normal business. Taking care of the patient's well-being is part
of the duties of a nursing assistant. The tortious conduct commit-
ted by Stewart was reasonably incidental to the performance of his
duties as a nurse's assistant although totally unauthorized by the em-
ployer and motivated by the employee's personal interest. Further,
Stewart's actions were closely connected to his employment duties
so that the risk of harm faced by the young female victim was fairly
attributable to his employer, who placed the employee in his capac-
ity as a nurse's assistant and in a position of authority and contact
with the victim. 7 7
Similarly, in Lyon v. Carey,78 the employer was held vicariously lia-
ble under respondeat superior when its delivery person raped a woman
to whom he was delivering furniture. 79 In Carr v. Win. C. Crowell Co., 80
the employer was held vicariously liable under respondeat superiorwhen
its carpenter hit another worker in the head with his hammer. In Rog-
ers v. Kemper Construction Co.,81 the employer of two heavy equipment
operators was held vicariously liable under respondeat superior when its
employees, four hours after completing their work, changing, and
drinking three or four beers each, assaulted another worker at the job
75 Id. at 348; see also Simmons v. United States, 805 F.2d 1363 (9th Cir. 1986) (similar
holding on similar facts); Turner v. State of Louisiana, 494 So. 2d 1292 (La. Ct. App. 1986)
(holding state vicariously liable for national guard recruiting sergeant's unauthorized phys-
ical examinations of female applicants). But see Andrews v. United States, 732 F.2d 366,
370 (4th Cir. 1984) (finding a government hospital not vicariously liable under South Car-
olina law for therapist's "seduction" of a patient because the therapist was not furthering
his employer's business, but holding the hospital directly liable for its negligent failure to
supervise its employee).
76 594 So. 2d 571 (La. Ct. App. 1992).
77 Id. at 574.
78 533 F.2d 649 (D.C. Cir. 1976) (reversingJNOV for defendant and reinstatingjury
verdict).
79 See also White v. County of Orange, 166 Cal. App. 3d 566 (Cal. Ct. App. 1985)
(county may be held vicariously liable when deputy sheriff kidnapped plaintiff and
threatened to rape and murder her unless she agreed to go out with him that weekend);
Applewhite v. City of Baton Rouge, 380 So. 2d 119 (La. Ct. App. 1979) (city may be held
vicariously liable when police officer detains and rapes pedestrian).
80 171 P.2d 5 (Cal. 1946).
81 50 Cal. App. 3d 608 (Cal. CL App. 1975).
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site.8 2 In Ira S. Bushey v. United States,83 a drunken sailor decided to
open three large intake valves at a dry dock, causing his ship to sink.
The Second Circuit held that the government was vicariously liable
under respondeat superior, the sailor's acts, although unauthorized,
were of the type he was employed to perform and were thus within the
scope of his employment.8 4 In the context of sexual harassment,
where a supervisor's harassment of an employee occurs on the work-
site, during working hours,85 and within the supervisor-subordinate
relationship, it meets the scope of authority standards for respondat
superior imposed by the Restatement. The fact that the employer has
not authorized the supervisor to harass the employee is irrelevant.
ii. The requirement that the employee be motivated, at least in part,
by a purpose to serve the master
The Restatement takes the position that in order to apply respon-
deat superior, the employee must be motivated, at least in part, by an
intent to serve the employer.86 Where this rule is retained, the courts
accept any connection between the motivation for the wrongful act
and the employee's work as sufficient to bring the conduct within the
scope of employment. Accordingly, in Chesterman v. Barmon,8 7 the Or-
egon Supreme Court reversed a grant of summary judgment for an
employer whose employee broke into a house and sexually assaulted
82 As further examples, see Fields v. Sanders, 180 P.2d 684 (Cal. 1947) (affirmingjury
verdict against employer where its employee, a truck driver, hit a motorist in the head with
a wrench in the course of an argument following an accident); Frederick v. Collins, 378
S.W.2d 617 (Ky. Ct. App. 1964) (affirming wrongful death verdict against employer where
its clerk, despite instructions not to resist robbery attempts, shot and killed a customer
pretending to hold up store).
88 398 F.2d 167 (2d Cir. 1968) (Friendly, J.).
84 Id. at 170-73.
85 See, e.g., Capital City Foods, Inc. v. Superior Court, 5 Cal. App. 4th 1042 (Ct. App.
1992) (employer not liable for supervisor's rape of employee occurring off premises dur-
ing non-work hours).
86 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY §§ 228(1) (c), 235, 236 (1957). However, many
states have rejected this position. See, e.g., Ira S. Bushey & Sons v. United States, 398 F.2d
167, 171-72 (2d Cir. 1968) (discarding motivation-to-serve-master test in favor of test of
foreseeability of conduct); Mary M. v. City of Los Angeles, 814 P.2d 1341, 1344 (Cal. 1991)
(observing that acts need not benefit the employer for the courts to impose respondeat
superior liability); Marston v. Minneapolis Clinic of Psychiatry, 329 N.W.2d 306, 311 (Minn.
1983) (discarding motivation-to-serve-master test in favor of inquiry into whether the act at
issue was related to the employee's duties). But cf. Doe v. Samaritan Counseling Center,
791 P.2d 344, 347-48 (Alaska 1990) (reaffirming that conduct reasonably incidental to the
performance ofjob duties is within the scope of employment); Turner v. State, 494 So. 2d
1292, 1295 (La. Ct App. 1986) (stating that conduct is within the scope of employment if it
is "so closely connected in time, place, and causation to ... employment duties"). See
generally Verkerke, supra note 38, at 300 n.71 (citing Lange v. Nat'l Biscuit Co., 211 N.W.2d
783 (Minn. 1973), and its observation that as of 1973, Mississippi, California, Kentucky,
Illinois, Alabama, Connecticut, and Montana had repudiated the business-purpose test).
87 753 P.2d 404 (Or. 1988).
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the occupant while hallucinating under the influence of mescaline.
The court concluded that the facts raised sufficient evidence of a
claim of respondeat superior to deny summary judgment because the
employee claimed he had ingested the mescaline to give him energy
to work.
In all but the most remarkable circumstances, a supervisor engag-
ing in sexual harassment will have some personal purpose other than
serving the interests of the employer. But even when the business-
purpose test is applied, the existence of a personal motive does not
alone relieve the employer of liability. The Restatement finds that
conduct may be within the scope of employment, even when the moti-
vation is largely to serve the employee's private interests.88 The Com-
ment to § 236 explains:
The fact that the predominant motive of the servant is to benefit
himself or a third person does not prevent the act from being
within the scope of employment. If the purpose of serving the
master's business actuates the servant to any appreciable extent, the
master is subject to liability if the act otherwise is within the service
89
The Restatement illustrates the purpose-to-serve-the-master prin-
ciple by using the example of a speeding delivery person.90 The pur-
pose of employment is to deliver goods, not to speed. In fact, the
employer may specifically direct the driver not to speed. However, the
driver may speed in order to finish early, or to win a race-reasons
independent from serving the employer.91 Nonetheless, the speeding
is within the scope of the delivery person's employment.92 Thus, if
the driver's speeding causes an accident, the employer is vicariously
liable.
The California Supreme Court, in adopting this position, has
explained:
[Where the employee is combining his own business with that
of his employer, or attending to both at substantially the same time,
no nice inquiry will be made as to which business he was actually
engaged in at the time of the injury.93
88 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 236 (1957).
89 Id. § 236 cmt. b.
90 Id. § 236 cmt. a, illus. 2.
91 See id.
92 Id.
93 Perez v. Van Groningen & Sons, Inc., 719 P.2d 676, 680 (Cal. 1986) (quoting Lock-
heed Aircraft Corp. v. Industrial Accident Comm'n, 172 P.2d 1 (Cal. 1946). But see Noah v.
Ziehl, 759 S.W.2d 905, 912 (Mo. Ct. App. 1988) (reversing ajudgment against an employer
after the employer's nightclub bouncer assaulted a patron who patted the bouncer's girl-
friend on the rear, reasoning that the assault "exceeded reasonable bounds of the scope
and course of employment" and that it was not foreseeable because it was for personal
rather than business reasons).
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The comparison of a hypothetical harassing supervisor to the
speeding delivery person is helpful in determining whether the super-
visor's harassment falls within the scope of his employment. The
driver's business purpose is to deliver goods, and the supervisor's busi-
ness purpose is to oversee the work of subordinate employees. As
long as the supervisor's conduct mixes work-related and non-work-re-
lated functions, his sexual harassment is incidental to the perform-
ance of the job. Just as the delivery driver's speeding is within the
scope of his employment, the supervisor's interactions with
subordinate employees, including his harassment, are incidental to,
and thus within the scope of, his employment. Therefore, unless the
non-work-related interactions can be surgically separated so as to have
no relation to the supervisor-subordinate relationship, all of the super-
visor's harassment of subordinates falls within the scope of his employ-
ment. As one commentator has explained, "the employer is
vicariously liable for faults that are risks of his business, whether or not
they further his business. Thus, even practical jokes and horseplay
occurring on the job that originate from job-related contacts and as-
sociations are within the scope of employment."94
iii. The inclusion of intentional wrongful acts
The fact that harassment may be intentional and consciously
wrongful will not prevent the application of respondeat superior. As is
evident from many of the cases described supra, the employer's liabil-
ity under respondeat superior extends to willful and malicious torts, as
well as negligence. 95 For example, in Agarwal v. Johnson,96 the Califor-
nia Supreme Court upheld a verdict against an employer whose super-
visor fired an employee shortly after calling him a "black nigger,
member of an inferior race."97 The court explained that "the rule in
this state is that the employer is liable for the wilful misconduct of his
employees acting in a managerial capacity. The reason for the imposi-
94 Katherine S. Anderson, Employer Liability Under Title VII For Sexual Harassment After
Meritor Savings Bank v. Vinson, 87 COLUM. L. REv. 1258, 1273 (1987) (citing FlemingJames,
Jr., Vicarious Liability, 28 TUL. L. REv. 161, 182, 191-92 (1954)).
95 See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY §§ 231, 245 (1957); id. § 247 (explaining
that the master is vicariously liable for the servant's defamation if it was within the scope of
employment). Moreover, where courts are limited by the substantive law of their jurisdic-
tion to assessing vicarious liability only for negligence, they will take an expansive view of
the term "negligence." See, e.g.,Jamison v. Encarnacion, 281 U.S. 635, 641 (1930) (under
FELA provision limiting employers' vicarious liability to acts of employee negligence, an
assault and battery of a sailor by his supervisor, although in excess of the supervisor's au-
thority, constitutes negligence attributable to the employer).
96 603 P.2d 58 (Cal. 1979).
97 Id. at 64.
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tion of liability is to encourage careful selection and control of per-
sons placed in important management positions."98
In Dilli v. Johnson9 9 a restaurant manager responded to a cus-
tomer's complaint about a hamburger by striking him in the head
with a nightstick. The D.C. Circuit affirmed ajudgment for the plain-
tiff against the restaurant, explaining that once the employer placed
the manager in charge of its operation, it could not escape liability
simply because the manager went beyond the ordinary line of duty or
temperament. 100 And in Munick v. City of Durham,101 the court held
the city liable when the office manager of its waterplant assaulted a
customer and called him a "God damned Jew" even though the man-
ager had no authority to insult or assault customers.10 2
In Leonbruno v. Champlain Silk Mills,'0 3 Justice Cardozo advanced
what could be called the "boys will be boys" theory of employer liabil-
ity for intentional wrongful acts. An employee threw an apple at an-
other employee, blinding him in one eye. The court held that the
accident arose in the "course of employment"'10 4 because such rough-
housing should be expected by "men and boys" in the workplace. 10 5
Similarly, in Carr v. W. C. Crowell Co.,10 6 Justice Traynor reversed a
directed verdict in favor of the employer of a carpenter who intention-
ally hit another worker in the head with his hammer. He explained
the reasoning behind the "boys will be boys" theory as follows:
Men do not discard their personal qualities when they go to work.
Into the job they carry their intelligence, skill, habits of care and
rectitude. Just as inevitably they take along also their tendencies to
carelessness and camaraderie, as well as emotional makeup. In
bringing men together, work brings these qualities together, causes
frictions between them, creates occasions for lapses into careless-
ness, and for fun-making and emotional flareup. Work could not
go on if men became automatons repressed in every natural expres-
98 Id at 67 (citations omitted).
99 107 F.2d 669 (D.C. Cir. 1939).
100 Id. at 670.
101 106 S.E. 665 (N.C. 1921).
102 Id. at 666; see also Ledman v. Calvert Iron Works, Inc., 89 S.E.2d 832 (Ga. Ct. App.
1955) (holding employer vicariously liable when its foreman assaulted an employee who
complained that his termination was unjust).
103 128 N.E. 711 (N.Y. 1920).
104 The term "course of employment" is used in workers' compensation cases. It is
closely related to the "scope of employment" test of respondeat superior
105 128 N.E. at 711. For further cases on point, see, for example, Hartford Accident &
Indem. Co. v. Cardillo, 112 F.2d 11 (D.C. Cir. 1940) (injury found to have occurred in the
course of employment where claimant was struck in the face by his supervisor after mutual
namecalling); Bums v. Merritt Eng'g Co., 96 N.E.2d 739 (N.Y. 1951) (injury found to have
occurred in the course of employment where a "practical joke" resulted in an employee
drinking carbon tetrachloride believing that it was gin).
106 171 P.2d 5 (Cal. 1946).
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sion.... These expressions of human nature are incidents insepa-
rable from working together. They involve risks of injury and these
risks are inherent in the working environment. 10 7
Just as the risk of injury from roughhousing, practical jokes and flare-
ups was an inherent risk in the workplace in the 1940s, the risk of
injury from harassment is an inherent risk in today's workplace.
Recognition of the supervisor's harassment as within the scope of
employment depends to some extent on the point of view of the ob-
server. From the point of view of the employer, the supervisor's har-
assment may bear no relation to the job the supervisor was hired to
perform. The employer may thus view the harassment as not simply
outside the scope of employment, but as a completely private matter
between the supervisor and employee, in which the existence of an
employee-supervisor relationship is irrelevant.108 From the viewpoint
of the supervisor himself, he may or may not consciously regard his
ability to subject the employee to his unwanted conduct as a privilege
of his employment position. But from the employee's point of view,
the supervisor's ability to harass her is created precisely by the agency
relationship, which affords the supervisor the authority to call her into
his presence, to retain her in his presence over her objections, to use
his responsibility to act as the voice of the employer to place her in a
compromising position, and to take liberties with her personal privacy
beyond the reach of a co-equal acquaintance, or a stranger.10 9 The
authority that the employer has given him to supervise leaves her vul-
nerable to his wrongful acts.
2. Vicarious Liability Based on Harassment in Which the Supervisor
is Aided by the Agency Relationship
The Restatement treats certain wrongful acts of servants as falling
outside the scope of employment, but within the scope of vicarious
liability. The Restatement imposes vicarious liability on the employer
for the acts of its employees, although committed outside the scope of
employment, if the employee "was aided in accomplishing the tort by
the existence of the agency relation.""10 Such liability is properly
viewed as vicarious, not direct, since it is imposed without considering
the fault of the employer. The employer may be blameless; it is none-
theless liable.
107 Id. at 7-8 (quoting Cardillo, 112 F.2d at 15) (internal quotation marks omitted).
108 Most of the early Title VII decisions on sexual harassment advanced this view, re-
jecting plaintiffs' claims that sexual harassment violated the Act. The cases are discussed,
infra, at part II.B.1.
109 Verkerke argues that "it may be more difficult to harass strangers than to harass
one's coworkers. A would-be harasser has substantially less information about strangers
than about coworkers." Verkerke, supra note 38, at 310.
110 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 219(2)(d) (1957).
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The imposition of vicarious liability for wrongful acts committed
outside the employee's "scope of employment" is based upon the prin-
ciple that the employee is vested with "power" by the employer, a con-
cept the Restatement distinguishes from "authority.""' An agent's
power to bind the principal derives from the very existence of the
agency relationship; it is thus sometimes called "inherent authority."
The Restatement explains:
The rules designed to promote the interests of these enterprises are
necessarily accompanied by rules to police them. It is inevitable
that in doing their work, either through negligence or excess of
zeal, agents will harm third persons or will deal with them in unau-
thorized ways. It would be unfair for an enterprise to have the ben-
efit of the work of its agents without making it responsible to some
extent for their excesses and failures to act carefully. The answer of
the common law has been the creation of special agency powers or,
to phrase it otherwise, the imposition of liability upon the principal
because of unauthorized or negligent acts of his servants and other
agents. 112
Given the process by which harassment occurs in the workplace,
the supervisor's opportunity to engage in sexual harassment necessar-
ily arises from the existence of the agency relationship. Certainly,
from the employee's point of view, the supervisor's ability to harass
her arises precisely because the agency relationship affords her super-
visor the authority to call her into his presence, to retain her in his
presence over her objections, to place her in a compromising posi-
tion, and to a large extent encroach upon her personal privacy. Har-
assment occurs when there is an imbalance of power in the
workplace-an imbalance arising from a relationship in which the su-
pervisor, empowered by the principal, oversees the disempowered
subordinate employee." 3 Even when the harassment is unrelated to
job functions, the level of trust and authority conferred upon the su-
pervisor by the employer affords the supervisor with opportunities de-
III Id. § 8A; see also SEAvEY, supra note 58, § 8(F), at 15-17.
112 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCv § 8A cmt. a (1957).
113 See Steiner v. Showboat Operating Co., 25 F.3d 1459, 1463 (9th Cir. 1994) (supervi-
sor used sexual harassment to disempower female employees), cert. denied, 115 S. Ct. 733
(1995); Ellison v. Brady, 924 F.2d 872, 878-79 (9th Cir. 1991) (discussing that men are
rarely victims of sexual assault whereas women are frequently victims of rape and sexual
assault resulting from inequality and coercion); Waltman v. International Paper Co., 875
F.2d 468, 471-72, 482 (5th Cir. 1989) (discussing male employees' use of sexual harassment
to demean female co-employee). See generally CATHARINE A. MAcKINNON, TOWARD A FEMI-
NIST THEORY OF THE STATE 122-23 (1989) (discussing the significance of power and domi-
nance in rape and sexual harassment); Estrich, supra note 43; Barbara A. Gutek,
Understanding Sexual Harassment at Work 6 NOTRE DAME J.L. ETHics & PUB. POL'Y 335
(1992); Maria L. Ontiveros, Three Perspectives on Workplace Harassment of Women of Color, 23
GOLDEN GATE U. L. REv. 817 (1993);Joan Vermeulen, Employer Liability Under Title VIlfor
Sexual Harassment by Supervisory Employees, 10 CAP. U. L. REv. 499 (1981).
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nied other employees or strangers. When the supervisor abuses that
trust and authority by harassing a subordinate, the law of vicarious
liability holds the employer responsible.
B. Vicarious Liability Based on Public Policy
Contemporary courts and scholars are less likely to rely on the
delegation of authority to justify the imposition of respondeat superior
Some focus on the issue of foreseeability; they argue that when a
wrongful act is foreseeable, it is one of the risks of doing business
which the enterprise must bear. 14 Others argue that the doctrine fur-
thers three distinct policy objectives which should be satisfied before
imposing liability on the employer." 5 The first consideration is deter-
rence: Will the imposition of vicarious liability create an incentive for
employers to prevent such wrongs from occurring in the future? The
second is risk shifting: Will the imposition of vicarious liability in-
crease the likelihood that the injured party will be compensated. The
final objective is risk spreading: Is the employer in a better position
than the injured party to spread the risk among the beneficiaries of
the enterprise, to treat the cost of such injuries as part of the cost of
doing business, and to insure against the risk? When the three objec-
tives are satisfied, respondeat superior is imposed.'1 6
To illustrate, Judge Friendly of the Second Circuit relied upon
foreseeability to impose respondeat superior liability on the government
114 See generally Weber, supra note 49.
115 See Doe v. Samaritan Counseling Ctr., 791 P.2d 344, 349 (Alaska 1990) (stating that
the purpose of respondeat superior is to "include in the costs of operation inevitable losses to
third persons incident to carrying on an enterprise, and thus distribute the burden among
those benefitted by the enterprise"); Mary M. v. City of Los Angeles, 814 P.2d 1341, 1343,
1347-49 (Cal. 1991) (listing three policy objectives of respondeat superior in finding county
liable for rape of motorist by deputy sheriff). See generally Perez v. Van Groningen & Sons,
Inc., 719 P.2d 676 (Cal. 1986); WiLLiAM L. PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF THE L w OF TORTS 471
(3d ed. 1964); Maria M. Carrillo, Hostile Environment Sexual Harassment by a Supervisor Under
Title VL Reassessment of Employer Liability in Light of the Civil Rights Act of 1991, 24 CoLUM.
HUM. RTS. L. Ray. 41, 84-91 (1992).
116 Verkerke argues:
[L]iability for harms creates an incentive to invest to prevent those
harms. Employers may therefore be induced to screen their employees
more carefully, to train and supervise them closely, and to discharge any
employee who seems likely to cause harms for which the employer will be
liable. Second, liability compensates victims for the consequences of tor-
tious acts, and employers may be able to spread the cost of this compensa-
tion, a form of insurance, among many individuals by including it in the
price of their products and services. Third, liability influences the scale of
the employer's enterprise. As more costs are internalized, the employer's
cost of doing business increases. Higher costs imply higher prices and
higher prices mean less demand for the product or service. The employer's
activity level will thus vary inversely with the extent to which costs are
internalized.
Verkerke, supra note 38, at 308.
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when a drunken Coast Guard seaman inexplicably opened the intake
valves of a drydock, sinking his ship and damaging the drydock." 7
The government contended that because the seaman's acts were not
motivated by an intent to benefit his employer, they were outside the
scope of employment. The court rejected the argument as outmoded.
Relying on authority from workers' compensation decisions by justices
Rutledge and Cardozo, respondeat superior decisions by Justice Traynor
of the California Supreme Court, and commentary on respondeat supe-
rior and workers' compensation by Harper & James, the court ex-
plained that an employer should be aware that the employment of
laborers will give rise to certain risks. When those risks are reasonably
foreseeable, the court reasoned, the enterprise should bear the risks
as part of the cost of operation." 8 As applied in Bushey, the court held
that it was foreseeable that seamen would get drunk and commit acts
of negligence or even intentional torts. Thus, the court concluded
that the opening of the valves, although unauthorized and not moti-
vated by the employer's interests, were within the seaman's scope of
employment." 9
With respect to vicarious liability for sexual harassment, it cannot
be seriously argued that sexual harassment in employment is unfore-
seeable conduct. Polling data indicates that somewhere between forty
and ninety percent of all women in the United States workforce have
experienced some form of sexual harassment on the job.120 Ninth
Circuit Judge Alex Kozinski recently wrote "[i] t is a sobering revela-
tion that every woman-every woman-who has spent substantial time
in the work force in the last two decades can tell at least one story
117 Ira S. Bushey & Sons, Inc. v. United States, 398 F.2d 167 (2d Cir. 1968).
118 Id. at 171-72.
119 Id.
120 See BARBARA A. GUTEK, SEX AND THE WORKPLACE 46 (1985) (survey reporting that
53.1% of women have experienced sexual harassment); UNITED STATES MERrT SYSTEMS PRO-
TECTION BOARD, SEXUAL HARASSMENT IN THE FEDERAL WORKPLACE-IS IT A PROBLEM?
(1981) (survey finds that of 23,000 federal employees, 42% of women report some form of
sexual harassment); UNITED STATES MERrr SYSTEMS PROTECTION BOARD, SEXUAL HARASS-
MENT IN THE FEDERAL GovERNMENT. AN UPDATE (1988) (follow up survey disclosing no
significant change); WORKING WOMEN'S INSTITUTE, SEXUAL HARASSMENT ON THE JOB: RE-
SULT OF A PRELIMINARY SURVEY Research Series Report No. 1 (1975) (70% of women re-
spondents stating that they had been sexually harassed); Gutek, supra note 113, at 343-46
(citing WOMEN'S LEGAL DEFENSE FUND, SEXUAL HARASSMENT IN THE WORKPLACE (1991),
discussing report showing that two-thirds of the women serving in the military have been
sexually harassed); Matthew C. Hesse & LesterJ. Hubble, Note, The Dehumanizing Puzzle of
Sexual Harassment: A Survey of the Law Concerning Harassment of Women in the Workplace, 24
WASHBURN L.J. 574, 575-76 nn.4-10 (1985); Eliza G.C. Collins & Timothy B. Blodgett, Sexual
Harassment: Some See It... Some Won't 59 HARv. Bus. REV. 81, Mar.-Apr. 1981, at 81 (stating
that 52% of women managers disagreed with the proposition that the amount of sexual
harassment at work is greatly exaggerated); Claire Safran, Wat Men do to Women on the job:
A Shocking Look at Sexual Harassment, REDBOOK, Nov. 1976, at 149, 217 (reporting that
nearly 9 out of 10 women have experienced unwanted attention on the job).
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about being the object of sexual harassment."1 21 A recent California
Court of Appeal decision took judicial notice of the fact that sexual
harassment on thejob is foreseeable conduct. 22 In short, sexual har-
assment on the job is indisputably foreseeable.
On the broader question of imposing respondeat superior liability
for reasons of public policy, Dean Prosser states:
[T] he modern justification for vicarious liability is a rule of pol-
icy, a deliberate allocation of a risk. The losses caused by the torts
of employees, which as a practical matter are sure to occur in the
conduct of the employer's enterprise, are placed upon that enter-
prise itself, as a required cost of doing business. They are placed
upon the employer because, having engaged in an enterprise which
will, on the basis of all past experience, involve harm to others
through the torts of employees, and sought to profit by it, it is just
that he, rather than the innocent injured plaintiff, should bear
them; and because he is better able to absorb them, and to dis-
tribute them, through prices, rates or liability insurance, to the pub-
lic, and so to shift them to society, to the community at large.123
Law-and-economics writers, addressing the policy justifications
for vicarious liability have argued that it is particularly relevant in sex-
ual harassment cases because it is doubtful that sexual harassment will
systemically vanish absent the imposition of vicarious liability.' 24 Rich-
ard Posner argues that "the most efficient method of discouraging
sexual harassment may be by creating incentives for the employer to
police the conduct of its supervisory employees, and this is done by
making the employer liable.' 25 Alan Sykes argues that because em-
ployers may easily replace an injured employee at little or no cost, the
employer bears no financial risk when an employee is sexually
harassed, and correspondingly, no incentive to prevent harassment. 26
Absent the imposition of vicarious liability, employers are unlikely to
adopt policies to discourage harassment. Only when they bear the
costs of the harassment caused by their business enterprise will em-
ployers be motivated to take steps to eradicate it.127
121 Alex Kozinski, Foreword to BARBARA LINDEMANN & DAVID D. KADUE, SExuAL HARASS-
MENT IN EMPLOYMENT LAW, at v (1992).
122 Capitol City Foods, Inc. v. Superior Court, 5 Cal. App. 4th 1042, 1048 (Ct. App.
1992).
123 PROSSER, supra note 115, at 471.
124 Richard A. Posner, An Economic Analysis of Sex Discrimination Laws, 56 U. CHI. L.
REv. 1311, 1332 (1989); Alan 0. Sykes, The Boundaries of Vicarious Liability: An Economic
Analysis of the Scope of Employment Rule and Related Legal Doctrines, 101 HARV. L. REV. 563, 605-
08 (1988).
125 Posner, supra note 124, at 1332.
126 Sykes, supra note 124, at 605-06.
127 . See ALAN F. WESTIN & ALFRED G. FELUu, RESOLVING EMPLOYMENT DIsPuTEs WITHOUT
LITIGATION 7 (1988) (claiming that two out of three companies surveyed are attempting to
improve complaint systems because of legal costs, awards, and settlements); Sykes, supra
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Imposition of vicarious liability, then, may be the most cost effec-
tive and efficient manner of preventing and eradicating sexual harass-
ment. 28 The employer, rather than the supervisor or employee, is in
the best position to prevent the harm from occurring because the em-
ployer controls the workplace. The master (employer) selects the ser-
vant (supervisor), controls the servant's responsibilities, and
promulgates workplace policy.
Vicarious liability also dramatically increases the likelihood that
the victim will be compensated for her injuries.1 29 Absent employer
liability, the employee may seek relief from: (1) the harasser, who is
likely to be judgment-proof; (2) her own insurance, but only to the
extent that she had insured against her injury; or (3) the state,
through welfare and social insurance programs. These alternative re-
covery schemes are likely to be both arbitrary and unsatisfactory. A
few victims will be able to piece together adequate compensation, but
many more will find that they alone must bear the loss. Such uncer-
tainty serves no significant social goal, does nothing to reduce the in-
cidence of sexual harassment, and masks the true costs borne by the
victims.
The benefits of shifting risks from injured employees to their em-
ployers is apparent throughout the tort compensation system-a char-
acteristic providing strong support for the imposition of respondeat
supefior. Two reasons make the doctrine particularly appropriate in
the case of sexual harassment. First, unlike most other types of tor-
tious conduct, sexual harassment and related discrimination have,
through the enactment of Tide VII, been singled out by the Congress
for special protection. Sexual harassment is not merely a common-law
tort, such as assault, battery, defamation, or intentional infliction of
emotional distress; it is also a statutory wrong for which Congress has
provided free government investigations, federal jurisdiction, and at-
torneys' fees as well as legal damages.
Second, without risk-shifting, women will bear virtually all the risk
associated with sexual harassment. Because men presumably benefit
as much, if not more, than women from the employment system, men
note 124, at 605-08 (arguing that absent vicarious liability, employers will have no incentive
to prevent sexual harassment); James G. Frierson, Reduce the Costs of Sexual Harassmen
PERSONNEL.J., Nov. 1989, at 79 (describing a 1987 Bureau of National Affairs survey show-
ing that 77% of the relevant firms had adopted anti-harassment policies for legal reasons);
Ronni Sandroff, SexualHarassment in theFortune 500, WORKING WOMAN, Dec. 1988, at 69, 70
(reporting that 76% of 160 Fortune 500 firms surveyed have written policies banning sex-
ual harassment as of 1988 and another 16% ban harassment through their antidiscrimina-
tion policies; 66% of those surveyed said EEOC Guidelines prompted their policies, and
54% said general fear of legal exposure also contributed to this decision).
128 Sykes, supra note 124, at 605-06. But cf. Verkerke, supra note 38 (arguing that it is
inefficient to impose strict vicarious liability in any individual discrimination case).
129 Mary M. v. City of Los Angeles, 814 P.2d 1341, 1343, 1348-49 (Cal. 1991).
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should bear a proportionate share of the cost of injuries imposed by
that system.' 30 Respondeat superior spreads the risk of harm among
men as well as women, rather than leaving it on those women upon
whom it arbitrarily falls.' 3 '
In the case of sexual harassment, employers are clearly the most
efficient risk spreaders and minimizers. They can either insure (or
self-insure) against vicarious liability for harassment5 2 or incorporate
the cost in their pricing and compensation. That is, employers can
treat vicarious liability for sexual harassment as a cost of doing busi-
ness. As explained above, there are significant advantages to employ-
ers treating sexual harassment damages as a part of the cost of doing
business. It increases employers' incentives to control improper con-
duct, and insures that the full cost of harassment is reflected in the
cost of goods and services. Here too, the fact that harassment is
largely suffered by women is relevant. Absent risk spreading, women
as a class will suffer disproportionately from the cost of harassment,
while men will not pay their fair share. Such a distribution is not only
inequitable, it is inefficient. It discourages men from taking full ac-
count of the costs of harassment in planning their activities. By forc-
ing employers to assume the risks of sexual harassment, respondeat
superior more equitably distributes the costs of injury between men
and women, and substantially increases the efficiency of the system.
C. Liability Based on the Relationship Between the Employer
and the Harassed Employee
1. Vicarious Liability Based on the Employer's Non-Delegable Duty to
Prevent Harassment
The law of agency imposes vicarious liability on principals for
wrongful acts committed by agents acting outside the scope of their
authority where the principal has a duty which is deemed nondelega-
ble.133 A nondelegable duty is any duty for which the principal retains
absolute responsibility,134 and generally arises where a special rela-
tionship exists which requires a heightened duty of care.
130 Arguably, since men are more likely to be the perpetrators of sexual harassment,
and women are more likely to be the victims, the cost of injuries attributable to sexual
harassment should be shifted largely to men. To the extent that men are more likely than
women to have an ownership interest in employing entities, an even greater justification
exists for risk shifting.
131 Cf, Mary M., 814 P.2d at 1343, 1347-50.
132 Employers may be precluded from insuring against direct liability for intentional
harassment but should not be precluded from insuring against vicarious liability, where the
liability is imposed without fault. See Coit Drapery Cleaners, Inc. v. Sequoia Ins. Co., 18
Cal. Rptr. 2d 692 (Ct. App. 1993); Sean W. Gallagher, Note, The Public Policy Exclusion and
Insurance for Intentional Employment Discrimination, 92 MIcH. L. REv. 1256 (1994).
133 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 214 (1957).
134 Id. § 214 cmt. a.
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Two illustrations from the Restatement are useful in understand-
ing the scope of liability created by nondelegable duties:
Illustration 1: When a train conductor assaults a passenger, the
employer railroad is subject to liability, even if the conductor acts
outside the scope of employment and without any fault by the rail-
road.8 5 The railroad, as a common carrier, has a nondelegable, spe-
cial duty to protect its passengers from harm.
Illustration 2: When an innkeeper hires an employee whom the
innkeeper reasonably believes to be honest, the innkeeper is liable if
the employee steals a guest's clothes.' 3 6 The special duty the inn-
keeper owes to the guest is nondelegable.
Nondelegable duties also arise by statutory enactment. For exam-
ple, the Fair Housing Act37 prohibits property owners from discrimi-
nating on the basis of race, color, religion, sex, or national origin in
the sale or rental of property. When the owner's agent discriminates,
even in the face of a directive not to discriminate, the owner is subject
to vicarious liability.'38 The duty not to discriminate is nondelegable
because of the important national policy of providing fair housing
throughout the United States.' 3 9
The Restatement provides that employers have a nondelegable
duty to take affirmative steps to make the workplace safe for their em-
ployees, and to warn them of risks to their well-being that they might
not otherwise recognize. 14° The Restatement compares the em-
ployer's duty to provide a safe workplace for its employees with the
landowner's duty to protect an invitee or business guest from danger-
ous conditions on the landowner's premises. 14' More substantial than
the duty owed the general public, the employer's duty requires the
employer either to make the workplace reasonably safe or to warn of
dangers of which the employer is or ought to be aware.' 42
The California Supreme Court applied this principle in Alcorn v.
Anbro Engineering Inc., a racial harassment case brought as a common-
135 Id. illus. 5.
136 Id. illus. 5.
137 Civil Rights Act of 1968 §§ 801-812, 42 U.S.C. §§ 3601-3619 (1988).
138 United States v. Youritan Constr. Co., 370 F. Supp. 643, 649 (N.D. Cal. 1973), modi-
fied on other grounds, 509 F.2d 623 (9th Cir. 1975). Accord Harrison v. Otto G. Heinzeroth
Mortg. Co., 430 F. Supp. 893, 896-97 (N.D. Ohio 1977); Williamson v. Hampton Manage-
ment Co., 339 F. Supp. 1146, 1149 (N.D. Ill. 1972); cf General Bldg. Contractors Ass'n v.
Pennsylvania, 458 U.S. 375, 395-97 (1982) (employers who did not participate in discrimi-
nation by union did not owe a nondelegable duty under 42 U.S.C. § 1981 to prevent the
union from discriminating against applicants for employment).
139 42 U.S.C. § 3601 (1988).
140 RESTATEMENT (SEcoND) OF AGENCY § 492 (1957).
141 Id. introductory note preceding § 492.
142 Id. § 492.
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law tort action.1 43 In Alcorn, an employee who had been called a "nig-
ger" by his supervisor sued the employer for intentional infliction of
emotional distress. Overruling a demurrer, the California Supreme
Court noted that the "plaintiffs status as an employee should entitle
him to a greater degree of protection from insult and outrage than if
he were a stranger to defendants."144
The Restatement further provides that the employer's non-dele-
gable duty to provide a safe workplace includes the duty to provide
employees with competent supervisors in order to prevent exposing
employees to undue risk of harm.145 Moreover, any duty to protect its
employees imposed on the employer by statute is nondelegable. 146
Thus, when a supervisor receives notice of the breach of a nondelega-
ble duty or the existence of a dangerous condition, the employer is
itself deemed to have received notice. 14 7
In the context of sexual harassment, the employer-employee rela-
tionship creates a nondelegable duty. Like the inn guest or railway
passenger, an employee cedes a degree of personal autonomy in ex-
change for the right to enter into an economic relationship. To illus-
trate, a railway passenger puts herself into the hands of the railway
company, trusting it to convey her to her destination safely. The rail-
way passenger cannot control the train, but relies on railway employ-
ees to operate the vehicle responsibly. An inn guest puts herself into
the care of the innkeeper, trusting that the innkeeper will insure the
safety of her person and effects. Similarly, an employee places herself
in the hands of the employer, giving up many aspects of individual
autonomy. The employer places the employee under the direction of
a supervisor. In return, the employee relies on the employer, through
its agents, to protect her from foreseeable risks.1 48
143 Alcorn v. Anbro Eng'g, Inc., 468 P.2d 216, 218-19 (Cal. 1970).
'44 Id. at 218 n.2.
145 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 507 (1957).
146 Id. § 520.
147 Id. § 496.
148 The Restatement recognizes two related defenses to conduct that would otherwise
breach the employer's special duty to its employees-assumption of risk and the fellow-
servant rule. Assumption of risk is available where the employee, knowing of and under-
standing the risks, voluntarily enters into or continues in the employment. RESTATEMENT
(SEcOND) OF AGENCY § 521 (1957). However, the defense is not available if the wrongful
act is prohibited by a statute. Id. §§ 521, 524. Since Title VII prohibits sexual harassment,
the assumption of risk defense is inapplicable.
The second defense, the fellow-servant rule, provides that an employer "is not liable to
a servant or subservant who, while acting within the scope of his employment or in connec-
tion therewith, is injured solely by the negligence of a fellow servant in the performance of
acts not involving a violation of the master's non-delegable duties." Id. § 474. Fellow ser-
vants are those who work in sufficient proximity to one another that "there is a special risk
of harm to one of them if the other is negligent." Id. § 475.
The fellow-servant rule may provide a partial defense for employers whose employees
have sexually harassed other employees. But the common law limits this defense to wrong-
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In sum, employers owe a duty to protect their employees from
workplace harms, including sexual harassment. The source of this
duty is both the common law of agency, which imposes obligations on
employers to protect their employees, and the 1964 Civil Rights Act,
which prohibits sexual harassment in employment. Because the duty
is based on the special relationship between an employer and em-
ployee, and because it is afforded statutory protection, it is nondelega-
ble. Pursuant to this nondelegable duty, the employer must (1)
protect employees from improper harassment, when the employer or
its supervisors know or ought to know that the employee is at risk; (2)
hire and properly train competent supervisors, who will neither harass
employees nor permit their harassment by others; and (3) establish
and enforce internal rules prohibiting harassment which are likely to
be effective.
2. Direct Liability Based on the Employer's Negligence
In addition to vicarious liability, the law of agency also provides a
direct basis for employer liability. A negligent or reckless master is
subject to liability for the torts of his servants, even when the servants
act outside the scope of their employment. 49
Specifically, under Restatement section 213 direct liability arises
where the master is
negligent or reckless:
(a) in giving improper or ambiguous orders [or] in failing to make
proper regulations; 150 or
(b) in the employment of improper persons or instrumentalities in
work involving risk of harm to others;15 1 or
ful conduct by nonsupervisors. Supervisors are excepted from the fellow-servant rule by
the "superior servant" or "vice-principal" exception. Id. § 476 cmt. a; see aLso HAROLD GILL
REUSCHLEIN AND WiLLIAM A. GREGORY, THE LAW OF AGENCY AND PARTNERSHIP §§ 149-53, at
219-24 (1990); Comment, The Creation of a Common Law Rule: The Fellow Servant Rule, 1837-
1860, 132 U. PA. L. REv. 579 (1984). This exception provides that a negligent supervisor is
an agent of the employer, and thus not a fellow servant.
Even if the fellow-servant rule applied to sexual harassment by supervisors, it would be
risky to give it much weight. The rule was largely repudiated by the universal adoption of
workers' compensation statutes in the early twentieth century. Although the fellow-servant
rule is still codified in the Restatement, it has been largely moribund, with no opportunity
to grow, develop, or die.
149 RESTATEMENT (SEcoND) OF AGENCY § 219(2) (b) (1957).
150 See, e.g., Cutter v. Town of Farmington, 498 A.2d 816, 320 (N.H. 1985) (city held
directly liable for injuries sustained by a civilian who was improperly handcuffed by a police
officer because the city provided the officer with the handcuffs without any training or
supervision in their use).
151 An agent, although otherwise competent, may be incompetent because of
his reckless or vicious disposition, and if a principal, without exercising due
care in selection, employs a vicious person to do an act which necessarily
brings him in contact with others while in the performance of a duty, he is
subject to liability for harm caused by the vicious propensity.
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(c) in the supervision of the activity; or
(d) in permitting, or failing to prevent, negligent or other tortious
conduct by persons, 15 2 whether or not his servants or agents, upon
premises or with instrumentalities under his control.' 53
The relevance of this rule to sexual harassment is readily appar-
ent. Properly applied, agency law should impose direct liability when
an employer: (1) unreasonably fails to instruct its employees to re-
frain from sexual harassment; (2) unreasonably fails to adopt rules,
policies, and regulations designed to prevent harassment from occur-
ring; (3) unreasonably employs people it knows or should know to be
engaged in sexual harassment of other employees; (4) fails to prop-
erly supervise its employees to prevent harassment from occurring;
(5) stands by and does nothing when it knows, or should know, that
harassment is occurring; or (6) fails to prevent harassment that it
could have reasonably prevented. In such cases, the law of master and
servant holds the employer directly liable for the harm caused by the
employer's breach of duty. Moreover, when an employer ratifies an
act of harassment, it adopts the act as its own. 15 4 Thus, when an em-
ployer fails to disapprove of harassment in an appropriate manner, it
may be held directly liable.
D. Summary of Common-Law Theories of Employer Liability
Four common-law doctrines derived from agency law impose lia-
bility on employers when supervisors harass nonsupervisory
employees:
1. Vicarious liability arises under the doctrine of respondeat supe-
rior when the supervisor acts within the scope of his employment. If
the act occurs within the general process of supervising employees or
communicating with employees over whom he has authority, the con-
duct should be viewed as incidental to his employment, and thus
within its scope. The fact that the harassment may be termed an in-
tentional, willful, or malicious wrong does not excuse the employer's
liability.
2. Vicarious liability may arise even when the harassment falls
outside the scope of employment if the existence of an agency rela-
tionship aided the supervisor's ability or opportunity to harass his
subordinate. A supervisor inherently obtains this power when
charged with supervising other employees.
RzsrATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 213 cmt. d (1957).
152 See, e.g., Destefano v. Grabrian, 763 P.2d 275, 287-88 (Colo. 1988) (plaintiff stated
valid claim under Restatement § 213 against diocese for negligent supervision where priest
entered sexual relationship with plaintiff's wife while counseling couple on marital
problems, since diocese knew of similar, past misconduct by the priest).
153 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 213 (1957).
154 See id. § 82.
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3. Vicarious liability may arise from the employer's breach of a
nondelegable duty, such as the duty to protect employees from sexual
harassment.
4. Direct liability may arise from an employer's own wrongdoing
in failing to take reasonable steps to prevent harassment from occur-
ring or in permitting harassment to occur after receiving actual or
constructive notice of the harassment.
The common law of agency, then, provides substantial authority
for the proposition that liability should result whenever supervisors
harass their subordinates. As the next three Parts demonstrate, how-
ever, courts have failed to properly apply the law of agency in assessing
liability for sexual harassment, thereby exacerbating an already exas-
perating problem.
II
EARLY HARASSMENT LAW UNDER TITLE VII
A. The Development of Title VII's Prohibition of Racial,
Religious, and Ethnic Harassment
Tide VII provides that employers may not "fail or refuse to hire or
to discharge any individual or otherwise ... discriminate against any
individual with respect to his compensation, terms, conditions, or
privileges of employment, because of such individual's race, color,
religion, sex, or national origin."1 55 The legislative history evidences
no discussion of whether a person's terms, conditions, or privileges of
employment included a right to be free from improper harassment.
Rather, the congressional debates focused on discrimination in hiring
and compensation and the racial segregation of workers common at
that point in our nation's history.
Soon after the Act took effect, the federal courts and the EEOC
began to grapple with the problem of on-thejob harassment. Begin-
ning with racial and ethnic harassment cases in the early 1970s, a doc-
trine of unlawful harassment developed that required courts to
determine when employers were liable for harassment by employees.
A number of courts invoked two agency law doctrines. First, the courts
recognized a statutory duty on the part of employers to protect their
employees from harassment-a nondelegable duty created by a spe-
cial relationship. Second, although some courts found employer lia-
bility without discussing its theoretical basis, those courts that
addressed the question of vicarious liability applied the doctrine of
respondeat superior
155 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a) (1) (Supp. V 1993).
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1. The Emergence of a Right to Be Free from Harassment
Employer liability in the context of harassment first arose in ad-
ministrative decisions of the EEOC. In the late 1960s and early 1970s,
the agency began to impose a duty on employers to prevent harass-
ment. Employers who permitted the workplace to become "pol-
luted" 56 by harassment were held responsible if harassment led to the
discharge of a harassed employee. In the first of these cases, the
EEOC considered whether there was reasonable cause to find a Title
VII violation where an African American employee was discharged be-
cause of his inability "to get along with" white co-employees who had
subjected him to racial insults. Finding a Title VII violation, the Com-
mission explained that an "[e]mployer is required to maintain a work-
ing environment free of racial intimidation-by positive action where
necessary." 157
A series of similar opinions followed. For example, the Commis-
sion suggested that Title VII would be violated where a white em-
ployee is fired after complaining about racial harassment targeting his
African American co-workers. The Commission explained that the
employer was "obliged under this Act to maintain a working atmos-
phere free of racial intimidation or insult. Failure to take steps rea-
sonably calculated to maintain such an atmosphere violates the
Act."'158 The Commission employed similar language where a supervi-
sor used racial epithets to refer to an African-American employee. 159
Where an employer was charged with tolerating an atmosphere in
which ethnic and racial 'jokes" were told, the Commission concluded
that "the... failure to take reasonable steps to eliminate such actions
or to remedy their effects discriminates against" members of the
targeted ethnicity or race and violates Title VII.' 60
These EEOC decisions make no reference to the theories of vica-
rious or direct liability, but the reasoning in each case is consistent
with both doctrines. For example, the employer's obligation is cast as
a special duty, imposed by statute, to protect employees from harass-
156 The term, borrowed from concern about the environment, was apparently first
used in Rogers v. EEOC, 454 F.2d 234, 238 (5th Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 406 U.S. 957 (1972).
157 EEOC Dec. No. YSF 9-108, 1 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 922 (1969).
158 EEOC Dec. No. 71-909, 3 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 269 (1970).
159 "Title VII requires an employer to maintain a working environment free of racial
intimidation. That requirement includes positive action where positive action is necessary
to redress or eliminate employee intimidation." EEOC Dec. No. 72-0779, 4 Fair Empl.
Prac. Cas. (BNA) 317, 318 (1971).
160 EEOC Dec. No. 72-1561, 4 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 852 (1972); see also EEOC
Dec. No. 74 05, 6 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 834 (1973) (finding violation where em-
ployer did not take steps to eliminate racial "kidding" by supervisors and co-employers with
Spanish-surnamed employees); EEOC Dec. No. CL 68-12-431EU, 2 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas.
(BNA) 295 (1969) (finding violation when employer tolerated "Polish jokes" and physical
harassment in the workplace).
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ment. Pursuant to this duty, an employer must prevent harassment
and remedy it when it occurs. Upon breach of this duty, an employer
might find itself vicariously liable, based on its responsibility for the
acts of its servants or the breach of a nondelegable duty owed to its
employees, or directly liable, based on the breach of its own duty of
care.
In Rogers v. EEOC, 1 1 the first reported appellate decision to ad-
dress on-thejob harassment,162 the Fifth Circuit adopted the EEOC's
view that Title VII created a duty to prevent workplace harassment.
After losing her job with an optical service, plaintiff filed a complaint
with the EEOC alleging that her supervisor told her she was being
fired not because of her work performance, but because abusive be-
havior by white employees directed toward her had created friction in
the workplace. 163 When the EEOC sought discovery from the em-
ployer regarding the work environment, the employer resisted, main-
taining that Ms. Chavez's claim was not actionable. 64 The district
court agreed and denied the discovery request.165 The Fifth Circuit
reversed. Judge Goldberg explained:
[Title VII] sweeps within its protective ambit the practice of creating
a working environment heavily charged with ethnic or racial dis-
crimination.... One can readily envision working environments so
heavily polluted with discrimination as to destroy completely the
emotional and psychological stability of minority group workers,
and ... Title VII was aimed at the eradication of such noxious
practices.166
Consistent with the EEOC decisions, the court implicitly applied
the agency law principle that an employer shares a special relationship
with its employees and thereby possesses a heightened duty to protect
the employees from harm. However, the court did not indicate
whether the employer was directly liable for its own breach of that
duty, or vicariously liable because the duty breached by its employees
was within the scope of employment or was nondelegable.
In Rogers, Ms. Chavez's termination, not her harassment, formed
the basis of a Title VII action.167 The question soon arose whether
161 454 F.2d 234 (5th Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 406 U.S. 957 (1972).
162 Mentor Say. Bank v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 65 (1986).
163 The plaintiff also alleged that the employer had harmed her by segregating its pa-
tients by race. 454 F.2d at 236.
164 Rogers v. EEOC, 316 F. Supp. 422, 42-24 (E.D. Tex. 1970), rev'd, 454 F.2d 234 (5th
Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 406 U.S. 957 (1972).
165 Id. at 425-26.
166 454 F.2d at 238.
167 Id. at 236; see also United States v. City of Buffalo, 457 F. Supp. 612, 631-35
(W.D.N.Y. 1978) (existence of racial harassment by co-employees and failure of police
commissioner to take strong stand against harassment supported finding of pattern and
practice of discrimination in terminations), modified and aff'd, 633 F.2d 643 (2d Cir. 1980);
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harassment itself was actionable in the absence of a tangible discrimi-
natory employment decision. A number of early decisions so held,
extending the Rogers decision to include harassment unaccompanied
by economic damages. 168
2. Applying the Doctrine of Respondeat Superior to the Right to be
Free from Harassment
In the wake of Rogers, courts began to distinguish between cases
involving harassment by supervisors and those involving harassment
by nonsupervisor co-employees. Agency law became an explicit and
decisive factor in the determination of liability. In cases involving har-
assment by supervisors, the courts generally imposed liability on the
employer.169 It was rarely clear, however, whether the underlying the-
ory was: (1) direct liability for the employer's own breach of its duty
to protect against harassment; (2) vicarious liability for the supervi-
sor's breach of the employer's nondelegable duty to protect against
harassment; or (3) respondeat superior vicarious liability for the supervi-
sor's commission of a wrongful act within the scope of his
employment.
In cases involving harassment by nonsupervisorial co-employees,
the question of liability was less certain. In these cases, the knowledge
and/or response of the employer played a critical role. When man-
agement knew or should have known that the harassment was occur-
ring and failed to take appropriate steps, courts imposed direct
liability for the employer's negligence. °70 In contrast, when the em-
Murry v. American Standard, Inc., 373 F. Supp. 716, 717-18 (E.D. La. 1973) (harassment
used as evidence that plaintiff's termination was motivated by racial bias), aff'd, 488 F.2d
529 (5th Cir. 1973).
168 See, e.g., Compston v. Borden, Inc., 424 F. Supp. 157, 160-62 (S.D. Ohio 1976)
(holding that verbal religious harassment violates Title VII, and that in absence of adverse
employment action or economic damages, employee is entitled to nominal damages);
United States v. Lee Way Motor Freight, Inc., 7 Fair Empl. Prac. Gas. (BNA) 710, 748 (W.D.
Okla. 1973) (holding that it is an independent violation of Title VII for employer "to allow
its hiring or supervisory personnel to refer to [minority employees] in a manner deroga-
tory to their race or national origin"); cf. Gray v. Greyhound Lines, East, 545 F.2d 169, 176
(D.C. Cir. 1976) (holding that current employees have standing to bring action alleging
discrimination in hiring because resulting workforce will have an impact on the work envi-
ronment and because Title VII "grants an employee the right to 'a working environment
free of racial intimidation' " (citations omitted)).
169 See, e.g., EEOC v. Murphy Motor Freight Lines, Inc., 488 F. Supp. 381, 385-86 (D.
Minn. 1980) (holding that harassment by supervisors contributed to finding of violation);
Compston, 424 F. Supp. at 163; United States v. Lee Way Motor Freight, Inc., 7 Empl. Prac.
Dec. (CCH) 9066, at 6499 (W.D. Okla. 1973) ("It is a prima facie violation of Title VII,
therefore, for an employer. . . to allow its hiring or supervisory personnel to refer to
[applicants or employees] in a manner derogatory to their race or national origin.").
170 See, e.g., De Grace v. Rumsfeld, 614 F.2d 796, 804-05 (1st Cir. 1980) (holding that
supervisor's culpable neglect is ground for Title VII violation); Murphy Motor Freight Lines,
488 F. Supp. at 386. Anderson v. Methodist Evangelical Hospital, Inc., 4 Fair Empl. Prac.
Gas. (BNA) 33, 35 (W.D. Ky. 1971), aff'd, 464 F.2d 723 (6th Cir. 1972), provides another
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ployer or its supervisors were not on notice of harassment by non-
supervisory employees, courts generally refrained from imposing lia-
bility on the employer. In these cases, the nonsupervisorial co-em-
ployees' wrongful acts fell outside the scope of their employment.
And when the employer received no notice of the incidents, it could
not be subject to direct liability.171 Furthermore, even when the em-
ployer was given notice of the harassment, prompt remedial action
would absolve the employer of responsibility for the wrongful acts.' 72
a. Cases Denying Liability Because the Harassment Was Committed
by Nonsupervisor Co-Employees and the Employer Was
Either Unaware of the Harassment or Acted Properly
to Protect the Harassed Employee
The most influential early harassment case to discuss the issue of
liability in terms of agency law was Fekete v. United States Steel Corp.1 7 3
The plaintiff, a Hungarian refugee, complained that co-employees
harassed him because of his national origin, calling him derogatory
example of such direct liability. In this case, the plaintiff, an African-American woman, was
fired because she "could not get along with" a racist co-employee. 4 Fair Empl. Prac. Cases
at 33-34. The court found that although the supervisors making the decision to terminate
did not themselves have a racist motivation, two of them knew of the racial animosity of the
white coworker toward the plaintiff, thus putting the employer on notice of the harass-
ment: "Such notice to them, as supervisory agents of the corporation, constitutes notice to
it. A corporation speaks through its agents." 4 Fair Empl. Prac. Cases at 35. Cf Croker v.
Boeing Co. (Vertol Division), 437 F. Supp. 1138, 1191-92 (E.D. Pa. 1977) (liability denied
where "upper level management" was unaware of harassment by lower level supervisors,
but imposed where upper level management should have known of the harassment but
failed to act), modified and af'd, 662 F.2d 975 (3d Cir. 1981).
171 See, e.g., Silver v. KCA, Inc., 586 F.2d 138, 142 (9th Cir. 1978) (holding that dis-
charge of employee for opposition to discriminatory act of coworker was not a violation of
Title VII because the employer did not authorize the act); Clark v. South Cent. Bell Tel.
Co., 419 F. Supp. 697, 706, 708 (W.D. La. 1976) (holding that racial harassment by co-
employees without knowledge of supervisors is not a violation of Title VII); cf. Higgins v.
Gates Rubber Co., 578 F.2d 281, 283 (10th Cir. 1978) (without a finding that the employer
knew or should have known of an atmosphere of harassment, it should not be held liable);
Croker, 437 F. Supp. at 1191-92 (liability denied where "upper level management" unaware
of harassment by lower level management, but imposed where upper level management
should have known of the harassment but failed to act).
172 See, e.g., Friend v. Leidinger, 588 F.2d 61, 67 (4th Cir. 1978) (finding no violation
where employer disciplined officers and employees who had engaged in harassment and
discrimination); Bell v. St. Regis Paper Co., 425 F. Supp. 1126, 1137 (N.D. Ohio 1976) (no
violation where employer "responded swiftly and reasonably" to harassment claims); How-
ard v. National Cash Register Co., 388 F. Supp. 603, 606 (S.D. Ohio 1975) (no liability
where co-employees engaged in offensive and prejudicial conduct where supervisory per-
sonnel took steps to prevent and correct harassment); Fekete v. United States Steel Corp.,
353 F. Supp. 1177, 1186-87 (W.D. Pa. 1973) (no liability because employer took steps to
prevent and correct ethnic animosity once it became aware of the situation); see also Rob-
erts v. St. Louis S.W. Ry. Co., 329 F. Supp. 973, 978 (E.D. Ark. 1971) (racial harassment by
co-employees not attributed to employer where employees did not control policy of em-
ployer and supervisors intervened to attempt to eliminate harassment).
173 353 F. Supp. 1177 (W.D. Pa. 1973).
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names, urging him, in graffiti, to go "home," and posting pictures of
chimpanzees, labeled "Hungarians."1 74 On the question of employer
liability, the court held that because any harassment that occurred 175
was perpetrated by nonsupervisorial co-employees, and because the
company's management prohibited harassment and took steps to pre-
vent and stop the harassment whenever it was made aware of it, the
employer bore no liability.176 By implication, had supervisors been
responsible for the harassment, and had no steps been taken to rem-
edy the situation, the employer would have been liable.
The court's rationale rested on a straightforward application of
agency principles. If supervisors had been responsible for the wrong-
ful conduct, their acts as agents would bind their employer. The
scope of their authority as supervisors included an obligation to ade-
quately supervise the employees, to establish and enforce proper
rules, and to maintain a safe work environment. Their failure to do so
constituted a breach of a legal duty falling within the authority dele-
gated to them as supervisors, either by actual delegation, or by their
apparent or inherent authority as supervisors. But nonsupervisory co-
employees possess no such authority. Thus, their wrongful acts do not
bind the employer unless the employer was directly liable for negli-
gence or recklessness by permitting the harassment to occur, or by
ratifying it.
Other courts quickly adopted the Fekete approach. In Howard v.
National Cash Register Co.,' 7 7 the plaintiff, National Cash Register's only
African-American plant guard, complained to his supervisors about
thirty-two acts of harassment committed by coworkers over a five-year
period. The court found a dozen acts to be racially motivated. 178 The
acts included 'jokes" and "references" to black people, use of the term
"nigger," and an incident in which the plaintiff was confronted with a
hangman's noose.179
The court held that management responded appropriately to
each incident. 8 0 It investigated the complaints, and met with the
plaintiff's coworkers to warn them that the company would note toler-
ate harassment and discrimination.181 The court found no violation
of Title VII. 182
174 Id. at 1183-84.
175 The court found that the harassment was motivated by the plaintiff's personality
and his derogation of the United States. The discussion of the theory of nonliability is thus
dicta. Id. at 1185-86.
176 Id. at 1186-87.
177 388 F. Supp. 603 (S.D. Ohio 1975).
178 Id. at 604.
179 Id. at 604-05
180 Id. at 606.
181 Id. at 605.
182 Id. at 607.
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Similarly, in Bell v. St. Regis Paper Co.,' 8 3 co-employees harassed a
white coworker because she was married to a black man.18 4 The har-
assment consisted of "name-calling, anonymous phone calls [and]
threatening messages."' 85 The plaintiff's supervisors responded to
each complaint by investigating the charge and reminding the em-
ployees that harassment was prohibited. 8 6 As a result, the court
found no employer liability under Title VII.18 7
The Fourth Circuit followed the Fekete view in Friend v. Leid-
inger.88 In Friend, African-American firefighters employed by the city
of Richmond, Virginia, complained about numerous acts of racial har-
assment by white firefighters.' 8 9 The court found no liability for two
reasons: (1) the acts were isolated, and thus not sufficiently pervasive
to constitute harassment; and (2) management employees took appro-
priate steps when they became aware of the wrongful acts.' 9 0
The employers in Fekete, Howard, Bell, and Friend avoided liability
by taking sufficient steps to remedy reported incidents of harassment.
Silver v. KCA, Inc.191 extended this reasoning to cases in which man-
agement employees were unaware of the harassment, and thus unable
to act. In Silver, a white employee named Warrington referred to a
black coworker as a 'Jungle bunny."' 92 Silver, a white coworker, de-
manded that Warrington apologize. 193 Warrington offered an apol-
ogy, but Silver was later fired.' 94 On Silver's action for unlawful
retaliation for her "opposing an unlawful employment practice," 95
the court concluded that Warrington, a nonsupervisor, was not an
agent of KCA, and that KCA had no knowledge of the harassment. 96
Thus, his actions were not unlawful under Title VII.197 Because Sil-
ver's objection was premised on conduct not violative of Title VII, the
employer's retaliation could not have been based on her having op-
183 425 F. Supp. 1126 (N.D. Ohio 1976).
184 Id. at 1128.
185 Id.
186 Id. at 1129-0.
187 Id. at 1137.
188 588 F.2d 61 (4th Cir. 1978).
189 Id. at 63-64.
190 Judge Butzner, in a concurring and dissenting opinion, concluded that supervisors
participated in the harassment, and thus, again consistent with Fekete, that liability should
be assessed. Id. at 67-69.
'91 586 F.2d 138 (9th Cir 1978).
192 Id. at 140.
193 Id.
194 Id.
195 See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-3(a) (1988).
196 Silver, 586 F.2d at 141-42.
197 Id. at 141.
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posed "an unlawful employment practice." Therefore, Silver's termi-
nation did not violate Title VII.' 98
b. Cases Imposing Liability Because the Employer Failed to Act to
Protect its Employees From Known Harassment Committed
by Nonsupervisory Co-Employees
By contrast, courts imposed liability when management failed to
take sufficient steps after receiving notice of harassment by co-employ-
ees. In EEOC v. Murphy Motor Freight Lines,199 the court found the em-
ployer liable for racial harassment where supervisors both engaged in
harassment and knew of co-employee harassment, but failed to act.2 00
However, the court did not premise its holding on a theory of vicari-
ous liability; rather, it imposed direct liability on the employer for the
supervisors' failure to protect the employees.20 1
Similarly, in DeGrace v. Rumsfeld,20 2 co-workers, with the knowl-
edge of supervisors, harassed a black civilian firefighter in the Navy.
When, as a result of the harassment, the plaintiff refused to continue
working, the Navy terminated his employment. The district court
held that although the Navy had condoned an atmosphere of racial
harassment, the plaintiff was not justified in walking off the job.203
The First Circuit reversed and held that because the Navy supervisors
had known of the harassment and had failed to respond properly, the
plaintiff could establish a violation of Title VII by showing a causal
connection between the harassment and his refusal to continue work-
ing.2 0 4 Thus, although the supervisors themselves did not harass the
plaintiff, they breached their duty to remedy the situation, rendering
the Navy liable.
c. Cases Considering Liability for Harassment by Supervisors
In cases in which supervisors engaged in harassment, the district
courts were divided on the question of liability. The courts deciding
United States v. Lee Way Motor Freight, Inc.,205 EEOC v. Murphy Motor
Freight Lines,206 and Compston v. Borden, Inc.207 followed the implied
holding of Fekete. In Compston, a supervisor directed unwarranted criti-
198 Silver was later limited to its facts by EEOC v. Crown Zellerbach Corp., 720 F.2d
1008, 1013 (9th Cir. 1983).
199 488 F. Supp. 381 (D. Minn. 1980).
200 Id. at 386.
201 The court also suggested, in dicta, that where the harassment was sufficiently se-
vere, constructive notice could be inferred. Id.
202 614 F.2d 796 (1st Cir. 1980).
203 Id. at 802-03.
204 Id. at 80-04.
205 7 Empl. Prac. Dec. (CCH) 1 9066 (W.D. Okla. 1973).
206 488 F. Supp. 381 (D. Minn. 1980).
207 424 F. Supp. 157 (S.D. Ohio 1976).
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cisms toward an employee, using epithets like "Christ-killer" and "god-
damn Jew."20 8 The court assessed liability against both the employer
and the supervisor, who, as an agent of the employer, was found to be
a proper defendant under Title VII.20 9 In Croker v. Boeing Co. (Vertol
Div.),210 however, a district court purportedly relied on agency princi-
ples to deny liability to a class of African-American employees despite
evidence of widespread racial harassment by supervisors. The court
held that only "upper level management" could bind the company,21'
and that class liability thus required proof that harassment was "the
company's standard operating procedure-the regular rather than
the unusual practice."212
Croker's narrow reading of respondeat superior, limiting the agency
relationship to upper level management instead of extending it to all
supervisors, marked the beginning of a growing misinterpretation of
the law of agency. It has contributed to a substantial line of cases
which require a sexual harassment plaintiff to prove not only that her
harasser was acting as an agent of the employer, but also that another
agent of the employer in an upper management position had actual
or constructive knowledge of the harassment.21 3 This interpretation
represents a substantial departure from the common law of agency by
requiring a plaintiff to prove both vicarious and direct liability. In
other words, a plaintiff must prove both harassment by an agent act-
ing within the scope of his employment, and authorization, ratifica-
tion, or negligence by the principal, when either one alone satisfies
the requirements of agency law.
d. Assessing Liability for Supervisor Harassment While Denying
Liability for Nonsupervisor Co-Employee Harassment
Pursuant to the Law of Agency
Although disagreement about how to apply the law of agency per-
sisted, in examining the harassment cases of the 1970s, virtually all
were in accord with the general proposition that agency law should be
208 Id. at 158.
209 Id. at 160. See generally 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(b) (1988) (Title VII defines "employer" as
including all "agents of employers," but does not define "agent.").
210 437 F. Supp. 1138 (E.D. Pa. 1977), modified and affd, 662 F.2d 975 (3d Cir. 1981).
211 Id. at 1191; see also United States v. United States Steel Corp., 371 F. Supp. 1045,
1054 (N.D. Ala. 1973) (generally discussing concern that acts of lower echelon supervisors
such as foremen should not result in employer liability when in conflict with established
company policies, but noting that discrimination by a foreman acting within the scope of
his employment violates Title VII).
212 437 F. Supp. at 1192 (quoting United States v. International Brotherhood of Team-
sters, 431 U.S. 324, 336 (1977)). The court determined that two of the class representa-
tives had proven individual claims of racial harassment because their harassment by
supervisors was so pervasive that upper management knew or should have known of it. Id.
at 1193-94.
213 See discussion infra part IV.A
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applied to determine employer liability for improper harassment.
Most cases held employers vicariously liable for all harassment by su-
pervisors. 214 Harassment by nonsupervisors subjected employers only
to the threat of direct liability.
Limiting vicarious liability to incidents of supervisorial harass-
ment is an improper application of the law of agency. Many circum-
stances occur in which the workplace interaction of nonsupervisorial
co-employees leads to improper harassment. If an employee's actions
injure another employee, the injury should be deemed incidental to,
and thus well within, the scope of the harasser's employment. There-
fore, vicarious liability should result.2 15
Turning again to the analogy of a business that employs drivers as
delivery persons, the prudent employer will select its drivers carefully
and will instruct them to drive in a safe manner. The employer may
even provide special training and offer incentives for safe driving
records. Nonetheless, the drivers will, from time to time, cause inju-
ries to others while making deliveries. Whether negligent or inten-
tional, the drivers' conduct subjects the employer to vicarious liability
under the doctrine of respondeat superior The same analysis should
hold true in cases of sexual harassment by nonsupervisory employees.
The line dividing supervisory from nonsupervisory harassment
may be explained by the fellow-servant rule.21 6 This rule protects em-
ployers from liability for harassment by co-employee fellow servants,
unless the co-employees were supervisors.21 7 Absent reliance on the
fellow-servant rule, the cases following Fekete may be criticized for ab-
solving employers of liability for harassment by nonsupervisors when
agency principles clearly dictate a contrary outcome. In short, without
the fellow-servant rule, the post-Fekete cases improperly deny harass-
ment victims a remedy to which they are entitled under the law of
agency.
Nonetheless, these cases have the advantage of setting forth a
consistent and easy-to-follow rule with a clear demarcation. When a
supervisor harassed an employee, the employer was liable. When a
nonsupervisorial co-employee harassed another employee, the em-
ployer was only liable if the employer knew or should have known of
the harassment and allowed it to occur. The employer would also be
liable if, after the fact, it failed to take appropriate remedial action.218
214 Or, in one case, upper level supervisors. See supra text accompanying notes 210-14
(discussing Croker).
215 This is the conclusion suggested in Miller v. Bank of America, 600 F.2d 211 (9th
Cir. 1979). See discussion infra text accompanying notes 245-48.
216 See supra note 148.
217 See supra note 148.
218 Whether the racial harassment cases continue to impose strict vicarious liability for
harassment by supervisors is open to dispute. CompareVerkerke, supra note 38, at 283 n.26
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B. The Early Development of Title VII's Prohibition of Sexual
Harassment
1. The Emergence of a Right to be Free from Sexual Harassment
Sexual harassment cases raised issues never confronted in racial,
ethnic, and religious harassment cases. While deeming some conduct
insufficiently offensive or pervasive to constitute harassment,219 courts
generally found it easy to recognize racial slurs, threats, and disparage-
ments as unwanted and offensive. 220
The question became more complicated when the problem was
sexual harassment. Subjecting women to sexual slurs, intimidation,
threats, and disparagement, or to suggestive physical touching, is
analogous to the kind of racial harassment to which the courts were
becoming accustomed.221 But some sexual conduct was subjectively
intended as nonoffensive and nonharassing, although it might never-
theless prove injurious.222 Thus, sexual advances and sexually
charged statements did not earn an initial presumption of harassment
the way that almost all racially charged conduct did. Moreover, condi-
tioning employment on sexual demands, and harassment through
(arguing that the only recent circuit court decision imposing strict liability is anomalous)
with Rachel E. Lumer, Note, Employer Liability for Sexual Harassment: The Morass of Agency
Principles and Respondeat Superior, 1993 U. ILL L. REv. 589, 618 (arguing that recent circuit
court decisions all impose strict vicarious liability on employers for racial harassment by
supervisors).
219 See, e.g., Cariddi v. Kansas City Chiefs Football Club, 568 F.2d 87, 87-88 (8th Cir.
1977) (occasional reference to plaintiff as a "dago" and to Italian Americans as the "Mafia"
was insufficiently severe or pervasive to violate Title VII); Kishaba v. Hilton Hotels Corp.,
737 F. Supp. 549, 555 (D. Haw. 1990) (no hostile work environment existed where plaintiff
failed to establish any objectively racially offensive conduct directed at herself or occurring
in her presence), aff'd, 936 F.2d 578 (9th Cir. 1991); Robertson v. Georgia Dep't of Correc-
tions, 725 F. Supp. 533, 538 (S.D. Ga. 1989) (plaintiff's allegation, without supporting evi-
dence, that he was removed to an inferior office because of his race, combined with
isolated racial slurs was insufficient to create a hostile work environment).
220 But see Vaughn v. Pool Offshore Co., 683 F.2d 922, 926 (5th Cir. 1982) (where
frequent racial slurs and epithets were exchanged between black plaintiff and white co-
employees, plaintiff failed to establish hostility or racial animus).
221 Some courts, however, have concluded that a different standard should apply to
sexual harassment than racial harassment, implicitly concluding that racial harassment is a
more serious problem. See, e.g., Davis v. Monsanto Chem. Co., 858 F.2d 345, 348 n.1 (6th
Cir. 1988) (justifying different standard for sexual, as opposed to racial, harassment based
on different standards for equal protection analysis), cert. denied, 490 U.S. 1110 (1989). But
see Henson v. City of Dundee, 682 F.2d 897 (11th Cir. 1982) (equating injury resulting
from sexual harassment with that resulting from racial harassment). The conflict is al-
luded to injustice Ginsburg's concurring opinion in Harris v. Forklift Systems, Inc. 114 S.
Ct. 367, 372 (1993) ("Davis [v. Monsanto Chemical Co.) concerned race-based discrimina-
tion, but that difference does not alter the analysis.").
222 See generally Ellison v. Brady, 924 F.2d 872, 878 (9th Cir. 1991) (examining sexual
harassment from victim's perspective). But see Miranda Oshige, Note, What's Sex Got To Do
With It?, 47 STAN. L. Rxv. 565, 572 (1995) (arguing that there is no basis in gender discrimi-
nation for a distinction between sexual and nonsexual conduct and that hostile work envi-
ronment sexual harassment should be reconfigured as gender-based disparate treatment).
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sexual advances, had no ready analogue in existing employment dis-
crimination law.
Beginning in the mid-1970s, a number of cases attempted to ap-
ply and expand the law of racial and ethnic harassment to the prob-
lem of sexual harassment. In most of these early cases, the district
courts, although finding sexual harassment wrongful and potentially
tortious, determined that it fell entirely outside the scope of Title VII.
Come v. Bausch and Lomb, Inc.,223 the first reported decision to
consider whether sexual harassment violates Title VII, concerned two
women who were constructively discharged due to verbal abuse and
sexual advances by their supervisor. The district court dismissed the
action, finding that the supervisor had not engaged in the conduct as
a matter of company policy, but rather as a "personal proclivity, pecu-
liarity or mannerism . .. satisfying a personal urge."224 If such con-
duct was actionable, the court reasoned, there would be a "potential
federal lawsuit every time any employee made amorous or sexually
oriented advances toward another."225 Whether or not such behavior
constituted misconduct, the court concluded, it was well outside the
scope of Title VII.22 6
Similarly, in Barnes v. Train,227 the district judge found that
although a supervisor had impermissably fired an employee after she
refused to have sex with him, his actions were outside the scope of
Title VII. The Court explained: "Regardless of how inexcusable the
conduct of the plaintiff's supervisor might have been, it does not evi-
dence an arbitrary barrier to continued employment based on plain-
tiffs sex."228 In Miller v. Bank of America,229 a supervisor promised an
employee a better job if she had sex with him. She refused and was
terminated. The district court dismissed the employee's action be-
cause the employee failed to take advantage of an existing bank policy
and grievance procedure.230 Finally, in Tomkins v. Public Service Electric
& Gas Co.,231 once again the plaintiff refused her supervisor's sexual
advances. She alleged that in retaliation, she was transferred, sub-
jected to unwarranted disciplinary layoffs, threats of demotion, and
223 390 F. Supp. 161 (D. Ariz. 1975), vacated, 562 F.2d 55 (9th Cir. 1977).
224 Id. at 163.
225 Id.
226 Id.
227 13 Fair Empl. Cas. (BNA) 123 (D.D.C. 1974), rev'd sub nom. Barnes v. Costle, 561
F.2d 983 (D.C. Cir. 1977).
228 Id. at 124.
229 418 F. Supp. 233 (N.D. Cal. 1976), rev'd 600 F.2d 211 (9th Cir. 1979).
230 Id. at 235-36.
231 422 F. Supp. 553 (D.NJ. 1976), rev'd, 568 F.2d 1044 (3d Cir. 1977).
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pay cuts, and was ultimately fired.23 2 Consistent with Come, Barnes,
and Miller, the court dismissed the action 23 3
By the end of 1976, federal courts had clearly assumed a position
of viewing sexual harassment as outside the scope of Title VII. But in
Williams v. Saxbe,234 Judge Richie of the District Court for the District
of Columbia rejected the reasoning of prior decisions and the argu-
ments of the United States Department ofJustice and found the plain-
tiff's retaliatory discharge claim within the ambit of Title VII. Ms.
Williams had initiated the Title VII action alleging that she had been
terminated by the Justice Department in retaliation for refusing her
supervisor's sexual advances. The court reasoned that because male
employees were not similarly subjected to retaliation for refusing the
sexual advances of supervisors, the court could find gender discrimi-
nation.2 35 Title VII therefore properly applied.23 6
The academic community responded critically with a series of ar-
ticles that articulated a theory of unlawful sexual harassment.23 7 Due
in part to these criticisms, the tide turned. In 1977, the Fourth Circuit
held that "an employer's policy or acquiescence in a practice of com-
pelling female employees to submit to the sexual advances of their
male supervisors" violated Title VII.23 8 Following the Fourth Circuit's
lead, the District of Columbia Circuit reversed Barnes.23 9 The court
reasoned that the decision to eliminate the plaintiff's job was sex dis-
crimination because the supervisor's sexual demands were gender
specific; the supervisor did not exact similar demands from male sub-
232 Id. at 555.
233 Id. at 556.
234 413 F. Supp. 654 (D.D.C. 1976), rev'd on other grounds sub nom. Williams v. Bell, 587
F.2d 1240 (D.C. Cir. 1978). On remand, the court again found a violation of Title VII.
Williams v. Civiletti, 487 F. Supp. 1387, 1389 (D.D.C. 1980).
235 413 F. Supp. at 659.
236 Id.
237 IAN FARLEY, SEXUAL SHAKEDOWN: THE SEXUAL HARASSMENT OF WOMEN ON THEJOB
(1978); CATHmUUNE A. MACKYNNON, SEXUAL HARASSMENT OF WORING WOMEN (1979); Gil-
bertJ. Ginsburg &Jean Galloway Koreski, Sexual Advances by an Employee's Supervisor. A Sex-
Discrimination Vwlation of Title VII?, 3 EMPLOYEE PE. L.. 83 (1977); William C. Seymour,
Sexual Harassment: Finding A Cause of Action Under Title VfI, 30 LAB. L.J. 139 (1979); Nadine
Taub, Keeping Women In TheirPlace: StereooipingPerSeAsAForm of Employment Discrimination,
21 B.C. L Rxv. 345 (1980); Joan Vermeulen, Employer Liability Under Title VI For Sexual
Harassment By Supervisory Employees, 10 CAP. U. L. REv. 499 (1981); Comment, 51 N.Y.U. L.
REv. 148 (1976); Note, Legal Remedies for Employment Related Sexual Harassment, 64 MINN. L.
REV. 151 (1979); JackJ. McGee, Jr., Note, Sexual Advances by Male Supervisory Personnel as
Actionable under Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964: Come v. Bausch & Lomb, Inc., Wil-
liams v. Saxbe, 17 S. TEXAS L.J. 409 (1976); Note, Sexual Harassment and Title Vff: The
Foundation for the Elimination of Sexual Cooperation as an Employment Condition, 76 MICH. L.
REv. 1007 (1978).
238 Garber v. Saxon Business Prods., Inc., 552 F.2d 1032 (4th Cir. 1977) (per curiam).
239 561 F.2d 983 (D.C. Cir. 1977).
19951
CORNELL LAW REVIEW
ordinates. 240 The Third Circuit soon reversed Tomkins,241 and the
Ninth Circuit reversed Miler 242 By the end of 1979, four circuits-
the District of Columbia, Third, Fourth, and Ninth-had agreed that
employment decisions conditioned on supervisorial sexual demands
constituted sexual harassment in violation of Title VII.
2. Applying the Law of Agency to the Right to be Free from Sexual
Harassment
Although the circuit courts imposed liability on employers for
sexual harassment committed by supervisors, an important difference
emerged in their respective applications of agency law. In Barnes, the
D.C. Circuit followed the reasoning of Fekete and its progeny when it
explained that "[g] enerally speaking, an employer is chargeable with
Title VII violations occasioned by discriminatory practices of supervi-
sory personnel."243 In contrast, the Tomkins court limited its applica-
tion of vicarious liability to upper level management, while the Miller
court extended vicarious liability to include cases involving sexual har-
assment by nonsupervisor co-employees acting within the scope of
employment.
The Third Circuit, in Tomkins, distinguished supervisors from the
employer as an entity, explaining:
"[W]e conclude that Title VII is violated when a supervisor, with the
actual or constructive knowledge of the employer, makes sexual advances
or demands toward a subordinate employee and conditions that
employee's job status-evaluations, continued employment, promo-
tion, or other aspects of career development-on a favorable re-
sponse to those advances or demands, and the employer does not
take prompt and appropriate remedial action after acquiring such
knowledge." 244
Thus, the Tomkins court limited the employer's liability to acts about
which the employer had received actual or constructive knowledge.
In other words, it diverged from Fekete-type racial harassment cases by
imposing direct liability on the employer for its own negligence, but
declining to impose vicarious liability for harassment committed by its
supervisors. Tomkins thus fell short of Fekete, leading to a conflict be-
tween direct and vicarious liability that has emerged as the critical is-
sue in determining employer liability for sexual harassment by
supervisors.
240 Id. at 991.
241 Tomkins v. Public Serv. Elec. & Gas Co., 568 F.2d 1044 (3d Cir. 1977).
242 Miller v. Bank of Am., 600 F.2d 211 (9th Cir. 1979).
243 Barnes, 561 F.2d at 993.
244 Tomkins, 568 F.2d at 1048-49 (emphasis added).
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In contrast to Tomkins, Miller evidenced the Ninth Circuit's will-
ingness to go beyond the limitations of Fekete. The court's reasoning
suggested that it would hold the employer vicariously liable for harass-
ment by all employees acting within the scope of their employment,
supervisors and nonsupervisors alike, and regardless of the knowledge
of the employer or its supervisors.2 45 The Miller court saw the prob-
lem as a simple application of respondeat superior. Responding to the
employer's argument that it could not be held liable for its supervi-
sor's harassment because it had a policy prohibiting sexual relations
between employees and an internal grievance procedure, the court
stated:
"The doctrine of respondeat superior has long been routinely
applied in the law of torts... It would be shocking to most of us if a
court should hold, for example, that a taxi company is not liable for
injuries to a pedestrian caused by the negligence of one of its driv-
ers because the company has a safety training program and strictly
forbids negligent driving. Nor would the taxi company be exoner-
ated even if the taxi driver, in the course of his employment, be-
came enraged at a jaywalking pedestrian and intentionally ran him
down.
Title VII... define [s] wrongs that are a type of tort, for which
an employer may be liable. There is nothing in [the Act] which
even hints at a congressional intention that the employer is not to
be liable if one of its employees, acting in the course of employ-
ment, commits the tort. Such a rule would create an enormous
loophole in the statutes. Most employers today are corporate bod-
ies or quasi-corporate ones such as partnerships. None of any size,
including sole proprietorships, can function without employees.
The usual rule, that an employer is liable for the torts of its employ-
ees, acting in the course of their employment, seems to us to be just
as appropriate here as in other cases, at least where, as here, the
actor is the supervisor of the wronged employee."24
Despite the analytical differences between Barnes, Tomkins, and
Miller, Tomkins relies on Barnes,24 7 and Miller on both Barnes and Tom-
kins. 2 48 All stand for the general proposition that employers are vicari-
ously liable for harassment by their supervisors; however, Tomkins
would treat low-level supervisors as if they were nonsupervisory co-em-
ployees, while Millerwould consider treating nonsupervisors as agents
under certain circumstances.
245 Milkr, 600 F.2d at 213.
246 Id. (citations omitted).
247 Tomkins, 568 F.2d at 1048.
248 Mi!/r, 600 F.2d at 213.
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III
EXACERBATING THE EXASPERATING I-THE EEOC AND
MERJTOR SA VINGS BANK V J NSON
By the end of the 1970s, a liability rule for sexual harassment by
supervisors was emerging from the circuit courts. Courts increasingly
held employers vicariously liable for sexual harassment by their super-
visors, regardless of the employers' degree of fault. Employer policies
against sexual harassment and immediate response when incidents of
harassment became known might limit the occurrence of harassment,
but they would not constitute a defense to employer liability. Suffi-
cient litigation and scholarship had been publicized to warrant the
attention of the EEOC and the Supreme Court. The EEOC addressed
the question first; the Court soon followed.
A. The Adoption of the EEOC Guidelines on Sexual
Harassment
1. The Guidelines Generally-Sexual Harassment Defined
The EEOC addressed the issue of employer liability for supervisor
harassment in 1980. In April of that year, the EEOC, under the direc-
tion of Eleanor Holmes Norton, published Interim Interpretive
Guidelines on Discrimination Because of Sex.249 After the public
comment period, the EEOC made amendments, then adopted the Fi-
nal Guidelines on September 23, 1980.250 On November 3, 1980-
one day before Ronald Reagan's election as President-Chairperson
Norton signed the new regulations. The Guidelines took effect on
November 10, 1980.251
In its role as the regulatory agency charged with investigating dis-
crimination claims, the EEOC concluded that sexual harassment vio-
lated Title VII. It set forth three alternative forms of unlawful sexual
harassment. The first was harassment in the form of conditioning an
offer of employment on submission to sexual demands.252 For exam-
ple, this form of harassment occurs when an employer refuses to hire
an applicant unless the applicant has sex with him. The second form
of harassment encompassed situations in which employment decisions
are based on the submission to or the rejection of sexual demands. 253
A typical example is the denial of a promotion to an employee be-
cause she refused to have sex with her supervisor.
249 45 Fed. Reg. 25,024 (1980).
250 45 Fed. Reg. 74,676 (1980) (codified at 29 C.F.R. § 1604.11 (1995)).
251 45 Fed. Reg. 74,677 (1980).
252 45 Fed. Reg. 74,677 (1980) (codified at 29 C.F.R. § 1604.11(a)(1) (1995)).
253 45 Fed. Reg. 74,677 (1980) (codified at 29 C.FR. § 1604.11(a) (2) (1995)).
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The first and second forms of harassment relate to a specific em-
ployment decision in which the employee or applicant loses a tangible
job benefit because she refused a sexual demand. Because the harass-
ment involves a demand of sex in exchange for employment, it is re-
ferred to as "quid pro quo" sexual harassment.2 54 In interpreting
Title VII to prohibit quid pro quo sexual harassment, the EEOC
merely followed the analysis of the four circuit courts that had previ-
ously addressed the issue.
To formulate its third form of harassment, the EEOC followed
the lead of feminist scholars like Catharine MacKinnon and Nadine
Taub and of courts in cases involving racial, religious, and ethnic har-
assment.2 55 The EEOC's third form of harassment encompassed the
type of conduct described in this Article's Introduction-unwelcome
sexual conduct that "has the purpose or effect of unreasonably256 in-
terfering with an individual's work performance or creating an intimi-
dating, hostile, or offensive working environment."257 Analogizing
"hostile work environment" sexual harassment to racial harassment,
the EEOC explained: "It is the Commission's position that sexual har-
assment, like racial harassment, generates a harmful atmosphere.
Under Title VII, employees should be afforded a working environ-
ment free of discriminatory intimidation whether based on sex, race,
religion, or national origin."258
The EEOC's view that "hostile work environment" sexual harass-
ment violates Title VII was highly controversial at the time it was pro-
254 See CATHARINE A. MAcKINNON, SExuAL HARASSMENT OF WORKING WOMEN 32-40
(1979). The courts first used this term in Henson v. City of Dundee, 682 F.2d 897, 908
(lth Cir. 1982), and later in Katz v, Dole. 709 F.2d 251, 254-55 (4th Cir. 1983), and Mer-
itor Saving Bank v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 65 (1986).
255 These cases include EEOC v. Murphy Motor Freight Lines Inc., 488 F. Supp. 881
(D. Minn. 1980); Compston v. Borden, Inc., 424 F. Supp. 157 (S.D. Ohio 1976); and Fekete
v. United States Steel Corp., 353 F. Supp. 1177 (W.D. Pa. 1973). All of these cases are
discussed supra part II.A.2; see also Kyriazi v. Western Elec. Co., 461 F. Supp. 894, 934-35,
949-50 (D.N.J. 1978) (evidence that co-employees attempted to embarrass and humiliate
the plaintiff through verbal remarks about her marital status and virginity, blocking her
path, and placing obscene cartoons on her desk, and that her supervisors knew of the
harassment and did nothing, supports finding of sex discrimination and of tort violations
under the federal civil rights conspiracy laws and state tort laws). The theory was also ad-
vanced by the plaintiffs in Tomkins, but rejected by the district court. Tomkins v. Public
Serv. Elec. & Gas Co., 422 F. Supp. 553 (D.NJ. 1976), ret'd, 568 F.2d 1044 (3d Cir. 1977).
256 The term "unreasonably" replaced the Interim Guidelines' use of the term "sub-
stantially." Compare Interim Guidelines, 45 Fed. Reg. 25,024 (1980) with Final Interpretive
Guidelines, 29 C.F.R. § 1604.11 (1995). Feminist critics of the Interim Guidelines consid-
ered the term "substantially" too rigorous. They argued that because "society will no
longer tolerate a small amount of race discrimination on the job [,] it should not tolerate a
small amount of sexual harassment, either." Joan Vermuelen, Comments on the Equal Em-
ployment Opportunity Commission's Proposed Amendment Adding Section 1604.11, Sexual Harass-
ment, to Its Guidelines on Sexual Discrimination, 6 WOMEN'S Rrs. L. REP. 285, 289 (1980).
257 45 Fed. Reg. 74,677 (1980) (codified at 29 C.F.R. § 1604.11(a)(3) (1995)).
258 45 Fed. Reg. 25,024 (1980).
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posed. It was subject to numerous attacks during the public comment
period.2 59 Soon after promulgation of the Guidelines, the decision to
include "hostile work environment" was criticized in a report to Presi-
dent-elect Reagan from transition team member Clarence Thomas,
who predicted that it would lead "to a barrage of trivial complaints
against employers around the nation." The report advised that "[t]he
elimination of personal slights and sexual advances which contribute
to an 'intimidating, hostile or offensive working environment' is a
goal impossible to reach. Expenditure of the EEOC's limited re-
sources in pursuit of this goal is unwise."260 Despite the early criti-
cism, however, the incorporation of "hostile work environment" into
Title VII's scope gained wide acceptance.2 61
2. The Guidelines' Application of the Law of Agency to the Right to
be Free from Sexual Harassment
Having defined sexual harassment, the EEOC turned to the issue
of employer liability for the acts of employees. Here, the EEOC com-
bined the bright line test of Fekete and its progeny with the more so-
phisticated agency rationale of Miller,262 distinguishing harassment
committed by agents from harassment committed by non-agent, non-
supervisory co-employees. Liability for nonsupervisory co-employee
harassment was limited to direct liability-those situations in which
the employer, including its agents and supervisory employees, knew or
should have known of the harassment, yet failed to take immediate
and appropriate corrective action. "With respect to conduct between
fellow employees, an employer is responsible for acts of sexual harass-
ment in the workplace where the employer (or its agents or supervi-
sory employees) knows or should have known of the conduct, unless it
can show that it took immediate and appropriate corrective action."2 63
259 In its "Supplementary Information" introducing the Final Amendment to Guide-
lines the EEOC commented:
A large number of comments referred to §1604.11(a) in which the Com-
mission defines sexual harassment. These comments generally suggested
that the section is too vague and needs more clarification. More specifi-
cally, the comments referred to subsection (3) of §1604.11(a) as presenting
the most troublesome definition of what constitutes sexual harassment.
45 Fed. Reg. 74,676 (1980).
260 Paul Taylor, Thomas's View of Harassment Said to Evolve; His Record at EEOC Is Source of
Dispute, WASH. Pos-r, Oct. 11, 1991, at A10. The author asked the Reagan Library for a
copy of the transition team report. The library declined to supply it, claiming it was the
.personal property" of former President Reagan. See Letter from Reagan Library (Oct. 4,
1994) (on file with author).
261 See generally Meritor Say. Bank v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57 (1986) (accepting hostile work
environment sexual harassment theory); cf. Harris v. Forklift Sys., Inc., 114 S. Ct. 367
(1993) (proof of hostile work environment sexual harassment does not require evidence
that harassment affected plaintiff's psychological well-being).
262 600 F.2d 211 (9th Cir. 1979).
263 45 Fed. Reg. 74,677 (1980) (codified at 29 C.F.R. § 1604.11(d) (1995)).
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On the question of liability for harassment by supervisors, the
EEOC, relying on Miller and the rule of agency law that a supervisor's
wrongful acts were the responsibility of the employer, determined that
an employer is vicariously liable when a supervisor or agent engages in
harassment. The Guidelines clearly held an employer responsible
"for its acts and those of its agents and supervisory employees with
respect to sexual harassment regardless of whether the specific acts
complained of were authorized or even forbidden by the employer
and regardless of whether the employer knew or should have known
of their occurrence."264
The EEOC thus attributed all harassment by supervisors to the
employer, while holding the employer liable for harassment by non-
supervisors only when the nonsupervisor acted as an agent-that is,
when he was an employee acting within the scope of employment.
This test provides a more sophisticated analysis than that of Fekete and
its progeny, which drew a bright line distinction between supervisors
and nonsupervisors.
Following publication of the Interim Guidelines, the EEOC re-
ceived numerous critical comments from employer groups objecting
to the imposition of vicarious liability for harassment by supervisors
and agents.2 65 The EEOC responded in the introduction to the Final
Guidelines:
[T]he strict liability imposed in §1604.11(c) is in keeping with the
general standard of employer liability with respect to agents and su-
pervisory employees. Similarly, the Commission and the courts
have held for years that an employer is liable if a supervisor or an
agent violates Title VII, regardless of knowledge or any other miti-
gating factor. Furthermore, a recent 9th Circuit case on sexual har-
assment imposed strict liability on the employer where a supervisor
harassed an employee without the knowledge of the employer 2 66
What did the Commission mean by the term "agent"? The Guide-
lines give the term no special or peculiar meaning, stating that
"' [a] gent' is used in the same way here as it is used in §701 (b) of Title
VII, where 'agent' is included in the definition of 'employer.' 267 Sec-
tion 701 (b) of Title VII defines "employer" as "a person engaged in an
264 45 Fed. Reg. 74,677 (1980) (codified 29 C.F.R. § 1604.11(c) (1995)).
265 45 Fed. Reg. 74,676 (1980). There was also mixed review of the EEOC Guidelines
by commentators. See Jan C. Leventer, Sexual Harassment and Title VH: EEOC Guidelines,
Conditions Litigation, and the United States Supreme Cour4 10 CAP. U. L. Rz.. 481, 484 (1981)
(criticizing the EEOC Guidelines for promulgating two standards of employer liability);
Nancy Fisher Chudacoff, Note, New EEOC Guidelines on Discrimination Because of Sex: Em-
ployerLiabilityfor Sexual Harassment Under Title W, 61 B.U. L. REv. 535, 537 (1981) (stating
that the vicarious liability standard in the EEOC Guidelines represents a proper interpreta-
tion of Title VII).
266 45 Fed. Reg. 74,676 (1980) (citations omitted).
267 Id.
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industry affecting commerce who has fifteen or more employees...
and any agent of such a person. '268 The statute gives no further defi-
nition of "agent." One may assume then, that the statute retains the
common-law definition of agency.
Although the term "agent" is not defined in Title VII, it at least
appears in the Act. In contrast, Title VII never uses the term "supervi-
sor." In the Guidelines, the EEOC states that it "will examine the cir-
cumstances of the particular employment relationship and the job
functions performed by the individual in determining whether an in-
dividual acts in either a supervisory or agency capacity." 269 This test
generally mirrors the test applied under the National Labor Relations
Act (NLRA) to determine whether an employee is a supervisor.2 70
The NLRA defines "supervisor" as:
any individual having authority, in the interest of the employer, to
hire, transfer, suspend, lay off, recall, promote, discharge, assign,
reward, or discipline other employees, or responsibility to direct
them, or to adjust their grievances, or effectively to recommend
such action, if in connection with the foregoing the exercise of such
authority is not of a merely routine or clerical nature, but requires
the use of independent judgment.2 71
This definition has been read by the National Labor Relations
Board and the courts to include anyone who exercises supervisory au-
thority. The definition is not limited to employees who have express
authority to act on behalf of the management; those with effective
authority to recommend supervisory action, such that their recom-
mendations will be carried out without independent investigation, are
considered supervisors under the NLRA.2 72
Although the EEOC Guidelines did not explicitly adopt the
NLRA definition of "supervisor," and although the NLRA definition
cannot be applied in every instance to Tide VII,2 73 the definition is
268 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(b) (1988).
269 29 C.F.R. § 1604.11(c) (1995).
270 29 U.S.C. §§ 142, 152(11) (1988).
271 Id. § 152(11).
272 Id.
273 In some instances, a Tide VII adoption of the NLRA test would merely drag the
courts into a contentious dispute over whether certain employees should be permitted to
organize despite possessing some of the authority of supervisors or whether they are suffi-
ciently aligned with management. In its most recent pronouncement on the scope of the
NLRA's managerial exclusion, NLRB v. Health Care & Retirement Corp. of Am., 114 S. Ct.
1778, 1783 (1994), the Supreme Court rejected the NLRB's test for determining supervi-
sory authority and held that nurses fall within the NLRA's managerial exclusion. See also
NLRB v. Yeshiva Univ., 444 U.S. 672 (1980) (holding that university faculty fall within the
managerial exclusion). In Health Care & Retirement Corp., Justice Ginsburg, joined byJus-
tices Blackmun, Stevens, and Souter, dissented, arguing that the NLRA amendment that
excluded supervisors also specifically included "professional employees," thus protecting
employees such as nurses. 114 S. Ct. at 1787 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
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nevertheless a useful starting point in distinguishing supervisors from
nonsupervisors.
By adopting the "job functions and circumstances of the particu-
lar employment relationship" test to define supervisor, and by using
the expansive phrase "a supervisor or an agent" in its commentary, the
EEOC clearly intended to include all supervisors, regardless of title,
and all other employees, who although not supervisors, are sufficiently
vested with the employer's authority. Thus, the EEOC broadly con-
strued employee acts attributable to the employer. For example, pro-
fessional employees such as attorneys, librarians, social workers, and
pharmacists, although excluded from the NLRA definition of supervi-
sor,27 4 are often in a position to affect the work environment by their
conduct. For this reason, such employees act as nonsupervisory
agents, and their employers therefore must assume liability for their
acts of sexual harassment.
3. The Application of the Guidelines in the Courts
The breadth of the Guidelines found mixed support in the circuit
courts of appeal as the law of sexual harassment continued to develop.
In cases involving quid pro quo sexual harassment, the courts adopted
the Guidelines' position that an employer is strictly liable for harass-
ment by its supervisors.2 75 The courts reasoned that when a supervi-
sor demands sex in exchange for ajob benefit, he uses the authority
to hire, fire, or discipline that the employer delegated to him. Given
this delegation of authority, the employer remained responsible for its
misuse. But in cases involving a hostile work environment, courts re-
mained reluctant to apply the Guidelines. Courts held that such har-
assment fell outside the scope of a supervisor's authority, and thus
beyond an employer's vicarious liability. This view represents an un-
fortunate misunderstanding of the law of agency. The courts failed to
recognize that in each case the harassment occurred within the scope
of the supervisor-subordinate relationship, and that each case arose
from the supervisor's authority to oversee the workplace.
In the first appellate decision following the issuance of the Guide-
lines, the D.C. Circuit reversed a grant of summary judgment for the
274 See, e.g., Marymount College of Va., 280 N.L.R.B. 486, 489 (1986) (professional
librarians not statutory supervisors); Greater Framington Mental Health Ass'n, 263
N.L.R.B. 1330, 1335 (1982) (supervising social workers not statutory supervisors); Say-On
Drugs, Inc., 243 N.L.R.B. 859, 862 (1979) (pharmacy managers not statutory supervisors);
Neighborhood Legal Servs., Inc., 236 N.L.R.B. 1269, 1273 (1978) (attorneys not statutory
supervisors).
275 See, e.g., Horn v. Duke Homes, 755 F.2d 599, 605 (7th Cir. 1985) ("Title VII de-
mands that employers be held strictly liable for the discriminatory employment decisions
of their supervisory personnel who are delegated the power to make such employment
decisions.").
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employer in Bundy v. Jackson,276 reasoning that employers are gener-
ally vicariously liable for sexual harassment by their supervisors. 277 In
dicta, however, the court stated that the "employer might be relieved
of liability if the supervisor committing the harassment did so in con-
travention of the employer's policy and without the employer's knowl-
edge, and if the employer moved promptly and effectively to rectify
the offense."278 In other words, even when not vicariously liable, an
employer might be directly liable if it failed to respond to a known
dangerous situation or condition.
Bundy did not squarely face the issue of whether the employer in
that case responded appropriately. When the plaintiff complained to
her supervisor's supervisor of the harassment, he replied that "any
man in his right mind would want to rape you," and solicited her him-
self.279 Although the holding in Bundy appears consistent with the
Guidelines, the dicta-absolving the employer of vicarious liability in
the case of a quick and appropriate response-seems inconsistent.
Under the Guidelines, an appropriate response by an employer could
cure an act of nonsupervisor harassment, but could never absolve the
employer of liability for harassment by a supervisor. The Bundy dicta
later proved troublesome as other courts looked to the D.C. Circuit's
decision for guidance.
The Bundy dicta was adopted by the Eleventh Circuit in Henson v.
City of Dundee.280 In Henson, the plaintiff, a police dispatcher, was sex-
ually harassed with "numerous harangues of demeaning sexual inquir-
ies and vulgarities" and repeated sexual solicitations by the chief of
police.281 The district court found for the defendant, holding that the
chief's "sexual habits and proclivities" 28 2 did not violate Title VII. The
court of appeals reversed, but required that the plaintiff satisfy a direct
liability test on remand. Mislabeling its holding as an application of
respondeat superior, the court explained: "Where, as here, the plaintiff
seeks to hold the employer responsible for the hostile environment
created by the plaintiff's supervisor or coworker, she must show that
the employer knew or should have known of the harassment in ques-
tion and failed to take prompt remedial action."28 3 Although the
court relied on the Guidelines elsewhere in its decision, it did not
discuss them in its purported application of the law of agency.
276 641 F.2d 934 (D.C. Cir. 1981).
277 Id. at 943, 947.
278 Id. at 943 (citing Barnes v. Costle, 561 F.2d 893, 993 (D.C. Cir. 1977)).
279 Id. at 940.
280 682 F.2d 897, 899 (11th Cir. 1982).
281 Id.
282 Id. at 901.
283 Id. at 905.
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The Henson court seriously erred by requiring the plaintiff to
prove her employer's complicity in the supervisor's harassment. The
holding ignored the harasser's status as an agent of the employer; it
ignored his use of the agency relationship to carry out his harassment;
and it ignored the employer's duty to protect its employees from har-
assment. Had the Henson court properly applied the law of agency
and the EEOC Guidelines, it would have held the city liable for the
on-the-job harassment committed by the chief of police.
The Henson court also erred when it described the applied stan-
dard as an application of the doctrine of respondeat superior28 4 Under
respondeat superior, the employer assumes responsibility for the acts of
its agent unless the agent has acted entirely outside the scope of his
employment. Moreover, the employer, in this case the city, can only
act through its agents. Therefore, where, as here, a chief of police
harasses a subordinate employee on the job, and where his position as
chief permits him to exercise supervisory authority over the employee,
proper application of respondeat supetiorwould require the employer to
take responsibility for the chief s wrongful acts. This misunderstand-
ing of how agency law operates continued to plague the application of
vicarious liability to sexual harassment thereafter. In case after case,
the authority courts relied upon was Henson v. City of Dundee.
One year after the Eleventh Circuit's decision in Henson, the
Fourth Circuit decided Katz v. Dole.28 5 Katz, an air traffic controller,
was verbally harassed by several supervisors.28 6 The court explained:
This harassment took the form of extremely vulgar and offensive
sexually related epithets addressed to and employed about Katz by
supervisory personnel as well as by other controllers. The words
used were ones widely recognized as not only improper, but as in-
tensely degrading .... [One of her supervisors] himself admitted
that he had suggested to Katz that her problems with another con-
troller, about whose sexual advances Katz was complaining, might
be solved if Katz submitted to him.287
The Fourth Circuit reversed the district court's verdict for the
FAA, finding the harassment to be so pervasive, and the employee's
complaints to her supervisors so numerous, that the FAA must have
known, or should have known, of the harassment. 288 The court
explained:
Except in situations where a proprietor, partner or corporate officer
participates personally in the harassing behavior, the plaintiff will
284 Id.
285 709 F.2d 251 (4th Cir. 1983).
286 Id. at 253-54.
287 Id. at 254.
288 Id. at 256.
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have the additional responsibility of demonstrating the propriety of
holding the employer liable under some theory of respondeat supe-
rior. We believe that in a "condition of work" case the plaintiff must
demonstrate that the employer had actual or constructive knowl-
edge of the existence of a sexually hostile working environment and
took no prompt and adequate remedial action.289
Here again, a court used the term "respondeat superior" while rejecting
the proper application of agency liability. Under respondeat superior,
any supervisor who had harassed Katz within the supervisor-
subordinate relationship should have bound the employer. Instead,
the court improperly required the plaintiff to prove direct liability on
the part of the employer.
B. The Vinson Case and the Application of Agency Law to the
Problem of Employer Liability for Sexual Harassment by
Supervisors
By 1985, there was considerable disagreement within the courts
regarding the scope of the hostile work environment theory of sexual
harassment. A case brought by Mechelle Vinson, an assistant branch
manager, against her employer, Meitor Savings Bank, and her super-
visor, branch manager Sidney Taylor, provided the Supreme Court's
first opportunity to address the issue. In Vinson, the Court considered
whether sexual harassment violates Title VII, whether hostile work en-
vironment sexual harassment violates Title VII, and what standard of
liability applies to employers for sexual harassment by their
supervisors.
1. The Vinson Case in the District Court and Court of Appeals
Vinson alleged that after Taylor hired, her, he compelled her to
participate in a coercive sexual relationship by threatening to fire her
if she did not cooperate. 290 She testified that he assaulted and raped
her at the bank on numerous occasions, that he frequently fondled
her breasts and buttocks in public, and that he would enter the ladies
restroom of the bank to expose himself to her.291 Taylor denied that
he had engaged in any sexual acts of any kind with Vinson.292 He
argued that a dispute over the proper training of a teller led Vinson to
fabricate her claims "because she was seeking to get even with him."298
The bank disclaimed responsibility, regardless of whether any harass-
289 Id. at 255 (citing Henson v. City of Dundee, 682 F.2d 897, 905 (11th Cir. 1982)).
290 Vinson v. Taylor, 23 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 37, 38 (D.D.C. 1980), rev'd, 753
F.2d 141 (D.C. Cir. 1985), reh 'g denied, 760 F.2d 1330 (D.C. Cir. 1985) (per curiam), aff'd in
par rev'd in part sub nom. Meritor Say. Bank v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57 (1986).
291 Id.
292 Id.
293 Id. at 39.
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ment had occurred, because Vinson failed to use its grievance proce-
dures to complain about Taylor's conduct.2 94
The district court agreed that quid quo pro sexual harassment vio-
lates Title VII, but made no finding regarding hostile work environ-
ment harassment. The court declined to determine whether Vinson
and Taylor had sexual relations, finding merely that if Vinson had sex
with Taylor, it was voluntary on her part.295 Thus, any sexual relations
between the two were unrelated to continued employment, advance-
ment, or promotion, and thus outside the concern of Title VII.296
The court further reasoned that even if Vinson had been sexually
harassed, the bank could not be liable for Taylor's acts because the
bank had a policy against sexual harassment, it was unaware of the
alleged harassment, and Vinson had not complained or otherwise
given notice of the harassment_297 In the context of the EEOC Guide-
lines, the court treated Vinson's claim as a complaint against a nonsu-
pervisoy co-employee, such that the employer was responsible for its
employee's sexual harassment only if it knew or should have known of
the harassment and failed to take appropriate remedial action.
The Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit re-
versed, holding that the district court erred both in its definition of
sexual harassment and in its failure to hold the employer responsible
for the acts of its supervisor.2 98 Regarding the question of whether
Vinson had been harassed, the court of appeals held that the district
court erred by considering only the question of quid pro quo harass-
ment Construing Vinson's complaint as a charge of both quid pro quo
and hostile work environment sexual harassment, the D.C. Circuit
held that her allegations, if true, could establish that Taylor had made
the workplace hostile through his unwelcome sexual conduct2 99
Turning to the question of liability, the court held that under the
EEOC Guidelines, if the supervisor engaged in sexual harassment, the
employer was strictly liable for his acts. 300 In approving the Guide-
lines, the court reasoned that all supervisors are agents for purposes
of Title VII because their authority as supervisors gives them the
"power to coerce, intimidate and harass."301
The circuit court's decision was the first to endorse wholeheart-
edly, and to apply correctly, the EEOC Guidelines. The court could
have relied on the Guidelines alone, or explained why the Guidelines
294 Id.
295 Id. at 42.
296 477 U.S. at 61.
297 23 Fair Empi. Prac. Cas. (BNA) at 43; 477 U.S. at 62 (describing facts).
298 753 F.2d at 144-45, 147.
299 Id. at 145-46.
300 Id. at 146-50.
301 Id. at 150.
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were consistent with the common law of agency. Unfortunately, it in-
stead erroneously described the Guidelines as being substantially
broader than the common law, creating a "higher level of imputed
responsibility than respondeat superior imposes,"3 02 and thus permitting
a court to impose liability where a court limited to common-law doc-
trine would be required to find no employer liability,30 3 The court's
error stemmed from a fundamental misunderstanding of the breadth
of respondeat superior. The court mistakenly believed that the scope-of-
employment requirement would limit employer liability to cases in
which the supervisor had been expressly authorized to sexually harass
his employees.30 4
Following the circuit court's decision, the bank sought a rehear-
ing en banc, which was denied in a per curiam opinion. 30 5 Judge Bork,
joined by Judges Scalia and Starr, filed a dissenting opinion. The dis-
senters expressed two major objections to the panel's decision. First,
they were concerned that a voluntary sexual relationship could lead to
a sexual harassment claim.3 06 Second, they objected to the panel's
determination that evidence of the supervisor's suggestive behavior
toward other employees was admissible, but that evidence of the plain-
tiff's suggestive behavior toward the supervisor was not.30 7
More significantly, Judge Bork questioned the court's imposition
of vicarious liability in the sexual harassment context. He argued that
the full Circuit should consider the question of whether the vicarious
liability rules applied in race discrimination cases under Title VII
should apply to sexual harassment cases, 08 and described that panel
decision as "at odds with traditional practice which was not to hold
employers liable at all for their employee's intentional torts involving
sexual escapades." 309
2. The Vinson EEOC Brief-A Shift in Position
When the Supreme Court agreed to hear Vinson, EEOC Chair-
man Thomas successfully lobbied Solicitor General Charles Fried to
submit an amicus curiae brief.31 0 The Solicitor General's role in Vinson
302 Id. at 151.
303 Id. at 150-52.
804 "Confining liability, as the common law would, to situations in which a supervisor
acted within the scope of his authority conceivably could lead to the ludicrous result that
employers would become accountable only if they explicitly require or consciously allow
their supervisors to molest women employees." Id. at 151.
305 760 F.2d 1330 (D.C. Cir. 1985).
306 Id. at 1330.
307 Id. at 1330-31.
308 Id. at 1331-32.
309 Id. at 1332.
310 David G. Savage, Thomas Fought Workplace Harassmen L.A. TIMES, Oct. 10, 1991, at
A6 ("Thomas set up a meeting with Solicitor General Charles Fried. 'He came to my office
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marked a major shift in the government's interpretation of Title VII
cases. Vinson constituted the thirty-ninth Title VII case heard by the
Supreme Court in which the United States had submitted an amicus
brief.311 In all but six of those cases, the Solicitor General had sided
with the employee. The few exceptions included cases involving sen-
iority rights in which the government sided with the employer against
a union, thus benefitting minority employees. 312 In Vinson, however,
the Solicitor General sided with the employer. During the three years
following Vinson, half the Solicitor General's Title VII amicus briefs
would support the employer.3 13
and made a very strong, very reasoned and powerful pitch,' Fried recalled.. ."); see also
Transcript of Hearings before the Committee on the Judiciary, United States Senate, on
the nomination of Clarence Thomas to be AssociateJustice of the Supreme Court, Part 4,
at 163 (responding to questions of Senator Hatch); Paul Taylor, Thomas's View of Harass-
ment Said to Evolve, WASH. POST, Oct. 11, 1991, at A10 (describing letter from Fried to
Senator Danforth in which Fried describes Thomas advocating the submission of an amicwus
brief). Although neither Professor Fried nor Senator Danforth has been able to locate this
letter, Professor (nowJustice) Fried has confirmed thatJustice (then-Chairman) Thomas
strongly lobbied him to submit the amicus brief.
311 Local No. 93, Int'l Ass'n of Firefighters v. City of Cleveland, 478 U.S. 501 (1986);
Meritor Say. Bank v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57 (1986); Cooper v. Federal Reserve Bank of Rich-
mond, 467 U.S. 867 (1984); Hishon v. King & Spalding, 467 U.S. 69 (1984); Firefighters
Local Union No. 1784 v. Stotts, 467 U.S. 561 (1984); Anderson v. City of Bessemer City,
N.C., 470 U.S. 564 (1985); W.R. Grace & Co. v. Local Union 759, Int'l Union of Rubber,
Cork, Linoleum & Plastic Workers, 461 U.S. 757 (1983); Crown, Cork & Seal Co. v. Parker,
462 U.S. 345 (1983); Connecticut v. Teal, 457 U.S. 440 (1982); Kremer v. Chemical Constr.
Corp., 456 U.S. 461 (1982); Pullman-Standard v. Swint, 456 U.S. 273 (1982); Zipes v. Trans-
World Airlines, Inc., 455 U.S. 385 (1982); County of Washington v. Gunther, 452 U.S. 161
(1981); Northwest Airlines, Inc. v. Transport Workers Union, 451 U.S. 77 (1981); Carson v.
American Brands, Inc., 450 U.S. 79 (1981); Mahasco Corp. v. Silver, 447 U.S. 807 (1980);
New York Gaslight Club, Inc. v. Carey, 447 U.S. 54 (1980); Delaware State College v. Ricks,
449 U.S. 250 (1980); California Brewers Ass'n v. Bryant, 444 U.S. 598 (1980); Great Am.
Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass'n v. Novomy, 442 U.S. 366 (1979); City of Los Angeles v. Manhart,
435 U.S. 702 (1978); Furnco Constr. Corp. v. Waters, 438 U.S. 567 (1978); East Texas
Motor Freight Sys. Inc. v. Rodriguez, 431 U.S. 395 (1977); TransWorld Airlines Inc. v. Har-
dison, 432 U.S. 63 (1977); Liberty Mut. Ins. Co. v. Wetzel, 424 U.S. 737 (1976); Franks v.
Bowman Transp. Co., Inc., 424 U.S. 747 (1976); McDonald v. Santa Fe Trail Transp. Co.,
427 U.S. 273 (1976); General Elec. Co. v. Gilbert, 429 U.S. 125 (1976); International
Union of Elec., Radio & Mach. Workers, Local 790 v. Robbins & Myers, Inc., 429 U.S. 229
(1976);Johnson v. Railway Express Agency, Inc., 421 U.S. 454 (1975); Albemarle Paper Co.
v. Moody, 422 U.S. 405 (1975); Alexander v. Gardner-Denver Co., 415 U.S. 36 (1974);
Espinoza v. Farah Mfg. Co., Inc. 414 U.S. 86 (1973); Norwood v. Harrison, 413 U.S. 455
(1973); McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973); Trfficante v. Metro. Life
Ins. Co., 409 U.S. 205 (1972); Love v. Pullman Co., 404 U.S. 522 (1972); Griggs v. Duke
Power Co., 401 U.S. 424 (1971); Phillips v. Martin Marietta Corp., 400 U.S. 542 (1971).
312 See, e.g., Local No. 93, Int'l Ass'n of Firefighters v. City of Cleveland, 478 U.S. 501
(1986); Firefighters Local Union No. 1784 v. Stotts, 467 U.S. 561 (1984); W.R. Grace & Co.
v. Local Union 759, Int'l Union of United Rubber, Cork, Linoleum & Plastic Workers, 461
U.S. 757 (1983).
313 The cases in which the Solicitor General's brief supported the employer include
Wards Cove Packing Co., Inc. v. Antonio, 490 U.S. 642 (1989); Watson v. Fort Worth Bank
and Trust, 487 U.S. 977 (1988); California Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n v. Guerra, 479 U.S. 272
(1987).
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Although the Solicitor General's Vinson brief purported to apply
the EEOC Guidelines,3 14 its analysis disavowed them.315 The Solicitor
General, on behalf of the EEOC, took the position that the district
court correctly determined that Vinson had not been sexually
harassed, and, further, that if the Court reached the issue of liability, it
should hold that the court of appeals had erred in holding that em-
ployers were strictly liable for harassment by supervisors. To support
its claim that there was insufficient evidence that Vinson had been
harassed, the Solicitor General argued that Vinson had failed to com-
plain until long after the alleged harassment occurred,316 had de-
clined opportunities to transfer to jobs away from the alleged
harasser,31 7 and had not appeared to others to be frightened of or
hostile toward her alleged harasser.318
Turning to the question of employer liability, the Solicitor Gen-
eral urged that the court reject any application of vicarious liability for
hostile work environment sexual harassment. The Solicitor General's
brief argued that supervisors committing hostile work environment
sexual harassment do not rely on their delegated authority; thus, un-
less an employer knows or should know of the harassment, it should
not be subject to liability for its employees' wrongful acts:
The court of appeals' theory of absolute employer liability is
erroneous as a matter of statutory construction and ignores the spe-
cial characteristics of "hostile environment" claims. In our view, an
employer should not be liable unless it knew or had reason to know
of the sexually offensive atmosphere. An employer without actual
knowledge will have "reason to know" of sexual misconduct at [its]
workplace if victims of sexual harassment have no reasonably avail-
able means of bringing complaints to the employer's attention and
seeking redress.... [A] n employer in our view should generally be
able to insulate itself from liability by publicizing a policy against
314 Brief for the United States and the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission as
Amici Curiae at 10-13, Meritor Say. Bank v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57 (1986) (No. 84-1979)
[hereinafter EEOC Brief].
315 Id. at 20-28.
316 Id. at 18.
317 Id. (describing "a pattern of decisionmaking difficult to reconcile with her
charges").
318 Id. (stating that "Vinson's long silence and her delay in asserting her claim well-
nigh compelled the district court's findings either that no sexual activities took pace [sic],
or that, if any took place, Vinson's participation was consensual and voluntary"). It is diffi-
cult to read these arguments, submitted by then-Solicitor General Fried and then-EEOC
Chairman Thomas, without being reminded of the similar defenses later raised on behalf
of then-Judge Thomas in response to the allegations of sexual harassment made by his
former employee Anita Hill. SeeJOHN C. DANFORTH, REsURRECTION: THE CONFIRMATION OF
CLARENCE THOMAS 31-32 (1994) (describing the White House counsel's skeptical initial
reaction to Anita Hill's allegations).
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sexual harassment and implementing a procedure designed to re-
solve sexual harassment complaints.3 19
The Solicitor General supported this proposition by seriously mis-
stating the law of agency. Addressing the question of who is an agent
under Title VII, the brief read:
When a Title VII charge is based on allegations of sexual har-
assment, the question whether a supervisor is acting as his em-
ployer's agent should turn primarily on the scope of authority
delegated to the supervisor and on the character of the actions
alleged.
... In general, harassment which affects tangible job benefits
and is manifested in a supervisory employment decision-that is,
"quid pro quo" harassment-will give rise to vicarious liability under
the guidelines. That is because the authority to make or substan-
tially influence such decisions is within the scope of authority that
the employer has delegated to the supervisor....
Where a sexual harassment claim proceeds on a pure "hostile
environment" theory, however, as Vinson's claim now does, the
usual basis for a finding of agency will often disappear. By defini-
tion, the supervisor in such circumstances is not exercising, or
threatening to exercise, actual or apparent authority to make per-
sonnel decisions affecting the victim.3 2 0
This argument grossly oversimplifies the law of agency, which
gives a far more expansive reading to the supervisor's scope of em-
ployment and the liability of employers. To support its arguments,
the Solicitor General's brief relied on the common misunderstanding
of the terms "scope of employment" and "scope of authority" found in
the circuit courts' decisions in Vinson, Henson, and Katz.3 2 1 The brief
relied, in part, on a section of the Restatement which is concerned
with contract law, not tort law.3 22 This error ignores the critical dis-
319 EEOC Brief, supra note 314, at 6-7; see Meritor Say. Bank v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 70-
72 (1986).
320 EEOC Brief, supra note 314, at 22-24.
821 See discussion supra text accompanying notes 280-89, 298-304.
322 "Nor, except in unusual cases, could it be demonstrated that the employer had
authorized the supervisor to engage in sexual harassment per se, or that the supervisor's
sexually harassing conduct has furthered any business of his employer as principal." EEOC
Brief, supra note 314, at 24 & n.13.
Footnote 13 referred to comment C of section 165 of the Restatement, which reads:
"If [a party] knows that the agent is acting for the benefit of himself or a third person, the
transaction is suspicious upon its face, and the principal is not bound unless the agent is
authorized." RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AG-NCY § 165 cmt. c (1957). Section 165 con-
cerns principals' liability for contracts entered into by agents without authority, not princi-
pals' liability for torts committed by agents:
A disclosed or partially disclosed principal is subject to liability upon a con-
tract purported to be made on his account by an agent authorized to make
it for the principal's benefit, although the agent acts for his own or other
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tinction between master-servant relationships and other principal-
agent relationships.3 23 The latter is a contractual relationship in
which "the principal will not incur liability for torts committed by the
agent."324 The former is an employment relationship in which "[t] he
servant, qua servant, has no power to bind his master in contract."3 25
Regrettably, the Solicitor General's brief was devoid of any discussion
of the policies supporting the doctrine of respondeat superior. Most
remarkably, nowhere did the brief admit that the Solicitor General's
position represented a disavowal of the 1980 EEOC Guidelines.
Having abandoned the traditional application of vicarious liabil-
ity for wrongful acts by employees, the government's brief recom-
mended that employers be granted immunity from work environment
sexual harassment suits as long as they had adopted a policy against
harassment, except in those situations in which they knew of harass-
ment and ignored it:
W] e propose a rule that asks whether a victim of sexual harassment
had reasonably available an avenue of complaint regarding such
harassment, and, if available and utilized, whether that procedure
was reasonably responsive to the employee's complaint. If the em-
ployer has an expressed policy against sexual harassment and has
implemented a procedure specifically designed to resolve sexual
harassment claims, and if the victim does not take advantage of that
procedure, the employer should be shielded from liability absent
actual knowledge of the sexually hostile environment (obtained,
e.g., by the filing of a charge with the EEOC or a comparable state
agency).
... [I]f the employer has implemented an effective procedure
for resolving such claims, it will be in the employee's interest to use
it, since failure to do so will create a presumption that the claimed
harassment never took place.3 2 6
To understand the distinction between the 1980 EEOC view
under Eleanor Holmes Norton and the 1986 EEOC view under Clar-
ence Thomas, reference to a hypothetical case is useful. Consider a
case in which an employee enters her supervisor's office to consult
with him. Without making any explicit sexual demands, he asks her
highly personal questions about her sex life and volunteers informa-
tion about his own. He tells her of his interest in pornographic films,
improper purposes, unless the other party has notice that the agent is not
acting for the principal's benefit.
Id. § 165.
323 See REUSCHLEIN & GREGORY, supra note 34, §§ 48-50, at 101-02.
324 Id. § 49 (Principal and Agent).
325 Id. § 50 (Master and Servant).
326 EEOC Brief, supra note 314, at 26, 30.
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describing in detail the events depicted in such films. She cannot de-
termine whether he wants to have sex with her, to embarrass her, to
demonstrate his authority over her, or achieve some other purpose.3 27
Indeed, he may be equally clueless as to his motives. Regardless, the
effect is that she is embarrassed and humiliated. In response to his
conduct, she attempts to change the subject and extricate herself, but
although the employer has a process for complaining about sexual
harassment, she chooses not to complain. Why not? She may be wor-
ried about the consequences to her career.3 28 She may be worried
that she will not be believed. She may believe that the fact-finding
process that will follow the complaint will exacerbate the humiliation
that she has already experienced. Or, just as he may be uncertain of
his own motives in harassing her, she may be unsure of her reasons for
not complaining.
This conduct, if judged sufficiently pervasive or severe to be ex-
perienced as hostile or abusive by a reasonable person in the em-
ployee's position, constitutes hostile work environment sexual
harassment. Under the 1980 Guidelines, the employer is responsible
for the supervisor's harassment. But under the view urged by the So-
licitor General in Vinson, the employer is not liable.
3. The Vinson Decision
The Supreme Court unanimously endorsed the Guidelines' posi-
tion that hostile work environment sexual harassment violates Title
VII:
"[U]nvelcome sexual advances, requests for sexual favors, and
other verbal or physical conduct of a sexual nature" . . . constitutes
prohibited "sexual harassment," whether or not it is directly linked
to the grant or denial of an economic quid pro quo, where "such
conduct has the purpose or effect of unreasonably interfering with
an individual's work performance or creating an intimidating, hos-
tile, or offensive working environment. '329
327 Regardless of his motives, his conduct constitutes sexual harassment. EEOC v.
Farmer Bros. Co., 31 F.3d 891, 897-98 (9th Cir. 1994) (sexual harassment illegal whether
motivated by sexual desire or gender bias); Steiner v. Showboat Operating Co., 25 F.3d
1459, 1463 (9th Cir. 1994), cert. denied, 115 S. Ct. 733 (1995) (supervisor used sexual harass-
ment to humiliate and disempower women employees); King v. Board of Regents of the
Univ. of Wisconsin, 898 F.2d 533, 539 (7th Cir. 1990) (same); Waltman v. Int'l Paper Co.,
875 F.2d 468, 471-72, 482 (5th Cir. 1989) (discussing male employees' use of sexual harass-
ment to distress and demean female co-employee).
328 See BARBARA A. GuTEm, SEX AND THE WoRKPLAcE 71 (1985) (30% of sexually
harassed women thought that reporting the harassment would hurt them); Barbara A.
Gutek, Understanding Sexual Harassment at Work, 6 NoTRE DAMEJ. L., ETHICS & PUB. POL'Y
335, 348-49 (1992) (many women "fear becoming victims of retaliation if they complain
about the harassment").
329 477 U.S. at 65 (citation omitted) (quoting 29 C.F.R. § 1604.11(a) (3)).
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Moreover, the Court rejected the bank's position that "the mere
existence of a grievance procedure and a policy against discrimina-
tion, coupled with [the victim's] failure to invoke that procedure,
must insulate [the employer] from liability."33 0 But on the vicarious
liability question, the Court closely divided in favor of the view urged
by EEOC Chairman Thomas and the Solicitor General.331 The lead
opinion, by Justice Rehnquist, followed the reasoning, and often the
language, of the Solicitor General's brief and the Henson decision.
The opinion noted that the question was not necessary to the resolu-
tion of the case, and thus declined to issue a "definitive rule" on it.332
Although only dicta, the language nonetheless made it clear that the
Court agreed in principle with the new EEOC position:
[W]e do agree with the EEOC that Congress wanted courts to look
to agency principles for guidance in this area. While such common-
law principles may not be transferable in all their particulars to Tide
VII, Congress' decision to define 'employer' to include any 'agent'
of an employer, 42 U. S. C. §2000e(b), surely evinces an intent to
place some limits on the acts of employees for which employers
under Tide VII are to be held responsible. For this reason, we hold
that the Court of Appeals erred in concluding that employers are
always automatically liable for sexual harassment by their supervi-
sors. See generally Restatement (Second) of Agency §§219-237
(1958). For the same reason, absence of notice to an employer
does not necessarily insulate that employer from liability. Ibid....
As to employer liability, we conclude that the Court of Appeals was
wrong to entirely disregard agency principles and impose absolute
liability on employers for the acts of their supervisors, regardless of
the circumstances of a particular case.333
330 Id. at 72.
331 On this question, ChiefJustice Burger and Justices White, Powell, and O'Connor
joined Justice Rehnquist. Justices Brennan and BlackmunjoinedJustice Marshall, concur-
ring in the judgment. Justice Stevens joined both opinions, seeing no inconsistency be-
tween them.
332 "This debate over the appropriate standard for employer liability has a rather ab-
stract quality about it given the state of the record in this case.... We therefore decline the
parties' invitation to issue a definitive rule on employer liability." 477 U.S. at 72.
333 Id. at 72-73. In his concurrence, Justice Marshall agreed that agency principles
applied to the employer liability issue, but asserted that the standards articulated in the
Guidelines were a proper application of the law of agency and should be followed.
A supervisor's responsibilities do not begin and end with the power to hire,
fire, and discipline employees, or with the power to recommend such ac-
tions. Rather, a supervisor is charged with the day-to-day supervision of the
work environment and with ensuring a safe, productive workplace. There
is no reason why abuse of the latter authority should have different conse-
quences than abuse of the former. In both cases it is the authority vested in
the supervisor by the employer that enables him to commit the wrong: it is
precisely because the supervisor is understood to be clothed with the em-
ployer's authority that he is able to impose unwelcome sexual conduct on
subordinates. There is therefore no justification for a special rule, to be
applied only in 'hostile environment' cases, that sexual harassment does
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The Vinson decision illustrates why a court should avoid deciding
issues unnecessary to the resolution of the particular dispute before it.
Although the lead opinion correctly held that the question of em-
ployer liability for work environment sexual harassment turns upon
the question of agency, the opinion failed to recognize that the court
of appeals' opinion did not "entirely disregard agency principles."3 34
Rather, the court of appeals correctly applied the law of agency in
determining that employers are responsible for hostile work environ-
ment sexual harassment by their supervisors.33 5 The Court assumed,
without discussion, that a distinction should be drawn between the
acts of supervisors and the acts of agents. The Court failed to recog-
nize, however, that given the responsibilities that supervisors exercise
over the workplace, they are agents.33 6 In the years following Vinson,
this led to a great deal of unnecessary uncertainty and confusion in
the law of sexual harassment.
IV
EXACERBATING THE EXASPERATING II- VINsOwAPPLIED
A. Vinson Applied by the Courts
In the wake of Vinson, the circuits have split on the proper test to
apply to hostile work environment harassment by a supervisor. Ironi-
cally, however, they have uniformly rejected a proper application of
respondeat superior. The Court's dicta in Vinson-that although Con-
gress intended some form of agency liability to apply, strict vicarious
liability for harassment by supervisors was not appropriate-spawned
lower court decisions that are difficult to reconcile with the law of
agency, the 1980 Guidelines, and the bulk of the Vinson decision. 337
not create employer liability until the employee suffering the discrimina-
tion notifies other supervisors. No such requirement appears in the statute,
and no such requirement can coherently be drawn from the law of agency.
Id. at 76-77.
334 Id. at 72-73.
335 Vinson v. Taylor, 753 F.2d 141, 149-50 (D.C. Cir. 1985).
336 The Court's reliance on authority from the law of agency is limited to a single
citation to the Restatement: "[W]e hold that the Court of Appeals erred in concluding
that employers are always automatically liable for sexual harassment by their supervisors.
See generally RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY §§ 219-237 (1958)." 477 U.S. at 72. The
sections cited are the compilation of the law of respondeat superior and direct employer
liability. The Court makes no reference to the special obligations imposed on employers
to protect their employees. See generally RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AcENCY §§ 492-520
(1957).
337 The Vinson decision has been the subject of much scholarly literature, some of
which discusses the fundamental confusion regarding the law of agency. See, e.g., Maria M.
Carrillo, Hostile Environment Sexual Harassment by a Supervisor Under Title VI. Reassessment of
Employer Liability in Light of the Civil Rights Act of 1991, 24 COLUM. HUM. RTS. L. REv. 41, 58
(1992-1993) (stating that Vinson is primarily responsible for the divergence from vicarious
liability of employers for supervisory sexual harassment); Estrich, supra note 44, at 826
(commenting that Vinson imposed restrictions on Title VII suits that reinforced demeaning
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1. Cases Requiring Both Vicarious Liability and Direct Liability
Several courts applying Vinson have required the plaintiff to prove
both vicarious and direct liability. For example, in Kauffman v. Allied
Signal,338 the Sixth Circuit held that in a hostile work environment
case, it is not enough that the plaintiff establish that a supervisor's
harassment was within the scope of his employment. The plaintiff
must also show that the employer failed to respond adequately and
effectively when it learned of the harassment.3 39 As in Henson, this
standard requires the employee to first prove that the employer is vi-
cariously liable under agency standards, and then to prove that the
employer is directly liable because of its own misconduct.
In Kauffman, the Sixth Circuit held that a supervisor acted within
the scope of his employment when he harassed the plaintiff.340 How-
ever, the court also determined that the company's response was
prompt and adequate, thereby relieving it of liability under the law of
agency.341 The court failed to explain the reasoning underlying its
purported application of the law of agency. Indeed, the court's con-
clusion is mystifying. The central and basic rule of master-servant
agency law is that if an employee commits a wrongful act within the
scope of his employment, the employer is liable.342 A company's swift
response may absolve it of any direct liability and protect it from puni-
tive damages, but a company's vicarious liability for the acts of its
agents carried out within the scope of their agency is absolute. That
the court would hold otherwise is bewildering. Although the court
sexual stereotypes of women); B. Glenn George, The Back Door: Legitimizing Sexual Harass-
ment Claims, 73 B.U. L. REv. 1, 35-37 (1993) (arguing that employer should bear responsi-
bility for its supervisor's sexual harassment); MichaelJ. Phillips, Employer Sexual Harassment
Liability Under Agency Principles: A Second Look at Meritor Savings Bank, FSB v. Vinson, 44
VAND. L. REv. 1229, 1240 (1991) (arguing that the Court's application of agency law in
sexual harassment cases is deeply flawed and has caused significant confusion); Katherine
S. Anderson, Note, Employer Liability Under Title WIfor Sexual Harassment After Meritor Savings
Bank v. Vinson, 87 COLUM. L. REV. 1258, 1265 (1987) (stating that the Vinson Court did not
resolve conflicts among the lower courts); Rachel E. Lumer, Note, Employer Liability for
Sexual Harassment: The Morass of Agency Principles and Respondeat Superior, 1993 U. ILL. L.
REv. 589, 607 (arguing that Vinson leaves courts with too much discretion when imposing
employer liability); Marlisa Vinciguerra, Note, The Aftermath of Meritor: A Search for Stan-
dards in the Law of Sexual Harassment, 98 YALE L. REv. 1717, 1730 (1989) (stating that the
Court's refusal to delineate the scope of employer liability for sexual harassment in Vinson
assures the perpetuation of confusion).
338 970 F.2d 178 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 831 (1992).
339 Id. at 184. The Sixth Circuit recently characterized its test in Kauffman as evaluat-
ing liability depending "on 1) whether the supervisor's harassing actions were foreseeable
or fell within the scope of his employment and 2) even if they were, whether the employer
responded adequately and effectively to negate liability." Pierce v. Commonwealth Life
Ins. Co., 40 F.3d 796, 803 (6th Cir. 1994).
340 Kauffman, 970 F.2d at 184-85.
341 Id. at 185.
342 See supra part IA
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purportedly applied rules of vicarious liability, it insisted that the
plaintiff prove the direct liability of the employer.
This direct liability standard was also adopted by the Third Cir-
cuit in Andrews v. City of Philadelphia.343 That case involved two female
police officers harassed by their fellow officers and their sergeants
with the complicity of their captain. The court correctly held that to
apply the law of agency under Vinson, the trial court must apply respon-
deat superior.3 "4 But the court incorrectly held that under respondeat
superior the plaintiff must prove "that management-level employees
had actual or constructive knowledge about the existence of a sexually
hostile environment and failed to take prompt and adequate remedial
action." 345 Thus, where middle management employees knew of and
acquiesced in the harassment, the employer must "demonstrate that
its supervisory employees investigated [the] plaintiffs' complaints and
took appropriate action."346
If middle-management employees acquiesced in the harassment,
why should it matter that they thereafter took appropriate action?
They had already, as agents of the employer, ratified the improper
behavior. The court should have recognized that it was too late for
the employer to escape liability. The Andrews rule, in essence, gives
employers the right to permit harassment, with impunity, until after
the employer receives notice. This, in fact, was the 'very argument
made by the Government, and rejected by the Court, in Vinson.347
This basic misunderstanding of the law of agency has also been
applied to harassment cases involving corporate officers and other
high-level supervisors. In Steele v. Offshore Shipbuilding, Inc.,34 8 -one of
the three cases described in the Introduction-the Eleventh Circuit
found that even harassment by a corporate vice president could not
automatically be attributed to his employer. The district court found
that the company's vice president and general manager 49 was an
agent of the employer, and thus an employer under Title VII.350 He
was personally assessed nominal damages.3 51 But because the person-
343 895 F.2d 1469 (3d Cir. 1990). This rule was adopted by the First Circuit in Kiessens
v. United States Postal Serv., 42 F.3d 1384 (1st Cir. 1994), discussed supra text accompany-
ing notes 16-22.
344 Andrews, 895 F.2d at 1486.
345 Id.
346 Id.
347 See Vinson, 477 U.S. at 72 (existence of grievance procedure and policy against sex-
ual harassment does not insulate employer from liability).
348 867 F.2d 1311 (11th Cir. 1989).
349 Id. at 1314.
350 See discussion infra text accompanying notes 367-77, 388-401 (discussing Sparks v.
Pilot, 830 F.2d 1554 (11th Cir. 1987), and Paroline v. Unisys Corp., 879 F.2d 100 (4th Cir.
1989), vacated in part, 900 F.2d 27 (1990)).
351 Steee 867 F.2d at 1314.
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nel at corporate headquarters in New York, who were initially unaware
of the harassment, reprimanded the vice president when notified, the
court excused the company from liability.3 52 The court of appeals af-
firmed, finding that the harassment, which included the supervisor's
requests that employees "visit him on the couch in his office,"353 did
not relate to his supervisory authority. Therefore, the law of agency,
the court argued, provided no link between the company and its cor-
porate officer.3 54
In two recent cases, the Ninth Circuit joined the First, Third,
Sixth, Eighth, and Eleventh Circuits to require direct employer liabil-
ity where respondeat superior should have applied. In Steiner v. Showboat
Operating Co.,355 the court adopted a Henson-like analysis. A company
vice president, Trenkle, verbally harassed the plaintiff, publicly refer-
ring to her as a "dumb fucking broad," "cunt," and "fucking cunt."3 56
When criticizing the plaintiff for giving free meals to certain custom-
ers, Trenkle suggested that she also "suck their dicks."3 57 Steiner, the
plaintiff, lodged a complaint, and Trenkle was reprimanded. But
Trenkle continued to harass Steiner for eleven months, until the com-
pany fired him for sexually harassing another employee.
The district court ordered summary judgment for the defendant.
The court of appeals reversed, citing a case involving harassment by a
nonsupervisory co-employee. That case held that an employee may
352 Id.
353 Id. at 1313.
354 Id. at 1314, 1316-17. Similarly, in Kotcher v. Rosa & Sullivan Appliance Center,
Inc., 957 F.2d 59 (2d Cir. 1992)-another case discussed in the introduction-the Second
Circuit held that harassment by a store manager need not be imputed to the store's owner.
The Second Circuit recently distinguished the Kotcher decision in Karibian v. Columbia
University, 14 F.3d 773 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 114 S. Ct. 2693 (1994), but in doing so, failed
to adopt a true agency test. In Karibian, a student-employee complained that she was co-
erced into entering a violent sexual relationship by her supervisor. When she complained
about his conduct to the school's Equal Opportunity Coordinator, he urged her not to file
a complaint, and the school did not investigate the supervisor's conduct. The district court
granted summary judgment to the defendants, relying on Kotcher. On appeal, the circuit
court reversed, explaining:
We hold that an employer is liable for the discriminatorily abusive work
environment created by a supervisor if the supervisor uses his actual or ap-
parent authority to further the harassment, or if he was otherwise aided in
accomplishing the harassment by the existence of the agency relationship.
In contrast, where a low-level supervisor does not rely on his supervisory
authority to carry out the harassment, the situation will generally be indis-
tinguishable from cases in which the harassment is perpetrated by the
plaintiff s co-workers; consequently, the Kotcher standard of employer liabil-
ity will generally apply, and the employer will not be liable unless "the em-
ployer either provided no reasonable avenue for complaint or knew of the
harassment but did nothing about it."
14 F.3d at 780 (citations omitted).
355 25 F.3d 1459 (9th Cir. 1994), cert. denied, 115 S. Ct. 733 (1995).
356 Id. at 1461.
357 Id.
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prevail if she can establish that the company failed to properly re-
spond to her complaints of harassment.3 58 Thus, despite the fact that
Trenide was a vice president of the company, liability for his harass-
ment would extend to the company only if the company itself failed to
act appropriately following Steiner's complaint. In short, the court
ignored Trenkle's role as an agent, absolving the company of any vica-
rious liability.
In a separate decision by the Ninth Circuit, Nichols v. Frank,359 a
postal clerk was sexually harassed by her shift supervisor, Francisco.
Francisco was the highest ranking manager on the plaintiff's shift.3 6 0
He had authority to direct employees' assignments, and to grant leave
and overtime pay.361 He was also the only supervisor who could com-
municate with Nichols, who is deaf and communicates through
sign.3 62 The district court found that Francisco continuously de-
manded that Nichols perform oral sex on him. It held the Postal Ser-
vice liable for Francisco's harassment "under the 'principles of the law
of agency"' because he was "acting within the 'scope of his
employment.'"3 6 3
The Ninth Circuit affirmed, but only because it considered Fran-
cisco's conduct quid pro quo harassment.364 The court held that in a
hostile work environment case the question is not whether the har-
asser was acting within the scope of employment, but whether the har-
assment was known to "management-level employees."3 65 Francisco,
the court held, was not a management-level employee; therefore, the
Postal Service was not liable under a theory of hostile work environ-
ment sexual harassment. 366
358 Id. at 1464.
359 42 F.3d 503 (9th Cir. 1994).
360 Id. at 506.
361 Id. at 506-07.
362 Id. at 507.
363 Id. at 508.
364 Id. at 508-09. The court relied on the 1980 EEOC Guidelines, but did not discuss
their application to hostile work environment sexual harassment. Id. at 511.
365 Id. at 508. The court relied on its earlier decision in EEOC v. Hacienda Hotel, 881
F.2d 1504 (9th Cir. 1989), which in turn relied on Vinson. See 881 F.2d at 1515-16.
Although each was a Ninth Circuit decision involving employer liability for work environ-
ment sexual harassment by a supervisor, Steiner did not cite Hacienda, nor did Nichols cite
Steiner.
366 Nichols, 42 F.3d at 508. Ironically, when faced with the problem of applying agency
law to assess employer liability for a supervisor's sexual harassment under state tort law, the
Ninth Circuit has had no trouble resolving the issue by simply applying the rule of respon-
deat superior. In Dias v. Sky Chefs, Inc., 919 F.2d 1370, 1373 (9th Cir. 1990), cert. denied, 503
U.S. 920 (1992), the plaintiff was verbally sexually harassed by her general manager. When
she complained about his conduct, she was transferred to another job, and then termi-
nated. Rather than file a Title VII action, she sued her former employer under Oregon law
for wrongful discharge and intentional infliction of emotional distress. The discharge was
wrongful because it was in violation of Oregon's public policy protecting employees from
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In each of the preceding cases, the courts of appeals have not, as
they have claimed, applied the law of agency. Instead, they have re-
jected it. The courts are treating the problem of liability for sexual
harassment as if it required proof of direct liability. If that were true,
the Supreme Court, in Vinson, would not have referred to agency law
at all. It would have instead held that all sexual harassment cases must
be based entirely on the independent liability of an employer. Yet
nothing in Vinson or the law of agency so provides.
2. Cases Rejecting Strict Vicarious Liability While Adopting Some
Elements of Agency Law
Some cases have rejected strict vicarious liability while adopting
other elements of agency law. In Sparks v. Pilot Freight Carriers, Inc.,367
the plaintiff, a secretary, was harassed by Long, her direct supervisor,
who held the position of "terminal manager." As terminal manager,
Long held the highest position in his geographical area, and "had au-
thority to exercise virtually unfettered discretion over personnel mat-
ters."368 He physically and verbally sexually harassed the plaintiff in
his office on a regular basis. He would, for example, rub her shoul-
ders, "fool with" and smell her hair, and repeatedly inquire into her
personal life.3 69 He also asked her if she could become pregnant;
and, after she declined his request to take him to her home, he made
threats against her, including one that the district court considered
"too sexually explicit" to put on the record.370
The Eleventh Circuit, applying Vinson, reversed an order of sum-
mary judgment for the employer based on an agency analysis.37' But
the court declined to find the employer liable under respondeat supe-
rior.372 It found instead that the employer could be liable only under
a convoluted application of agency law under which the supervisor
was treated as a statutory employer.3 73 The court found that Long was
not only an employee, but also was an agent of the employer. As such,
sexual harassment. The harassment and the retaliation constituted intentional infliction
of emotional distress. The court affirmed a jury verdict of $625,000 over the defendant's
assertion that it should not be held liable for its manager's conduct. Id. at 1876. The court
held the defendant vicariously liable under Oregon law because the manager's conduct,
although unauthorized, was within the scope of his employment Id. at 1375-76. The court
did not consider the question of whether the employer, as a separate entity, must itself
have knowledge of the manager's wrongdoing. Rather, it correctly applied the law of
agency, as other post-Vinson cases should, holding the employer vicariously liable for its
agents acts. Id.
367 830 F.2d 1554 (11th Cir. 1987).
368 Id. at 1556.
369 Id.
370 Id.
371 Id. at 1557-58, 1560.
372 Id. at 1558-59.
378 Id. at 1557-58.
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the court reasoned, he personally was Sparks's "employer" as defined
by Title VII.374 Thus, if Long was acting as Pilot Freight's agent in
harassing Sparks, and he personally was an employer as defined by
Title VII, Pilot Freight was liable for his harassment.3 75 The court
found he was an agent based on section 219(2) (d) of the Restatement
(Second) of Agency, which imposes liability where an employee is
"aided in accomplishing the tort by the existence of the agency
relationship."3 76
The result in Sparks is unassailable, and the use of Restatement
section 219(2) (d) is appropriate. But the determination that there
was no respondeat superior liability under section 219(1) is bewildering.
An employee may be acting within the scope of his employment even
when engaging in acts prohibited by the employer.3 77 A corporation
acts through its employees; and in Sparks, the highest ranking em-
ployee at the work-site engaged in the harassment. The acts of harass-
ment occurred within the context of his supervision of the plaintiff as
his secretary. If it means anything that an employee may bind the
employer despite the employer's lack of fault, Sparks called for the
application of respondeat superior.
In Hicks v. Gates Rubber Co.378 the Tenth Circuit adopted a posi-
tion similar to the Eleventh Circuit in Sparks. In Hicks, the plaintiff's
direct supervisor harassed her physically on at least two separate occa-
sions.379 On one occasion he grabbed her buttocks; on another, he
grabbed her breasts and, when she fell over, got on top of her.3 80 The
district court granted summary judgment for the defendant, finding
that the incidents, though "boorish,"381 did not constitute sexual har-
assment in violation of Title VII.3 82
The court of appeals reversed and remanded on the question of
whether the supervisor's sexual harassment could be attributed to the
employer.5 83 Offering guidance to the trial court, the Tenth Circuit
held that the employer could not be vicariously liable under respondeat
superior because sexual harassment did not fall within his job descrip-
374 Id.
375 Id.
376 Id. at 1559.
377 RESTATEMENT (SEcoND) OF AGENCY § 230 (1957); see discussion supra part IA.
378 833 F.2d 1406 (10th Cir. 1987).
379 Id. at 1410-11.
380 Id. at 1410. The supervisor also referred to African Americans as "niggers" and
"coons," and, referring to the plaintiff, an African American, complained about "lazy nig-
gers." The court inexplicably concluded that the supervisor's actions did not constitute
racial harassment. Id. at 1409, 1412-13.
381 Id. at 1411.
382 Id. at 1411-12.
383 Id. at 1417-19.
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tion. 38 4 The court concluded that employer liability instead could
arise under the principles of Restatement section 219(2) if. (1) the
employer was negligent or reckless; (2) the employee relied on the
supervisor's apparent authority; or (3) the supervisor was aided in his
harassment by the existence of the agency relationship.38 5
Again, the court misconstrued the scope of agency law. By limit-
ing the scope of an employee's employment to situations in which the
employee is properly engaged in carrying out his specific job duties,
the court rendered respondeat superior virtually meaningless. Employ-
ers rarely employ workers for the purpose of engaging in wrongful
acts. Delivery drivers are instructed to drive carefully, yet their negli-
gent, reckless, or even intentionally injurious driving is attributed to
their employer.38 6 Store clerks are instructed to act courteously, yet
their assaults on customers are the responsibility of the employer.38 7
The Tenth Circuit was correct to subject the employer to potential
liability under Restatement section 219(2), but was wrong in failing to
impose vicarious liability under respondeat superior.
The Fourth Circuit adopted a similar test in Paroline v. Unisys
Corp.,38 8 where a supervisor's wrongful acts included making sexually
suggestive remarks to the plaintiff, rubbing his hands over her back
even as she asked him to stop, and grabbing and kissing her against
her will.389 The district court granted summary judgment for the de-
fendants on the grounds that the employer took appropriate remedial
action and because the plaintiff terminated her employment before
the employer's remedy could work.390
The court of appeals began its analysis by examining whether the
supervisor, Moore, was an agent of Unisys. It adopted a test applied
elsewhere to determine whether an employee could be named indi-
vidually as an agent of an employer, and therefore qualify as a statu-
tory employer under Title VII.3 9 1 The court inquired whether the
384 Id. at 1417-18.
385 Id. at 1418.
386 See discussion supra text accompanying notes 90-94.
387 See discussion supra text accompanying notes 99-102.
388 879 F.2d 100 (4th Cir. 1989), vacated in par4 900 F.2d 27 (4th Cir. 1990).
389 Id. at 103.
390 Id. at 102.
391 Id. at 104. Early cases generally held that employees who are agents under Title VII
are statutory employers and may be personally liable for violations of the Act. See, e.g.,
Compston v. Borden, Inc., 424 F. Supp. 157, 158 (S.D. Ohio 1976) (supervisor in harass-
ment case was an agent, and thus an employer liable in damages under Title VII); Hutchi-
son v. Lake Oswego Sch. Dist., 374 F. Supp. 1056, 1059 (D. Or. 1974) (school board
members, as agents, are personally liable under Title VII), rev'd in par4 519 F.2d 961 (9th
Cir. 1975) (board members entitled to sovereign immunity), vacated on other grounds, 429
U.S. 1033 (1977). More recent cases have split on whether agent-employees may be per-
sonally liable under Title VII. Compare Sauers v. Salt Lake County, 1 F.3d 1122, 1125 (10th
Cir. 1993) (supervisory employees not individually liable under Tide VII but may be sued
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individual defendant served in a supervisory position in which he ex-
ercised "significant control over the plaintiffs hiring, firing or condi-
tions of employment. '3 92 This standard represents a workable,
common-sense definition to determine which employees act as agents
for Title VII purposes393 It is consistent with the law of agency, the
'job functions and circumstances of the particular employment rela-
tionship" test of the EEOC Guidelines, and the NLRA definition of
supervisor. It represents substantial progress in applying the law of
agency to the problem of employer liability for harassment by
supervisors.
Rather than ending the analysis here, however, the Paroline court
then went on to hold that if Moore was acting as an agent of Unisys in
his harassment, Unisys might nonetheless escape liability by establish-
ing that it took prompt and adequate remedial steps to deter Moore
from further harassment.3 94 Again, as in Henson, Sparks, and Hicks, a
court of appeals failed to properly apply the law of agency.3 95 Once
in their professional capacity for the purpose of recovering from the employer) and Busby
v. City of Orlando, 931 F.2d 764, 772 (11th Cir. 1991) (supervisory employees may not be
sued under Title VII in their individual capacities, but may be sued as agents for the pur-
pose of recovering from the employer) with Miller v. Maxwell's Int'l, Inc., 991 F.2d 583, 587
(9th Cir. 1993), cert. denied, 114 S. Ct. 1049 (1994) (no individual liability for supervisors'
violations of Title VII even if they qualify as agents); Bridges v. Eastman Kodak Co., 800 F.
Supp. 1172, 1180 (S.D.N.Y. 1992) (stating that both individual and official liability may be
imposed and that any narrow reading of Title VII has been undercut by the Civil Rights Act
of 1991); Kolb v. Ohio, Dep't of Mental Retardation & Dev. Disabilities, 721 F. Supp. 885,
891 (N.D. Ohio 1989) (stating that individuals who are responsible for making and/or
contributing to employment decisions may be liable as agents of the employer under Title
VII); McAdoo v. Toll, 591 F. Supp. 1399, 1404-06 (D. Md. 1984) (individuals liable for
discrimination under Title VII because they were charged with the responsibility-or con-
tributing to-employment decisions for the employer). See generally the cases cited in
Miller, 991 F.2d at 587. For additional reading see Scott B. Goldberg, Comment, Discrimi-
nation by Managers and Supervisors: Recognizing Agent Liability Under Title VII, 143 U. PA. L.
Rxv. 571 (1994); Christopher Greer, Note, "'W, Me?: A Supervisor's Individual Liability For
Discrimination in the Workplace, 62 FoRDHAm L. Rxv. 1835 (1994); Phillip L. Lamberson,
Comment, Personal Liability for Violations of Title VI: Thirty Years of Indecision, 46 BAYLOR L.
REv. 419 (1994).
392 Paroline, 879 F.2d at 104.
393 Similarly, the Sixth Circuit determines whether a harassing supervisor is acting
within the scope of his employment, and thus as an agent, by examining where and when
the harassment occurs; whether the action was foreseeable; and whether the harasser has
the authority to hire, fire, promote, and discipline the plaintiff. See, e.g., Kauffinan v. Allied
Signal, 970 F.2d 178, 184, 186 (6th Cir. 1992); Yates v. Avco Corp., 819 F.2d 630, 636 (6th
Cir. 1987). In the Sixth Circuit, however, harassment by an agent is not attributed to the
employer unless the employer is also directly at fault. See discussion supra text accompany-
ing notes 338-42.
394 Paroline, 879 F.2d at 106.
395 The Eighth Circuit appears to make the same error. In Davis v. Tri-State Mack
Distribs., Inc., 981 F.2d 340 (8th Cir. 1992), the court affirmed the district court's finding
of employer liability, holding that because the employee had complained to the branch
manager, there was no need for her to prove notice to the corporate headquarters. Id. at
343. The Davis court failed to recognize that under a proper application of agency law,
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the plaintiff has established that she was harassed by an agent of the
employer-here a supervisory employee acting within the scope of his
employment-the plaintiff should not need to prove some form of
direct liability on the part of the employer.3 96
In its discussion of direct (as opposed to vicarious) liability, the
Paroline court suggested a number of theories under which the plain-
tiff might recover. First, the plaintiff could persuade the trier of fact
that the steps taken by the employer were inadequate and not reason-
ably calculated to prevent further harassment 3 97 This approach com-
ports with Henson, and with the common-law agency doctrine of
ratification-by failing to take effective acts to remedy the employee's
harassment, the employer ratifies it, and thereby accepts responsibil-
ity.39 8 Second, the Paroline court suggested that the plaintiff could
prevail by establishing that because Unisys knew in advance that
Moore was harassing other women, there was a substantial risk that he
would also harass Paroline unless the company took preventative
measures.3 99 The court held that when employers are on notice of
prior harassment, so that they reasonably should anticipate further
harassment, they have a duty to take reasonable steps to prevent such
harassment from occurring.40 0 This approach is consistent with the
common law agency rule that employers have a duty to warn their
employees of known, reasonably foreseeable, or reasonably knowable
risks.40' The employer's failure to prevent such foreseeable harm con-
stitutes negligence.
In Paroline, Hicks, and Sparks, the circuit courts sought agency law
solutions for the problem created by the dicta in Vinson. Nevertheless,
the courts failed to identify the best solution-that proper application
of respondeat superior is sufficient to hold an employer vicariously liable
for harassment by its supervisors.
harassment by the service manager alone may be attributable to the employer, regardless
of the knowledge of headquarters' personnel.
396 In Kotcher, the Second Circuit agreed with the Sparks, Hicks, and Paroline courts in
holding that direct liability should result if an employer fails to adequately respond to a
complaint of harassment. Kotcher v. Rosa & Sullivan Appliance Ctr., Inc., 957 F.2d 59, 62-
63 (2d Cir. 1992); cf. Bouton v. BMW of N. Am., Inc., 29 F.3d 103, 110 (3d Cir. 1994)
("[We hold that an effective grievance procedure-one that is known to the victim and
that timely stops the harassment-shields the employer from Title VII liability for a hostile
environment.").
397 Paroline, 879 F.2d at 106-07.
398 See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 82 (1957).
399 Paroline 879 F.2d at 107. The factual support for this determination included
Moore's conduct during Paroline's employment interview-when he asked her how she
would react to being sexually harassed on the job-and the fact that before Paroline was
ever hired, Moore had been warned by his supervisor, Peterson, not to engage in sexual
harassment, but that Peterson himself madejokes about prior claims of harassment. Id. at
103, 107-08.
400 Id. at 107.
401 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 492 (1957).
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B. Vinson Applied by the EEOC
In 1993, following the election of President Clinton, the EEOC
reexamined the circumstances under which it believed employers
should be liable for sexual harassment by their employees. The EEOC
proposed new Guidelines on harassment,402 but subsequently with-
drew them after critics attacked the predicted impact of the proposed
regulations on cases involving religious harassment.40 3 Had the
Guidelines been adopted, they undoubtedly would have helped to
clarify the application of agency principles to sexual harassment law.
In particular, the proposed 1993 EEOC Guidelines rejected the
vicarious-plus-direct liability standard applied by the circuit courts,
and thus would have reestablished a true agency test as the relevant
legal standard. The proposed Guidelines would have codified the in-
son Court's language in support of an agency test for employer liability
when a supervisor engages in hostile work environment harassment:
(a) An employer is liable for its conduct and that of its agents and
supervisory employees with respect to workplace harassment on the
basis of race, color, religion, gender, national origin, age, or
disability:
(1) Where the employer knew or should have known of the conduct
and failed to take immediate and appropriate corrective action; or
(2) Regardless of whether the employer knew or should have known
of the conduct, where the harassing supervisory employee is acting
in an 'agency capacity.' 404
This position correctly applies the law of agency to the law of sexual
harassment. It is contrary, however, to recent decisions of the First,
Second, Fourth, Sixth, Eighth, Ninth, Tenth, and Eleventh Circuits,
which would have used the conjunction "and" rather than "or" be-
tween subparts (1) and (2).405
V
A CRITIQUE OF VINSONAND ITS PROGENY
A. Why Employers Should Be Vicariously Liable for Sexual
Harassment by Supervisors
As Vinson properly recognized, the appropriate standards to de-
termine vicarious liability are found in the common law of agency.
These standards, the product of generations of experience, reflect the
proper allocation of responsibility among employee, supervisor, and
402 Guidelines on Harassment Based on Race, Color, Religion, Gender, National Ori-
gin, Age, or Disability, 29 C.F.R. § 1609 (1993) (issued Oct. 1, 1993; withdrawn Oct. 11,
1994).
403 59 Fed. Reg. 51,396 (1994).
404 58 Fed. Reg. 51,266, 51,269 (1998) (emphasis added).
405 See supra part IV.
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employer. Unfortunately, Justice Rehnquist's opinion in Vinson erro-
neously distinguished between agency liability and vicarious liability
for harassment committed by supervisors. 4° 6 The circuit courts com-
pounded this error as they attempted to apply Vinson,40 7 leaving the
area in chaos, especially in light of the contrary dictates of the 1980
EEOC Guidelines.
Many sound reasons support a return to an agency standard that
comports with the bright-line rule announced in the 1980 Guidelines.
First, the 1980 Guidelines reflect a proper application of agency law.
Under the doctrine of respondeat superior, employers are vicariously lia-
ble for the wrongs of their employees, if committed while acting
within the scope of their employment. In almost every circumstance,
a rule establishing employer liability for wrongful acts by the em-
ployer's supervisors will result in the proper application of common-
law respondeat superior.
By vesting supervisors with the authority to assign work to employ-
ees, to oversee their work, to hire, fire, or discipline them, or to rec-
ommend personnel decisions about them, employers give the
supervisors they select authority to control the work environment
Thus, even when the employer has a policy against sexual harassment,
and does all it can to enforce the policy, the law of agency holds the
employer responsible for the wrongs of its supervisors. Like the em-
ployer of the dishonest hotel maid, or the employer of the violent
train conductor, an appropriate response by the employer of a sexual
harasser may be a reason to absolve it of punitive damages,408 but is
not a reason to immunize it from responsibility for the actual harm
caused by its agent, acting within the scope of his employment.
Moreover, the law of agency requires us to assess an employer's
liability for sexual harassment with regard to the duties an employer
owes its employees. Given the special relationship which exists be-
tween employers and employees, employers have special duties to pro-
tect their employees from harm. These duties, like other analogous
special duties, should be recognized as nondelegable. It is not
enough for employers to tell their supervisors to refrain from sexual
harassment. The special relationship doctrine requires them to in-
sure it, by accepting responsibility when their supervisors misbehave.
Second, a bright-line rule lends itself to ease of application. The
line of cases after Vinson demonstrates the difficult task the federal
courts face when grappling with the law of agency. Attempts to apply
Vinson also encourage needless litigation-uncertainty about likely
outcomes undoubtedly raises unnecessary barriers to early dispute res-
406 477 U.S. at 72.
407 See supra part IVA
408 See discussion infra part V.B.
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olution. By holding employers vicariously liable for all harassment
committed by supervisors, employers and employees would have a
clearer picture of their respective rights, responsibilities, and liabili-
ties, rendering Title VII cases easier and less costly to resolve.
Reducing the uncertainties in Title VII sexual harassment litiga-
tion will also do much to effectuate the purposes of the statute. The
Act is intended to accomplish the Herculean task of eliminating un-
lawful discrimination and harassment in the workplace. Yet it is en-
forced almost entirely by litigation in which an employee or former
employee must battle against her better-funded employer. Any rule
that reduces wrangling over legal issues thus helps alleviate this re-
source disparity by encouraging resolution before the initiation of
full-fledged litigation.
In sum, the EEOC was wrong to disavow its 1980 Guidelines in
Vinson. The Guidelines, which imposed vicarious liability for all sex-
ual harassment by supervisors, effectuated the purposes of Title VII,
effectively applied the common law of agency, and established a
bright-line rule easy for employers and employees to follow. However,
rather than apply the common law of agency, or the Guidelines that
had adopted those common-law rules, the courts instead established a
new rule, foreign to the law of agency, and placed an improper bur-
den on the victims of sexual harassment.
B. The Growing Risk to Employment Discrimination Law
Caused by Vinson
The misapplication of agency law in sexual harassment cases has
now infected other areas of employment discrimination law. For ex-
ample, in North v. Madison Area Ass'n for Retarded Citizens Developmental
Centers Corp.,409 the Seventh Circuit attempted to apply Vinson in a ter-
mination case. The plaintiff offered evidence that the executive direc-
tor of the defendant association was motivated by racial animus when
he recommended to the board of directors that it fire the plaintiff.
The court held that under Vinson the plaintiff was required to prove
that the board itself was motivated by race. It rejected his argument
that the executive director was an agent of the employer, finding that
such a strict liability rule stood in conflict with Vinson: "While Meritor
was limited in its facts to a claim of sexual harassment, the conclusions
reached by the Court are, in our opinion, not so limited, but rather
apply to any claim under Title VII in which employer liability is at
issue." 410 This is a ridiculous result, and a dangerous one. It threat-
ens all of employment discrimination law. But it is a logical develop-
409 844 F.2d 401 (7th Cir. 1988).
410 Id. at 407 n.7.
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ment in light of the way in which the Vinson decision is being
misapplied.411
Academics, too, seem willing to disavow the common-law rules
adopted by the 1980 Guidelines. In a recent law review article, Profes-
sor Dennis Duffy argues that under Vinson, courts should not apply
common-law vicarious liability to claims of intentional infliction of
emotional distress. Instead, courts should seek proof that an em-
ployer took reasonable steps to prevent the infliction of distress and
adopted prompt remedial measures upon learning of its
occurrence.
412
In another article, ProfessorJ. Hoult Verkerke advances a propo-
sal4' 3 that, if adopted, would dramatically alter all of employment dis-
crimination law. Although he argues that there is no principled basis
for treating hostile work environment claims differently than quid pro
quo claims of sexual harassment,414 Professor Verkerke further sug-
gests that for reasons of economic efficiency, the best solution would
impose strict vicarious liability only in cases of systemic discrimina-
tion.4 15 In all cases involving individual claims of discrimination, Pro-
fessor Verkerke would immunize employers who had an internal
complaint-filing process unless the employee had filed a complaint
and the employer thereafter failed to take appropriate corrective ac-
tion.41 6 Under such a system, employers would effectively get one free
act of discrimination or harassment, regardless of the status of the
perpetrator.
Professor Verkerke's proposal would turn Title VII on its head,
but it, too, is a logical outcome of the confusion arising from Vinson.
The proposal is essentially the position taken by the Government in
Vinson, in which the Solicitor General argued that where an employer
adopted a proper complaint procedure, and the employee did not file
a complaint, the employer should be immune from liability.417 This
was the issue in Vinson on which the Court's opinion was unanimous;
the argument was rejected.418 The argument is especially untenable
411 Cf Lam v. University of Hawaii, 40 F.3d 1551 (9th Cir. 1994) (rejecting defendant's
argument in a race, sex, and national origin hiring case that an evaluator's improper bias
was insufficient to prove discrimination absent proof that the university knew or should
have known of the bias).
412 Dennis P. Duffy, Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress and Employment at Wil" The
Case Against "Tortification" of Labor and Employment Law, 74 B.U. L. Rtv. 387, 418-21 (1994).
413 Verkerke, supra note 38.
414 Id. at 275-77.
415 Id. at 363-66.
416 Id. at 279.
417 See infra notes 319-28 and accompanying text.
418 See infra notes 330-36 and accompanying text.
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in light of the Civil Rights Act of 1991.1 19 Before 1991, the primary
remedy available in a hostile work environment Title VII case was cor-
rective action. Absent an improper termination, money damages
were not available-the only monetary remedy was back pay. But the
1991 amendments to Title VII enable an employee to recover com-
pensatory damages for emotional distress, as well as punitive dam-
ages. 420 There is no reason to conclude that Congress approved of
these tort-like damage remedies while intending to restrict claims to
plaintiffs who have suffered repeated injuries. Professor Verkerke's
proposal that courts utilize the direct liability standard in all cases of
individual discrimination illustrates the danger of the current confu-
sion surrounding the application of agency law in employment dis-
crimination cases. If the courts require proof of direct liability by the
highest corporate officials in all individual Title VII cases, employers
will be free to discriminate with near impunity.
C. Theories on Why the Federal Courts Have Failed to Properly
Apply the Law of Agency in Determining Employer
Liability for Sexual Harassment by Supervisors
The preceding discussion established that the federal courts have
misapplied the law of agency in Title VII sexual harassment cases.
Why did such fundamental errors occur? Many plausible theories
present themselves as viable explanations.
One possibility is that counsel have failed to correctly and con-
vincingly explain the operation of respondeat superior. Without proper
guidance from the parties, courts may easily substitute an incorrect,
albeit common-sense, understanding of an agent's authority, for the
more exacting requirements imposed by the law of agency.
Any confusion in this regard is exacerbated by the early decisions
of Henson4 21 and Katz.4 22 The errors made in the Government's ami-
cus brief in Vinson, on which the majority of the Court relied, further
compounded the problem. And, on a more fundamental level,
"courts routinely disagree about the meaning of the basic terminology
[of agency], thus impairing their ability to conduct an intelligent in-
tercircuit dialogue."423
Another possible explanation stems from the similarity between
Title VII sexual harassment cases and constitutional harassment cases,
involving issues such as police misconduct. Police harassment cases,
419 Pub. L. No. 102-166, 105 Stat. 1074 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 2000-2
(Supp. V 1993)).
420 42 U.S.C. § 1981(a)(1) (1988 & Supp. V 1993).
421 682 F.2d 897 (11th Cir. 1982) (discussed supra text accompanying notes 280-84).
422 709 F.2d 251 (4th Cir. 1983) (discussed supra text accompanying notes 285-89).
423 Verkerke, sura note 38, at 286.
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often brought in federal court under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, frequently in-
volve tort-like verbal and physical harassment by officers, readily
analogous to sexual harassment in the workplace. But liability in
§ 1983 actions is subject to a significant limitation not applicable to
Title VII actions.
When an officer commits a wrongful act of harassment resulting
in a § 1983 action, his or her employer is unlikely to be subject to
vicarious liability. If the officer is a state employee, the state is entitled
to sovereign immunity under the Eleventh Amendment to the U.S.
Constitution. The law permits damages actions against individual
state employees, but not against state govemments. 424 If the officer is
a local government employee, constitutionally imposed sovereign im-
munity does not apply;425 but the employer, the local government, is
only subject to liability if the harassment occurred pursuant to its offi-
cial policy or custom. 426 As a result, few police harassment cases in
federal court may be pursued against employers, even when the of-
ficer was acting as an agent under the law of vicarious liability.427
Courts accustomed to these limitations on liability may find it unu-
sual, and counter-intuitive, to correctly apply the doctrine of respondeat
superior in analogous Title VII sexual harassment cases.
Yet another theory suggests that courts assessing vicarious com-
pensatory damages mistakenly apply the rules governing the imposi-
tion of vicarious punitive damages. Professor Dobbs, in his hornbook
on remedies, 428 explains:
It is ordinarily thought that there is no criminal liability without per-
sonal fault and accordingly vicarious criminal liability is based upon
424 Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U.S. 651 (1974).
425 Monell v. Department of Social Servs., 486 U.S. 658 (1978).
426 Id. at 694.
427 The Fifth Circuit's decision in Hamilton v. Rogers, 791 F.2d 439 (5th Cir. 1986),
illustrates the limitations of such misconduct cases. The plaintiff, an African American
firefighter, sued the City of Houston Fire Department for racial harassment by his supervi-
sors. The court found no departmental liability under the Constitution, explaining:
Under § 1983, the Fire Department cannot be held vicariously liable for the
actions of its employees; .... "[T] he doctrine [of respondeat superior] has no
application in an action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983." . . . Instead, liability
under § 1983 can arise only "for a deprivation of rights protected by the
Constitution or federal laws that is inflicted pursuant to official policy."
Id. at 443 (citations omitted). The court found that department policy did not encourage
racial discrimination, but rather expressly prohibited it. Although the lack of a policy en-
couraging harassment could be overcome by proof of a widespread practice of harassment,
the court found that a dozen incidents of racial harassment by supervisors within two-and-
a-half years was insufficient to "warrant the imputation of constructive knowledge to high
ranking officers of the Fire Department." Id. at 443. The court imposed liability under
Title VII, correctly applying common-law agency principles to hold that the supervisors
were agents of the department. Id. at 444.
428 DAN B. DOBBs, LAW OF REMEDIES: DAmAGEs-EQunY-RsTrnuTiON § 3.11(6) (2d
ed. 1993).
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conspiracy or ratification which shows participation in the crime by
the person charged, or approval of it. To the extent that punitive
damages are truly punitive in nature and thus to be assimilated to
criminal responsibility, one would expect to find similar limits.
In line with this, the Restatements and a number of courts ef-
fectively exclude any pure vicarious liability for punitive damages.
Under this rule, the principal may be held [liable for punitive dam-
ages] if he authorizes, ratifies or participates in the wrongdoing, but
not otherwise. In the case of corporate principals, this means that
managerial level employees must participate in or ratify the wrong-
doing before punitive damages can be awarded. The principal may
also be held for punitive damages if it is itself egregiously at fault, as
by retaining an employee known to be dangerous; but in this case
liability is personal, not vicarious.42 9
Dobbs's language should be familiar to any reader of the federal
court decisions that deny vicarious liability for sexual harassment by
supervisors. The similarity of the language used suggests that the un-
duly restrictive view of vicarious liability may derive, in part, from the
misapplication of punitive damages law to the question of general
liability.
Another possibility that warrants consideration is gender bias in
the courts. Most federal court judges are men,430 as are most defen-
dant supervisors. Similarly, most plaintiffs in such cases are women.
Of the twenty sexual harassment circuit court opinions discussed in
subparts II.B, III.A and IV.A of this Article, 43' fifty-six of the judges
were men, while only four were women.4 32 In every one of these
429 Id. § 3.11(6), at 495-96 (footnotes omitted).
430 As of late 1994, approximately 10% of all federal judges were women (219 women
judges out of 2081 federal judges). BNA's DIREcrORY OF STATE AND FEDERAL COURTS,
JUDGES, AND CLERKS 1994-95 ED. (1994).
431 Elessens v. United States Postal Serv., 42 F.3d 1384 (1st Cir. 1994); Nichols v. Frank,
42 F.3d 503 (9th Cir. 1994); Bouton v. BMW of N. Am., Inc. 29 F.3d 103 (3d Cir. 1994);
Steiner v. Showboat Operating Hotel, 25 F.3d 1459 (9th Cir. 1994); Karibian v. Columbia
Univ., 14 F.3d 773 (2d Cir. 1994); Davis v. Tri-State Mack Distribs., 981 F.2d 340 (8th Cir.
1992); Kauffman v. Allied Signal, 970 F.2d 178 (6th Cir. 1992); Kotcher v. Rosa & Sullivan
Appliance Ctr., 957 F.2d 59 (2d Cir. 1992); Andrews v. City of Philadelphia, 895 F.2d 1469
(3d Cir. 1990); Paroline v. Unisys Corp., 879 F.2d 100 (4th Cir. 1989); Steele v. Offshore
Shipbldg., Inc. 867 F.2d 1311 (11th Cir. 1989); Hicks v. Gates Rubber Co., 833 F.2d 1406
(10th Cir. 1987); Sparks v. PilotFreight Carriers, Inc., 830 F.2d 1554 (11th Cir. 1987);Yates
v. Avco Corp., 819 F.2d 630 (6th Cir. 1987); Katz v. Dole, 709 F.2d 251 (4th Cir. 1983);
Henson v. City of Dundee, 682 F.2d 897 (11th Cir. 1982); Bundy v. Jackson, 641 F.2d 934
(D.C. Cir. 1981); Miller v. Bank of Am., 600 F.2d 211 (9th Cir. 1979); Tomkins v. Public
Serv. Elec. & Gas Co., 568 F.2d 1044 (3d Cir. 1977); Barnes v. Costle, 561 F.2d 983 (D.C.
Cir. 1977).
432 The men, in the order of the cases appearing supra note 431 are: Bruce M. Selya,
Frank M. Coffin, and Hugh H. Bownes (K/essens); Melvin T. Brunetti, Ferdinand F. Fernan-
dez, and Stephen Reinhardt (Nichols); Timothy K. Lewis and CollinsJ. Seitz (Bouton); Alex
Kozinski and Stephen S. Trott (Steiner); J. Daniel Mahoney, Joseph M. McLaughlin, and
Gerald W. Heaney (Karibian); Richard S. Arnold, George G. Flagg, and J. Smith Henley
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cases, the plaintiffs were women-twenty-four in all. In every case, the
alleged harassers were men, for a total of at least thirty-seven men.43 3
Professor Susan Estrich argues that sexual harassment law, like rape
law, is one of the flash points that illustrate the gender bias of our
legal system:
These very same doctrines, unique in the criminal law, are becom-
ing familiar tools in sexual harassment cases. The rules and
prejudices have been borrowed almost wholesale from traditional
rape law. The focus on the conduct of the woman-her reactions
or lack of them, her resistance or lack of it-reappears with only the
most minor changes. The evaluative stance is distressingly familiar:
One judges the woman's injury from a perspective which ignores
women's views; or one compares her view to that of some ideal rea-
sonable woman, or that of women afraid to speak out against harass-
ment for fear of losing their jobs; and thus one applies a standard
that the victim cannot and does not meet.4 -4
Those who believe that Justice Thomas was himself committing
hostile work environment sexual harassment in the early 1980s may
voice yet another possible explanation. 435 By criticizing the newly is-
(Davis); DannyJ. Boggs, Alan E. Norris, and William 0. Bertelsman (Kauffman); George C.
Pratt, James L. Oakes, andJon 0. Newman (Kotcher); Edward R. Becker, Robert E. Cowen,
and Max Rosenn (Andrews); Sam J. Ervin, Francis D. Murnaghan, Jr., and James Harvie
Wilkenson, III (Paroline); Emmett Ripley Cox, Joseph W. Hatchett, and Frank M. Johnson,
Jr. (Steele); William J. Holloway, Jr., Oliver Seth, and Sam A. Crow (Hicks); James C. Hill,
and Elbert P. Tuttle (Sparks); David A. Nelson, Boyce F. Martin, Jr., and Harry W. Wellford
(Yates); Sam Ervin, III, Robert F. Chapman, and James Dickson Phillips (Katz); Robert S.
Vance and Thomas A. Clark (Henson), J. Skelly Wright, Aubrey E. Robinson, Jr., and Lu-
ther M. Swygert (Bundy); Walter T. McGovern, Ben Cushing Duniway, and John F.
Kilkenny (Miller); RuggeroJ. Aldisert, Max Rosenn, and Leonard I. Garth (Tomkins); and
Spottswood W. Robinson, III, David L. Bazelon, and George E. MacKinnon (Barnes). The
women, again in the order of the cases appearing supra note 431 are: Carol Los
Mansmann (Bouton); Betty Fletcher (Steiner); and Phyllis A. Kravitch (Sparks and Henson).
433 We have only counted those men specifically identified. They are listed in the
order of the cases as they appear supra note 481: William Russell and John Russell (K/es-
sens); Ron Francisco (Nichols); Hans Duenzl and Carl Hooser (Bouton); Jack Trenkle and
Dean Flurry (Steiner); Mark Urban and Mark Spillane (Karibian); Butch Hogland (Davis);
Donald R. Butts (Kauffman); Herbert Trageser (Kotcher); Frank Doyle and at least 3 un-
named officers (Andrews); Edgar L. Moore (Paroline); Anthony Bucknole (Steele); Mr. Holec
and Mr. Gleason (Hicks); Dennis Long and Carl Connell (Sparks); Edwin Sanders (Yates);
John Sullivan and at least 5 unnamed harassers (Katz); John Sellgren (Henson); Delbert
Jackson, Arthur Burton, James Gainey, and Lawrence Swain (Bundy); unnamed harasser
(Miller); unnamed harasser (Tomkins); and unnamed harasser (Barnes).
434 Estrich, supra note 43, at 815-16.
435 Anita Hill testified that Clarence Thomas began asking her out in late 1981, and
that he began using "work situations to discuss sex" including "pornographic films involv-
ing such matters as women having sex with animals .... group sex or rape scenes....
materials depicting individuals with large penises or large breasts involved in various sex
acts, [and] ... of his own sexual prowess" in late 1981 or early 1982. Hearings Before the
Senate Comm. on theJudiciay, 102d Cong., 1st Sess. 36-37 (1993) (testimony of Anita F. Hill,
Professor of Law, University of Oklahoma). The harassment allegedly continued, intermit-
tently, until the middle of 1983, when she left the EEOC. Former EEOC employee Angela
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sued 1980 EEOC Guidelines as "unwise" and concerned with "trivial
complaints, 436 and by using his position as Chair of the EEOC to urge
the Supreme Court to ignore the Guidelines, now-Justice Clarence
Thomas may have consciously or unconsciously allowed his own self-
interest to play a role.
Whatever the reason, both the Government in its amicus brief and
the Supreme Court majority in Vinson rendered a potentially clear is-
sue of law confusing. With time, the confusion has only worsened.
VI
CALIFORNIA'S STATUTORILY IMPOSED ABSOLUTE LIABILITY
FOR SUPERVISORIAL HARASSMENT-AN
ALTERNATIVE APPROACH
California's state employment discrimination law demonstrates
that the confusion sown by Vinson and its progeny is unnecessary. As
the federal courts continue to grapple with the question of whether,
and when, an employer is vicariously liable for supervisorial hostile
work environment harassment, California's treatment of the issue is
well settled. By codifying the 1980 EEOC Guidelines as state law, the
California Legislature has provided, and the California courts have
held, that employers are strictly liable for all sexual harassment com-
mitted by their supervisors.
Five years before the passage of the 1964 Civil Rights Act, Califor-
nia enacted its own employment discrimination statute, which was
originally known as the Fair Employment Practice Act (FEPA). 437
FEPA's initial provisions closely paralleled those adopted in Title VII.
Following a government re-organization in 1980, the Act has been
known as the California Fair Employment and Housing Act
(FEHA) .438 Although FEHA's underlying prohibitions are not identi-
cal to those of Title VII,439 both laws prohibit employment discrimina-
Wright submitted an affidavit to the Senate Judiciary Committee stating that Thomas
harassed her from March of 1984 through April of 1985. SeeJANF MAYER &JILL ABRAMSON,
STRANGE JUSTICE, THE SELLING OF CLARENCE THOMAS 131-35 (1994). Former EEOC em-
ployee Sukari Hardnett informed the Senate Committee that there was a "sexual dimen-
sion" to the attention Thomas paid her and other female employees during the period
September 1985 through early 1986. Id. at 136-39. This was the period in which the Solici-
tor General and the EEOC were preparing the government's brief in support of the em-
ployer in the Vinson case.
436 See supra note 260.
437 CAL. LAB. CODE §§ 1410-1433 (West 1989), repealed by 1980 Cal. Stat. 992 § 11, re-
enacted as CAL. GOV'T CODE §§ 12900-12996 (West 1992 & Supp. 1995).
438 CAL. GOV'T CODE § 12900 (West 1992 & Supp. 1995).
439 The Act prohibits employment discrimination by employers of 5 or more persons,
and harassment by employers of one or more persons, on the basis of race, religious creed,
color, national origin, ancestry, physical handicap, medical condition, marital status, sex,
age (over 40), or pregnancy. CAL. GOV'T CODE §§ 12926(c), 12940(h) (West 1992 & Supp.
1995).
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tion, including harassment, on the basis of sex, race, religion, and
national origin.
The development of an independent FEHA prohibition of sexual
harassment began with the adoption of administrative regulations by
California's equivalent of the EEOC, the Fair Employment & Housing
Commission (FEHC), in 1980.440 The Regulations prohibit all harass-
ment enumerated in FEHA, treating such conduct as a deprivation of
equal terms, conditions, and privileges of employment.44 1 Like the
1980 EEOC Guidelines, the Regulations divide harassment into envi-
ronmental harassment and conditional harassment. Environmental
harassment is defined to include: verbal epithets, derogatory com-
ments, or slurs;4 2 physical assaults, impeding or blocking movement,
or physical interference with work;4 3 and visual forms of harassment,
such as derogatory posters, cartoons, or drawings.444 Conditional har-
assment is specifically limited to situations in which unwanted sexual
advances condition an employment benefit on performance of "sex-
ual favors". 445
The Regulations hold the employer liable for both conditional
and environmental harassment committed by the employer's agents
and supervisors. 446 In the case of harassment by co-employees, the
Regulations impose liability if the employer knows of the harassment
and falls to take immediate and appropriate corrective action, or if
the employer has constructive knowledge of the harassment. Con-
structive knowledge is inferred if the employer has not taken affirma-
tive steps to prevent harassment from occurring.44 7 In these respects,
the Regulations adopt the language of the 1980 EEOC Guidelines.
In 1982, the California Legislature amended FEHA4 8 to explic-
itly prohibit harassment on any basis covered by the Act, lifting parts
440 CAl. CoDE REs. tit. 2, § 7287 et seq. (1982).
441 Id. § 7287.6.
442 Id. § 7287.6(b)(1)(A).
443 Id. § 7287.6(b)(1)(B).
444 Id. § 7287.6(b)(1)(C).
445 Id. § 7287.6(b) (1)(D); see also § 7291.1(f) (1) (sexual harassment unlawful).
446 Id. § 7287.6(b) (2).
447 Harassment ... is unlawful if the employer or other covered entity, its
agents or supervisors knows of such conduct and fails to take immediate
and appropriate corrective action. Proof of such knowledge may be direct
or circumstantial. If the employer or other covered entity, its agents or
supervisors did not know but should have known of the harassment, knowl-
edge shall be imputed unless the employer or other covered entity can es-
tablish that it took reasonable steps to prevent harassment from occurring.
Such steps may include affirmatively raising the subject of harassment, ex-
pressing strong disapproval, developing appropriate sanctions, informing
employees of their right to raise and how to raise the issue of harassment
under California law, and developing methods to sensitize all concerned.
Id. § 7287.6(b) (3).
448 The author assisted in the drafting of the amendment to the statute.
[Vol. 81:66
TITLE VI LIABILITY
of its prohibition directly from the Regulations. The statute, as
amended, provides that it is unlawful for employers, their agents, or
other entities covered by the Act to engage in harassment of an em-
ployee or applicant:
Harassment of an employee or applicant by an employee other than
an agent or supervisor shall be unlawful if the entity, or its agents or
supervisors, knows or should have known of this conduct and fails to
take immediate and appropriate corrective action. An entity shall
take all reasonable steps to prevent harassment from occurring.
Loss of tangible job benefits shall not be necessary in order to estab-
lish harassment. 449
Like the EEOC Guidelines, the amended FEHA requires employers to
take precautionary measures to avoid liability in cases of harassment
by nonsupervisors, but imposes vicarious liability when supervisors en-
gage in harassment, regardless of the employer's diligence.
In the first reported sexual harassment decision under FEHA,
Fisher v. San Pedro Peninsula Hospital,450 the California Court of Ap-
peals held that the elements of an environmental sexual harassment
case are those set forth in Henson v. City of Dundee,45' including the
requirement of respondeat superior. Unlike the federal court in Henson,
however, the California court correctly applied the law of respondeat
superior, holding that "an employer is 'strictly liable for the harassing
conduct of its agents and supervisors"' 452 and harassment by non-
supervisor co-employees only "where it, its agents or supervisors
'knows or should have known of this conduct and fails to take immedi-
ate and appropriate corrective action.' "45 The California court prop-
erly held that when the employee establishes that a supervisor sexually
harassed her, the employer is vicariously liable despite its proper post-
harassment conduct.
Fisher was applied in Kelly-Zurian v. Wohl Shoe Company, Inc.454 to
affirm the grant of a plaintiff's motion for JNOV where a jury found
the supervisor, but not the employer, liable for sexual harassment
under FEHA. The trial court reasoned that if the supervisor was liable
for sexual harassment, the employer must also have been liable be-
cause the statute holds the employer vicariously liable for any sexual
449 CAL. GoV'T CODE § 12940(h) (West 1992 & Supp. 1995) (originally enacted as 1982
Cal Stat. 1184, § 1, and renumbered in 1987 Cal. Star. 605, § l(i)-(h)).
450 262 Cal. Rptr. 842 (Cal. Ct. App. 1989).
451 682 F.2d at 903-05; see discussion supra part IIA.3.
452 Fisher, 262 Cal. Rptr. at 851 n.6 (quoting DFEH v. Bee Hive Answering Service,
FEHC No. 84-16, at 23 (1984)). The author, as director of the Boalt Hall Employment
Discrimination Clinic, represented the DFEH in the Bee Hive case.
453 Id. (quoting DFEH v. Madera County, FEHC No. 88-11, at 22 (1988)). The author,
as director of the Boalt Hall Employment Discrimination Clinic, represented the DFEH in
the Madera County case.
454 27 Cal. Rptr. 2d 457 (Cal. CL App. 1994).
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harassment committed by the supervisor. 455 The state court of ap-
peals agreed, explaining that "harassment by a supervisor is unlawful
regardless of whether the employer knows or should have known and
fails to intervene."456
As these decisions illustrate, courts can easily apply the law of
agency to the question of employer liability for sexual harassment by
supervisors. With proper guidance from the Supreme Court or Con-
gress, there is a simple solution to this exasperating problem.
CONCLUSION
To appreciate the significance of the vicarious liability problem to
the resolution of sexual harassment cases, it is instructive to return
once more to an illustrative hypothetical. A supervisor, on several oc-
casions, describes his sexual exploits and fantasies to a subordinate
employee and then asks her to do the same. She declines, asks him to
stop, and then attempts to excuse herself from his presence, but his
conduct continues. She tries to avoid contact with him and makes
excuses to avoid being alone with him, but she does not complain to
another supervisor or official. No specific adverse employment action
has occurred; she has not been terminated, suspended, transferred, or
otherwise disciplined. Nevertheless, her supervisor's conduct has al-
tered the conditions under which she works, and she finds herjob less
satisfying and more stressful.
Under the common law of agency, the 1980 EEOC Guidelines, or
California's FEHA, the employer would be vicariously liable for the
employee's damages. Under Title VII as interpreted today, it probably
would not. The employer could successfully argue in the Second Cir-
cuit, and perhaps in the Ninth Circuit, that if the supervisor is not an
officer of the corporation, or an elected official of the government
entity, the supervisor is not an agent as defined for purposes of Title
VII sexual harassment.457 The employer could argue in the First,458
455 Id. at 465-66.
456 Id. at 466.
457 See Kotcher v. Rosa & Sullivan Appliance Ctr., Inc., 957 F.2d 59, 64 (2d Cir. 1992)
(discussed supra Introduction). But see Karibian v. Columbia Univ., 14 F.3d 773, 780 (2d
Cir. 1994) (discussed supra note 354).
458 See Klessens v. United States Postal Serv., 66 Fair Empl. Prac. Gas. (BNA) 1630, 1634
(1st Cir. 1994) (discussed supra Introduction).
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Third,459 Fourth,46 0 Sixth, 461 Eighth,4 62 Ninth,4 63 Tenth,464 and Elev-
enth465 Circuits that even if the supervisor is an agent, the employee's
failure to complain to the employer as an entity, instead of simply
complaining to the harasser, immunizes the employer from liability.
Even if she had complained, she could not recover for the damages
she had already suffered if the employer had then acted to prevent
further harassment.
Nothing in the language or purposes of Title VII supports such a
result; nothing in the Vinson decision compels it. It violates the obliga-
tions traditionally imposed on employers under the law of agency and
unduly complicates the litigation of Title VII actions. It singles out
the victims of sexual harassment as less deserving of Title VII protec-
tion than victims of other types of discrimination or harassment and
invites the diminution of other long-standing employment rights.
The Supreme Court should take the first available opportunity to limit
its dicta in Vinson and reinstate the 1980 EEOC Guidelines as a proper
construction of the law of agency. If the Court fails to act, Congress
should seek to amend Title VII in order to remain loyal to the law of
agency and the purposes of the 1964 Civil Rights Act.
459 See Andrews v. City of Philadelphia, 895 F.2d 1469, 1486 (3d Cir. 1990) (discussed
supra part IVAl).
460 See Paroline v. Unisys Corp., 879 F.2d at 106 (discussed supra part IVA.2); Katz v.
Dole, 709 F.2d 251, 255 (4th Cir. 1983) (discussed supra part IIIA3).
461 See Kauffman v. Allied Signal, 970 F.2d 178, 185 (6th Cir.) (discussed supra part
IVA1), cert. deniea 113 S. Ct. 831 (1992).,
462 See Davis v. Tri-State Mack Distribs., Inc., 981 F.2d 340, 343 (8th Cir. 1992).
463 See Nichols v. Frank, 42 F.3d 503 (9th Cir. 1994) (discussion supra part IVA1).
464 See Hicks v. Gates Rubber Co., 833 F.2d 1406, 1411 (10th Cir. 1987) (discussed
supra part IVA2).
465 See Steele v. Offshore Shipbldg., Inc., 867 F.2d 1311, 1313 (11th Cir. 1989) (dis-
cussed supra part IVA1); Sparks v. Pilot Fright Carriers, Inc., 830 F.2d 1554, 1558-59 (11th
Cir. 1987) (discussed supra part IVA2), Henson v. City of Dundee, 682 F.2d at 904 (dis-
cussed supra part IVA.1).
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